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Introduction 
 
This thesis is a collection of four essays in empirical economics.  
The first chapter is titled "When the Cat Is Near, the Mice Won’t Play: The Effect of External 
Examiners in Italian Schools". This paper is co-authored with Giorgio Brunello and Lorenzo Rocco. 
In this study, we use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner has 
both a direct and an indirect negative effect on the performance of monitored classes in 
standardized educational tests. The direct effect is the difference in the test performance between 
classes of the same school with and without external examiners. The indirect effect is the difference 
in performance between un-monitored classes in schools with an external examiner and un-
monitored classes in schools without external monitoring. We find that the overall effect of having 
an external examiner in the class is to reduce the proportion of correct answers by 5.5 to 8.5% - 
depending on the grade and the test - with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. 
The direct and indirect effects range between 4.3 and 6.6% and between 1.2 and 1.9% respectively. 
Using additional supporting evidence, we argue that the negative impact of the presence of an 
external examiner on measured test scores is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) 
rather than to the negative effects of anxiety or distraction from having a stranger in the class. 
The second chapter is titled "Selection and the Age - Productivity Profile. Evidence from Chess 
Players", and is also co-authored with Giorgio Brunello and Lorenzo Rocco.We use data on 
professional chess tournaments to study how endogenous selection affects the relationship between 
age and mental productivity in a brain-intensive profession. We show that less talented players are 
more likely to drop out, and that the age-productivity gradient is heterogeneous by ability, making 
fixed effects estimators inconsistent. We correct for selection using an imputation procedure that 
repopulates the sample by applying to older cohorts the self-selection patterns observed in younger 
cohorts. We estimate the age-productivity profile on the repopulated sample using median 
regressions, and find that median productivity increases by close to 5 percent from initial age (15) to 
peak age (21), and declines substantially after the peak. At age 50, it is about 10 percent lower than at 
age 15. We compare profiles in the unadjusted and in the repopulated sample and show that failure 
to adequately address endogenous selection in the former leads to substantially over-estimating 
productivity at any age relative to initial age.  
The third chapter is titled "Laterborns Don’t Give Up. The Effects of Birth Order on Earnings in 
Europe", and is joint work with Giorgio Brunello. While it is well known that birth order affects 
educational attainment, less is known about its effects on earnings. Using data from eleven 
European countries for males born between 1935 and 1956, we show that firstborns enjoy on 
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average a 13.7 percent premium over laterborns in their wage at labour market entry. However, this 
advantage is short lived, and disappears by age 30, between 10 and 15 years after labour market 
entry. While firstborns start with a better match, partly because of their higher education, laterborns 
quickly catch up by switching earlier and more frequently to better paying jobs. We argue that a key 
factor driving our findings is that laterborns are more likely to engage in risky behaviours. 
The fourth chapter is single-authored, and is titled " Hungry Today, Happy Tomorrow? Childhood 
Conditions and Self-Reported Wellbeing Later in Life". In this work, I use anchoring vignettes to 
show that, on data for eleven European countries, exposure to episodes of hunger in childhood 
leads people to adopt lower subjective reference points to evaluate satisfaction with life in 
adulthood. This is consistent with the satisfaction treadmill theory of hedonic adaptation, and 
highlights that failure to consider reporting heterogeneity will result in downward-biased estimates 
of the negative effects of starvation in childhood on the levels of wellbeing later in life. These 
findings underline the importance of considering issues of interpersonal comparability when 
studying the determinants of subjective wellbeing. 
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Introduzione 
 
Questa tesi è una raccolta di quattro saggi in economia empirica. 
Il primo capitolo è intitolato "When the Cat Is Near, the Mice Won’t Play: The Effect of External Examiners 
in Italian Schools". L'articolo è co-autorato con Giorgio Brunello e Lorenzo Rocco. In questo studio 
utilizziamo un esperimento naturale per mostrare che la presenza di un osservatore esterno ha effetti 
negativi diretti ed indiretti sui risultati delle classi coinvolte in test didattici standardizzati. L'effetto 
diretto è dato dalla differenza nei risultati tra le classi della stessa scuola con e senza esaminatori 
esterni. L'effetto indiretto è invece calcolato come la differenza di risultati tra le classi non 
monitorate in scuole con un esaminatore esterno e le classi non monitorate in scuole senza controllo 
esterno. Dalle nostre stime emerge che la presenza di un osservatore esterno in una classe riduce la 
percentuale di risposte corrette in un range che va dal 5,5 all' 8,5% - a seconda del grado e della 
materia considerata - rispetto alle classi nelle scuole senza osservatori esterni. Gli effetti diretti e 
indiretti variano rispettivamente tra il 4,3 e il 6,6% e tra l'1,2 e l'1,9%. Utilizzando ulteriore evidenza 
empirica, concludiamo che l'impatto negativo della presenza di un esaminatore esterno sui punteggi 
ai test standardizzati è dovuto alla riduzione di comportamenti scorretti (il cosiddetto cheating - da 
parte di studenti e/o docenti), piuttosto che agli effetti negativi su ansia o distrazione dovuti alla 
presenza di un estraneo in classe. 
Il secondo capitolo è intitolato "Selection and the Age - Productivity Profile. Evidence from Chess Players". 
Anche questo lavoro è co-autorato con Giorgio Brunello e Lorenzo Rocco. In questo studio, 
utilizziamo dati sui tornei di scacchi professionistici per studiare come la selezione endogena 
influenza la relazione tra età e produttività in una professione ad alta intensità cognitiva. 
Innanzitutto, mostriamo che gli scacchisti meno dotati sono più propensi ad abbandonare lo 
scacchismo agonistico nelle prime fasi della loro carriera, e che il gradiente età/produttività è 
eterogeneo in base all'abilità innata dei giocatori, rendendo gli stimatori ad effetti fissi non 
consistenti. Dunque, correggiamo per la selezione endogena utilizzando una procedura di 
imputazione che ripopola il campione applicando alle coorti più anziane i pattern di auto-selezione 
osservati nelle coorti più giovani, e stimiamo quindi il profilo età/produttività sul campione 
ripopolato attraverso regressioni sulla mediana. I nostri risultati evidenziano un aumento della 
produttività mediana di quasi il 5% dall'età iniziale (15 anni) al picco di età (21 anni), ed un declino 
sostanziale dopo il picco. A 50 anni, la produttività mediana è circa il 10% inferiore rispetto alla 
produttività dei quindicenni. Confrontando i profili stimati nel campione ripopolato e nel campione 
selezionato, concludiamo che non considerare la selezione endogena porta a sovrastimare 
sostanzialmente la produttività a qualsiasi età in relazione all'età iniziale. 
x 
 
Il terzo capitolo si intitola "Laterborns Don’t Give Up. The Effects of Birth Order on Earnings in Europe", ed 
è co-autorato con Giorgio Brunello. Mentre è ben noto che l'ordine di nascita influenza il livello di 
istruzione, vi sono risultati meno chiari circa gli effetti dell'ordine di nascita sui redditi. Utilizzando 
dati per i maschi nati tra il 1935 e il 1956 in undici paesi europei, mostriamo che, rispetto ai loro 
fratelli, i primogeniti godono in media di un premio salariale del 13,7% all'ingresso nel mercato del 
lavoro. Tuttavia, questo vantaggio è di breve durata, e non è più presente già all'età di 30 anni, tra 10 
e 15 anni dopo l'entrata nel mercato del lavoro. Mentre i primogeniti trovano inizialmente un lavoro 
di qualità migliore, in parte grazie alla loro maggiore istruzione, i secondogeniti colmano 
rapidamente queste differenze muovendosi prima e più frequentemente dei loro fratelli verso lavori 
meglio pagati. Nell'analisi, mostriamo che un fattore chiave per spiegare i nostri risultati riguarda la 
maggiore propensione dei secondogeniti ad assumere comportamenti rischiosi. 
Il quarto capitolo è a firma singola, e si intitola "Hungry Today, Happy Tomorrow? Childhood Conditions 
and Self-Reported Wellbeing Later in Life". In questo lavoro vengono utilizzate le anchoring vignette per 
mostrare che, su dati relativi ad undici paesi europei, i soggetti esposti ad episodi di deprivazione 
nutrizionale nell'infanzia adottano standard di riferimento più bassi per valutare la propria qualità di 
vita nell' età adulta. Questo è coerente con la teoria del satisfaction treadmill, ed implica che la mancata 
considerazione di una possibile eterogeneità individuale negli stili di risposta porta a sottostimare gli 
effetti negativi dell'esperienza di deprivazione nutrizionale nell'infanzia sui livelli di benessere 
soggettivo nell'età adulta. Questi risultati sottolineano l'importanza di considerare problemi di 
comparabilità interpersonale nello studio delle determinanti del benessere soggettivo. 
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Chapter 1 
 
When the Cat Is Near, the Mice Won’t Play:  
The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools* 
 
by 
 
Marco Bertoni 
(University of Padova and CEP, LSE) 
 
Giorgio Brunello 
(University of Padova, IZA and CEsifo) 
 
Lorenzo Rocco 
(University of Padova) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner has both a direct and 
an indirect negative effect on the performance of monitored classes in standardized educational 
tests. The direct effect is the difference in the test performance between classes of the same school 
with and without external examiners. The indirect effect is the difference in performance between 
un-monitored classes in schools with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools 
without external monitoring. We find that the overall effect of having an external examiner in the 
class is to reduce the proportion of correct answers by 5.5 to 8.5% - depending on the grade and the 
test - with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. The direct and indirect effects 
range between 4.3 and 6.6% and between 1.2 and 1.9% respectively. Using additional supporting 
evidence, we argue that the negative impact of the presence of an external examiner on measured 
test scores is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to the negative 
effects of anxiety or distraction from having a stranger in the class. 
 
Keywords: education, testing, external monitoring, indirect treatment effects. 
JEL codes: C31, H52, I2. 
                                                        
* The authors are grateful to Erich Battistin, Thomas Breda, Daniele Checchi, David Figlio, Ifty Hussain, Edwin Leuven, 
Marco Manacorda, Guy Michaels, Hessel Oosterbeek, Steve Pischke, Olmo Silva and to the audiences at the 2012 LSE-
CEP Annual Conference, the 2012 HECER Economics of Education Summer Meeting in Helsinki, the APPAM-
INVALSI conference “Improving Education through Accountability and Evaluation” in Rome, and at seminars in 
Padova and CIDE (Bertinoro) for comments and suggestions. We also thank Patrizia Falzetti, Roberto Ricci and Paolo 
Sestito (INVALSI) for helping us with data collection and for explaining several technical features of the administration 
of the SNV tests. Financial support by the Ministry of Italian Universities (PRIN contract n. 2009MAATFS_002) is 
gratefully acknowledged. All errors are our own. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A problem with test – based accountability systems in education is that they generate incentives for 
teachers, students and school administrators to “game” the system in order to obtain better results. 
The manipulation of test outcomes generates efficiency losses both when these outcomes are used 
to allocate resources to schools and teachers and when – more modestly – they provide valuable 
benchmarking information which can affect the choices of schools and their stakeholders.  
One mechanism for inflating test scores is outright cheating. Empirical analysis of cheating 
behaviour is scarce1. In their influential study, Jacob and Levitt (2003) develop an algorithm for 
detecting teachers’ cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and 
suspicious patterns of answers for students in a class. They find that a small fraction of Chicago 
teachers responded to accountability pressures by completing student examinations in an attempt to 
improve outcomes.  
A possible deterrent of forms of cheating that may occur during the test – e.g. students copying 
from one another or teachers communicating the correct answers – or during the scoring – e.g. 
teachers changing students’ answers or filling in missing answers – is monitoring by external 
examiners. External monitoring has costs and benefits. Costs increase with the desired level of 
coverage. Benefits depend both on the efficiency gain associated to a reduction in cheating and on 
how effective monitoring is in influencing test scores and reducing cheating.  
In this paper, we estimate the impact of external monitoring on test scores, using a rather unique 
natural experiment designed by the Italian central test administrator (INVALSI), which assigned 
external examiners to randomly selected classes and schools with the task of monitoring students 
taking the test and reporting results2. We compare test outcomes in the classes with an external 
examiner with the outcomes in other classes, where the test was administered by a local teacher, and 
find that the rate of correct answers is lower in the former than in the latter. Using additional 
supporting evidence, we argue that the negative impact of the presence of an external examiner on 
measured test scores is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to the 
negative effects of anxiety or distraction from having a stranger in the class. 
Our study contributes to the literature on school accountability in two main directions. First, we 
show that the introduction of external examiners has a significant effect on measured test scores in 
an environment where there are incentives to manipulate results. Second, we document that the 
monitoring effects of having an external examiner spill over to un-monitored classes of the same 
school. We decompose the overall effect of external monitoring - which we measure as the 
                                                        
1 See Figlio and Loeb, 2011, for a review of the recent literature. 
2 These tests are taken by the universe of primary second and fifth grade students. INVALSI sampled a number of 
classes and schools for external monitoring to obtain reliable data, speed up data collection and verification and prepare 
an annual report on the state of primary education in Italy.  
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difference in the average rate of correct answers in monitored classes and in classes of un-monitored 
schools - into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect is the difference in the test 
performance between classes with and without external examiners belonging to schools selected for 
external monitoring. The indirect effect is instead the difference in performance between un-
monitored classes in a school with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools 
without external examiners.  
We estimate that having an external examiner reduces the percentage of correct answers by 3.6 to 
5.4 percentage points - depending on the grade and the test - which corresponds to 5.5 to 8.5% of 
the average score in classes belonging to schools with no external examiner. The estimated direct 
effect ranges from 2.8 to 4.2 percentage points (4.3 to 6.6%), and the residual indirect effect from 
0.8 to 1.2 percentage points (1.2 to 1.9%). We discuss two alternative reasons why the effects of 
monitoring spread from the monitored class to the other classes in the same school. The first is that 
the presence of an external examiner in the school acts as a disciplinary device also on students and 
teachers in other classes of the same school because of the fear that the examiner may roam about. 
The second is that teachers dislike excessive dispersion in average class scores within the same 
school, because of the conflicts it could generate.    
We find that the estimated overall effect of external supervision is significantly higher in the schools 
located in Southern Italy than in Northern schools and in schools where class size is smaller and the 
proportion of tenured teachers is higher. We show that territorial differences are associated to 
differences in social capital, even after controlling for territorial differences in GDP per capita and 
unemployment rates. 
Studying the Italian experience with external monitoring has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The key advantage is that the random allocation of examiners to schools and classes allows us to 
bypass the selection problems that typically plague the evaluation of monitoring effects. A potential 
disadvantage is that in the Italian context there is limited accountability of schools and teachers. In 
this environment, the incentives to cheat may be weaker than in high-stakes contexts. In this case, 
our estimates can be interpreted as lower bounds of the effect of external monitoring in contexts 
where the incentives to manipulate results are stronger.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and Section 3 describes 
the design of the INVALSI test and the dataset. The empirical strategy is presented in Section 4. 
The main empirical results, a few robustness checks and extensions are reported in Section 5, 6 and 
7, respectively. Conclusions follow. 
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2. Review of the literature  
 
Aside from outright cheating studied by Jacob and Levitt (2003), the literature has identified several 
indirect ways that teachers and school administrators can use to manipulate student results. On the 
one hand, Jacob (2005), Figlio (2006), Figlio and Getzler (2006), Cullen and Reback (2006) and 
Hussain (2012) investigate whether schools engage in strategic manipulation of the composition of 
the pool of tested students by excluding low ability students, either by reclassifying them as disabled 
or by strategically using grade retention and disciplinary suspensions. On the other hand, Figlio and 
Winicki (2005) show that during testing periods some schools increase the caloric intake provided by 
school cafeterias so as to boost students’ performance. Attempts to increase test scores by taking 
psycho-stimulant drugs are documented for the US by Bokhari and Schneider (2011), who show that 
the diagnosis of “attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder” is more frequent in states where there are 
stronger accountability laws.  
To our knowledge, we are the first in this literature to investigate both the direct and the indirect 
effects of external examiners as deterrents of cheating in standardized tests. That indirect treatment 
effects can occur has been already pointed out by a broader literature. Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 
(1999), for instance, discuss how policy effects may spread to those not directly participating in the 
programme mainly because of general equilibrium or spill-over effects. Miguel and Kremer (2004) 
evaluate both direct and external effects of a Kenyan programme aimed at treating intestinal worms 
infection among primary school kids. In a similar fashion, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) evaluate 
the effects of Progresa, a Mexican aid programme based on cash transfers, and stress the importance 
of estimating indirect treatment effects on the ineligibles when there are social interactions between 
eligible and ineligible individuals.  
 
3. The Design of INVALSI Servizio Nazionale di Valutazione (SNV) Tests and the Data 
 
INVALSI3 standardized tests in Italian and Math were introduced in Italian primary schools in 20084 
to evaluate school productivity. The purposes of the evaluation5 are to inform the central 
government about the general performance of the school system, and to offer schools a 
standardised reference to self-assess their strengths and weaknesses, using a value added approach. 
These tests are not formally high-stakes, because the allocation of resources to schools, the salary of 
                                                        
3 INVALSI is the National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System, in charge of the design and 
administration of standardized education tests in Italy. 
4 See Law n.147 – 2007, and Ministry of Education and Research Decree n.74 and 76 – 2009. 
5 See article 2 of the INVALSI statute (Ministry of Education and Research Decree n. 11-2011) and the Ministry of 
Education and Research Directive n. 88-2011. 
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teachers and the school career of students do not explicitly depend on test outcomes. Even so, 
pressure to perform well in the tests has been high because of the widespread expectations that they 
might be used at some point to evaluate teachers and schools. These expectations were fostered by 
the Ministry of Education, who in an intervention at the Lower House of the Italian Parliament 
(June 10th 2008) when the tests were introduced, made explicit reference to the need to establish 
within a few years a system of evaluation and incentives for teachers and schools based on student 
performance in the tests. Schools have an incentive to perform well also because results affect their 
reputation. Although the outcomes of the tests are not made public by INVALSI, schools have 
access to the results of their own students and can disclose them to parents and other stakeholders, 
in an effort to build their reputation and attract good students6.  
Since 2008 the tests have been administered every year. In this paper, we focus on the 2010 wave 
because of its peculiar design features. First, this wave was the first to test and collect data for the 
entire population of Italian primary school students in their second and fifth grade. Second, and 
most important for our purposes, in 2,000 randomly selected classes - out of a population of about 
30,000 - the test was administered in the presence of an external examiner7, who had two main tasks: 
a) be present in the class during the test and monitor its correct implementation; b) report student 
answers on the dedicated answer sheets and transmit them to INVALSI. In the other classes, the 
test was administered by teachers of the school (but not of the class and not in the subject tested), 
and reporting was done jointly with the teacher of the class. We use the random selection of classes 
as a natural experiment to estimate the effects of external monitoring on test outcomes. 
Classes assigned to external monitoring were sampled using the same two-stage sampling scheme 
adopted by the IEA TIMSS survey, with stratification by region8. In the first stage, a pre-determined 
number of schools in each region were randomly selected by probabilistic sampling, with probability 
of inclusion proportional to school size, measured by the total number of students enrolled in the 
tested grades (second and fifth). In the second stage, and depending on school size, one or two 
classes for each tested grade within each treated school were selected by simple random sampling9. 
In each selected class, the test was administered in the presence of an external examiner. Table 1 
shows for each grade the total and sampled number of primary schools, classes and pupils: about 
                                                        
6 “INVALSI does not provide public rankings of schools based on the outcomes of the test. The main purpose of the 
tests is to provide each single school and its stakeholders with valuable information that can help them to benchmark 
and improve their performance. Each school is free to advertise its own results, using the tools provided by the Ministry 
of Education…” (free translation by the authors of Ricci and Sestito, 2012). 
7 External examiners were selected by INVALSI and the Regional Schooling Authorities mainly among retired teachers 
and active teachers employed in non-primary schools. Each examiner was paid 200 euro per working day. Details on the 
criteria adopted to select external examiners are reported in the Appendix. 
 
8 Region Valle d’Aosta and the Province of Bolzano autonomously decided to have all classes assigned to external 
monitoring. For this reason, we exclude them from our analysis. Our management of the data from the original to the 
final dataset is described in the Appendix.  
9 The average number of classes per school in sampled schools is 5.3, with a standard deviation of 1.9. Further details on 
the sampling procedure are reported in the Appendix. 
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18% of all primary schools and close to 7% of all classes and pupils in the second and fifth grade 
were selected to have an external examiner during the test.  
We have access to the records containing the individual answers to the questions of the test taken in 
2010 by students in classes with and without external monitoring, as they were transmitted to 
INVALSI by teachers and external examiners10. For each student, we also have information - 
provided by school offices - on her marks in Italian and Math during the semester before the test 
and on parental background. We add to these data the results of a questionnaire administered by 
INVALSI exclusively to fifth graders in order to collect additional information both on parental 
background and on student feelings and motivation during the tests. Finally, we have obtained from 
INVALSI additional information on school and class characteristics, including the number of 
students enrolled in each class and in each school for each tested grade, the proportion of tenured 
teachers in each school and, only for fifth grade students, an index of individual economic, social 
and cultural status (ESCS) 11. 
We test for successful randomization by checking whether observables are balanced between 
sampled and non-sampled schools and classes. Reflecting the sampling strategy adopted by 
INVALSI, we verify balancing in two steps, first between sampled and non-sampled schools and 
second between sampled and non-sampled classes within the set of sampled schools. Since sampling 
is stratified by region and sampling probabilities depend on school size, our balancing tests are 
conditional on regional effects, school size and, in the second step, the number of classes in the 
school. Although we have data for second and fifth graders, we focus hereinafter on the latter for 
brevity. Selected results for second graders are shown in the Appendix. 
For each variable X in Table 2 we first test between – school balancing by running  
 
jrjrjj RSRDtX         (1) 
 
where the subscript r is for the region where the school is located, Xj is the average value of X in 
school j, tj is a dummy taking the value 1 if school j has been sampled and 0 otherwise, rRD is the 
full set of regional dummies, rjRS  is school size interacted with regional dummies and j  is the 
error term.   
                                                        
10 All questions were either multiple choice or open questions with a univocally correct answer, and were coded by 
INVALSI as correct, incorrect or missing. 
11 Available information includes the following variables: 1) at the school level: whether the school offers a full time 
schedule; 2) at the class level: class size measured both as the number of students enrolled in the class and as the number 
of students who were present at the test, full or part-time schedule (measured in term of the schedule of the median 
student in the class, to avoid measurement errors); 3) at the individual level: gender, place of birth, citizenship, 
attendance of pre-primary school, age, employment, education and nationality of parents. For fifth grade students only 
we have information on: whether the student at home has own bedroom, internet access, an encyclopaedia, own desk, a 
computer and a place for doing homework, the number of books in the house, the number of siblings, whether she lives 
with both parents or not, the language spoken at home, whether she gets help with her homework or not. 
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Next, we test within-schools balancing by running  
 
௜ܺ௝ ൌ ߛ ൅ ߜݐ௜௝ ൅ ܴ߫௥௝ ൅ ߭௜௝        (2) 
 
where Xij is the average value of X in the class i of school j, tij is a dummy that indicates whether 
class i in school j has been sampled and ܴ௥௝ ൌ ሾܴܦ௝, ܴܵ௥௝, ܴܥ௥௝ሿ is a vector which includes the 
controls used in equation (1) as well as rjRC , the number of fifth (or second) grade classes in school 
j interacted with regional dummies. We estimate equation (2) only for the classes belonging to the 
schools with external examiners and, since the second stage randomization took place within each 
school, we add school fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the school level. 
Table 3 reports the point estimates of the β and δ coefficients in (1) and (2) and their statistical 
significance. Since balancing is not attained for the number of students enrolled in a class, which is 
greater among treated classes, we include this variable as a covariate in all our regressions. Turning 
to individual variables, although for some covariates we detect statistically significant differences 
across the various groups, the point estimates show that these differences are very close to zero in 
almost all cases. Prudentially, we add these variables as covariates in our regressions to eliminate the 
risk of unbalancing and to increase precision12.  
 
4. Identification and Estimation 
 
We define the following three potential outcomes at the class level: Y00 if the class was assigned to a 
school with no external observer (an untreated class in an untreated school), Y11 in case of direct 
monitoring (a treated class in a treated school) and Y01 if the class was not monitored by an external 
examiner but belonged to a school where at least one other class was monitored (an untreated class 
in a treated school). By design, all classes of untreated schools are un-monitored.  
Let the dummy variable Sj take the value one if school j has been assigned to school-level treatment 
(and zero otherwise) and the dummy Ci take value one if class i has been assigned to class-level 
treatment (and zero otherwise). The observed outcome Yij for class i in school j can be represented 
in terms of potential outcomes as follows: 
 
Yij  (1 S j )Y00  S jCiY11  S j (1Ci)Y01      (3) 
 
                                                        
12 We notice that the proportion of missing data is slightly smaller in sampled schools and classes. This might be due to a 
more careful reporting of administrative information by secretaries in the schools and classes assigned to external 
monitoring. 
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We are interested in the identification and estimation of a) the average direct effect of monitoring 
E[Y11-Y01]; b) the average indirect effect of monitoring E[Y01-Y00]; c) the average overall effect of 
monitoring E[Y11-Y00], where E[.] is the mean operator.  
The sampling procedure described in Section 3 is characterized by conditional randomization, which 
implies that a) in each region, the assignment to school - level treatment is random, conditional on 
the size of the school, measured by the number of students enrolled in the second and fifth grade; b) 
the assignment to class - level treatment for a class of a given grade in a treated school is random 
conditional on the size of the school, measured both by the number of students enrolled in the 
second and fifth grade and by the number of classes in the selected grade. Conditional 
randomization in each grade implies that 
 
Y00, Y01, Y11  S j,  Ci | R       (4) 
 
When (4) holds, the average direct, indirect and overall effects of external monitoring are given by  
 
],1,0|[],1,1|[]|[ 0111 RSCYERSCYERYYE jiijjiij    (5) 
],0,0|[],1,0|[]|[ 0001 RSCYERSCYERYYE jiijjiij    (6) 
],0,0|[],1,1|[]|[ 0011 RSCYERSCYERYYE jiijjiij    (7) 
 
We aggregate our data at the class level and evaluate the effects of external monitoring on average 
class performance in the Math test by estimating  
 
ijijrjjjijij uRSSCY  43210      (8) 
 
where the dependent variable is the average percentage of correct answers in the class. We allow 
errors u to be correlated among the classes of the same school and weigh each class-level 
observation with the number of students in the class. The vector   includes for all grades the 
number of students enrolled in a class, which is greater among treated classes, and the following 
covariates: type of school (public or private), full or part-time schedule, average (in the class) gender, 
place of birth, citizenship, attendance of pre-primary school, age, grades in Italian and Math in the 
previous semester, employment, education and nationality of parents, and only for the fifth grade 
the percentage (in the class) of students who have their own bedroom, internet access, an 
encyclopaedia, own desk, a computer and a place for doing homework, the average number of 
books in the house, the average number of siblings, the percentage of students living with both 
parents, the language spoken at home, and whether they receive help with her homework. The 
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summary statistics of these covariates are in Panel A of Table 2. The direct, indirect and overall 
effect of external monitoring are given by 1 , 2 and 21   respectively. 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 4 shows our baseline estimates of Eq. (8). Standard errors in this and the next tables are 
clustered at the school level. The first column in the table considers all Italian regions, and the 
remaining columns show the estimates by macro area (North, Centre and South). We find that 
having an external examiner in the class reduces the percentage of correct answers by 3.59 
percentage points, which corresponds to a 5.5 percent decline with respect to the mean score in 
untreated schools13. Close to 80 percent (2.79/3.59) of this total effect is direct, and the remaining 
20 percent (0.81/3.59) is indirect. The size of the total, direct and indirect effects varies with the 
macro area and is highest in Southern regions, where the total effect is -8.9%, and lowest in 
Northern Italy, where it is -2.6%. 
Why are test results worse in classes with the external examiner? One possibility is that young 
students under-perform because they are distracted by the presence of a stranger in the class and are 
more anxious that students in un-monitored classes. The other possibility is that either students or 
teachers in classes without the external examiner engage in outright cheating14. We believe that the 
second one is the explanation, for the following reasons.  
First, there is no evidence that students in classes with the external examiner are negatively affected 
in their feelings and motivation to complete the test properly. In a questionnaire filled up by fifth 
graders participating to the test in classes with and without the external examiner, INVALSI asked a 
set of motivational questions aimed at capturing the psychological status of students during the test, 
which included agreement or disagreement with the following sentences: a) I was already anxious 
before starting the test; b) I was so nervous I couldn’t find the answers; c) while answering, I felt like 
I was doing badly; d) while answering, I was calm. Table 5 presents the results of estimating Eq. (8) 
when the dependent variable is the percentage of students in the class agreeing with each of the four 
statements above. We find no evidence that being in a class with an external examiner increased 
                                                        
13 As shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix, the total effect is somewhat larger for second graders (5.4 percentage points, 
or 8.5% of the average score in untreated schools). 
14 We assume that cheating is unlikely in classes with the external examiner. On the one hand, since schools are informed 
of having been selected to receive an external examiner only about one week prior to the date of the test, there is little 
room of manoeuvre for teachers to react and adopt strategies that manipulate student performances in the presence of the 
examiner. On the other hand, we assume that external examiners have no incentive to cheat and collude with school 
teachers and principals in order to boost school results. In support of this assumption, INVALSI (2010a) used a 
procedure to detect cheating in monitored classes and concluded that there was no evidence of cheating. The cheating 
detection algorithm is described in INVALSI (2010b). 
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anxiety or nervousness. Quite the opposite, there is evidence that students in these classes were less 
nervous and calmer during the test.  
Second, we examine the distribution of results within classes. In the absence of external controls, the 
teacher can communicate the correct answers to students or change their answers in the answer 
sheet, or students can simply copy from each other. If outright cheating by students and/or teachers 
was taking place in the classes without the external examiner, we should find that in these classes – 
ceteris paribus - the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of test results are lower than in 
classes with the external examiner, where cheating is minimized or altogether absent. While 
distraction and anxiety can reduce average performance, it is not obvious that they reduce its 
variability. Table 6 shows for the entire country the effects of the presence of an external examiner 
on the within – class standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the percentage of correct 
answers, as well as on the bottom quartile, median and top quartile of the distribution of test scores 
within classes.  
We find that in classes with the external examiner the standard deviation and the coefficient of 
variation of results are about 6% and 11% higher than in un-monitored classes. There is also 
evidence that the presence of the external examiner affects to a higher extent the performance of 
students in the lower quartile of the distribution of outcomes, in line with the expectation that 
cheating typically helps low performers, or that low performing students are those more prone to 
copy. When compared with students in untreated schools, having an external examiner reduces the 
score of these students by about 8% (-4.26/55.6). This effect is strongest for second grade students 
in Southern Italy, where if reaches a striking 18.7%15. 
Third, we compute an index of heterogeneity in the pattern of answers given by students in each 
class. For each question, we use a modified version of the Herfindahl Index 
 
H 
1 sa2
a1
A
1 1
A
.           (12) 
 
where sa is the within-class share of students who chose answer “a” in the set A of possible 
answers16. Index H ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values signalling a more heterogeneous 
pattern of answers to a given question. We obtain an overall measure of the heterogeneity of 
answers in the class by averaging H across all questions in the test. While we expect this measure to 
decline in classes without the external examiner in the presence of cheating, it is not clear whether it 
                                                        
15 Detailed results by macro area are available from the authors upon request. 
16 We treat missing values as a separate category.  
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declines or increases if anxiety or distraction play a role. Table 7 reports the estimates of Eq. (8) 
when the dependent variable is H, and shows that heterogeneity is significantly higher in classes with 
the external examiner. We also find that, as in the case of the percentage of correct answers in the 
class, the effects of external monitoring on the heterogeneity of answers increase significantly 
moving from Northern to Southern Italy (columns (2) to (4)). 
Finally, the correlation between test score outcomes and teacher grades in the semester before the 
tests should be lower in the presence of cheating. Using individual student data, we examine the 
correlation between the rank in the test and the rank in teacher grades in classes with and without 
the external examiners. In line with our expectations, we find a higher correlation for students taking 
the test in classes with the external examiner17.  
While these results are suggestive of the presence of cheating, we cannot say whether cheating 
occurs because teachers change answers in their report to INVALSI, or because they suggest the 
correct answers to students in the class, or because students are given extra time or are allowed to 
copy from each other in classes without the external examiner. Since all these cheating strategies 
generate a higher proportion of correct answers and a lower within - class dispersion of results, they 
are observationally equivalent in our data. To distinguish between some of these strategies, we 
would need to observe both the answers directly chosen by students and the answers reported by 
teachers to INVALSI. Unfortunately, we only observe the latter. We can only speculate that since in 
un-monitored classes teachers are responsible for supervision in class, collection of the tests, filling-
in of the answer sheets on the basis of the responses given by the students and transmission of the 
answer sheets to INVALSI, they have certainly plenty of opportunities to modify test results. 
An interesting and novel result of our analysis is that external examiners affect performance not only 
in the class they supervise but also in other classes of the same school. This indirect effect of 
monitoring in school tests has not been detected before and deserves further explanation. One 
interpretation is that teachers administering the test in the same school where the external examiner 
is present are afraid to be monitored by this supervisor and therefore restrain their cheating 
activities. This interpretation relies on irrational behaviour, because teachers were informed before 
the test that the external examiner’s mandate was restricted to the randomly selected class.  
An alternative explanation is that teachers dislike excessive dispersion in average test scores within 
the same school, because such dispersion could generate conflicts with other teachers. To illustrate, 
consider a school where a single class is supervised by an external examiner. If teachers 
administering the test in the other classes cheat freely, these classes will look much better than the 
supervised class, where cheating is restrained. This may generate conflicts with the teacher in charge 
                                                        
17 We regress the individual within-class rank in the test on the individual within-class rank in teacher grades and its 
interaction with the presence of an external examiner and find that the interaction attracts a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient, especially in the South, where cheating appears to be more widespread. Detailed results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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of the supervised class. To reduce these conflicts, teachers in un-monitored classes may be induced 
to restrain their cheating.  
 
6. Robustness checks  
 
In this section we investigate whether our main results are robust to several sensitivity checks. First, 
since the dependent variable of our main estimates is a fraction (the percentage of correct answers in 
the class) we implement the GLM estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to deal with 
fractional dependent variables. Estimated marginal effects, shown in Table A.4 in the Appendix, are 
in line with the baseline estimates in Table 4.  
Second, we exploit the census nature of our data and the fact that we observe almost the entire 
population of students in each grade to apply a finite population correction to statistical inference. 
Results (Table A.5 in the Appendix) are qualitatively unchanged with respect to the baseline, but 
precision increases significantly.  
Third, we drop all observable covariates not required for the implementation of conditional 
randomization18. Since assignment to treatment does not depend on observables, finding differences 
between the estimates that include and exclude covariates is a symptom of strategic manipulation of 
the composition of the pool of tested students. Results in Table A.6 in the Appendix do not provide 
any strong evidence in this direction. Finally, we test for differences in absenteeism across treatment 
statuses, using as dependent variable the percentage of students absent from the test in each class. 
Again, differences in behaviour across the three groups are minimal (see Table A.7 in the Appendix).  
 
7. Extensions 
 
So far, we have allowed treatment effects to vary across the different macro areas of the country. 
Yet there might be other relevant sources of heterogeneity to be considered. In this section we do 
two things. We start by exploring what these other sources could be – without pretending to be 
exhaustive - and then examine whether regional heterogeneity is related to regional differences in 
social capital.  
Our candidate sources of heterogeneous treatment effects are a) class size; b) the percentage of 
tenured teachers in the school; c) an indicator of average parental background for the students in the 
class19. On the one hand, if student cheating is easier in larger classes, we should find that the overall 
effect of having an external examiner increases with class size. On the other hand, larger classes 
                                                        
18 We still include regional dummies, regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade 
classes in the school, and the number of students enrolled in the class. 
19 Descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2 – Panel B. 
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could increase the cost of cheating by teachers or could reduce the effectiveness of external 
supervision. In this case, the overall effect should be smaller in larger classes. Column (1) in Table 8 
presents our estimates when both the direct and the indirect effect are interacted with class size20. 
The evidence suggests that the overall effect of external supervision is smaller in larger classes, in 
line with the second hypothesis.  
Column (2) in the table shows that both the direct and the overall effect of external monitoring are 
higher in schools where the percentage of tenured teachers is higher. Typically, these are senior 
teachers with very secure jobs, who are less willing to adjust their teaching style to the needs of 
standardized tests and may therefore be more likely to engage in cheating and sabotaging.  
Column (3) examines the interactions of the overall, direct and indirect effects with ESCS, the 
indicator of the average parental background in the class. If the incentives to engage in cheating 
were higher in classes with poor parental background, perhaps because teachers wish to altruistically 
compensate their students for their unfavourable initial conditions, we should find that the negative 
effect of external supervision is higher in these classes. Yet, there is no statistical evidence that this is 
the case21. 
Next, we ask whether the regional differences in the size of the effects of external monitoring are 
associated to the differences in the level of social capital22. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) 
define social capital as civic capital, or as “...those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a 
group overcome free rider outcomes...”(p.8). They report higher levels of social capital in Northern 
and Central Italy compared to the South.  
We interact both the direct and the indirect effect of external monitoring with two measures of 
social capital at the provincial level taken from Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), the number of 
blood donations per 10,000 inhabitants in 1995 and the average electoral participation in the 
referenda held in Italy between 1946 and 1987. Since social capital is strongly correlated with local 
economic conditions, as shown in Figures 1.a-1.d, we also interact both effects with provincial GDP 
per capita and unemployment rates in 2009.  
Results are shown in Table 923. Column (1) in the table reports the estimates of the baseline model 
in the sub-sample of provinces for which data on social capital are available. These estimates are in 
line with those presented in Table 4. Column (2) and (4) show the interactions of the direct, indirect 
                                                        
20 In this and in the following regressions the interacted variable is included also as an independent control. 
21 One possible explanation is that not only teachers, but also external examiners may be induced to engage in 
compensatory behaviour. 
22 In their seminal work, Putnam et al. (1993) links differences in the performance of local Italian governments to 
regional heterogeneity in social capital, measured in terms of local patterns of associationism, newspaper readership and 
political participation. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show that social capital is a key determinant of financial 
development, and Nannicini et al. (2012) study the impact of social capital on political accountability. Finally, Ichino and 
Maggi (2000) measure civicness in terms of shirking behaviour in the workplace and document large shirking 
differentials between Northern and Southern Italy.  
23 Descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2 – Panel B.  
14 
 
and overall effect of external monitoring with the two selected measures of social capital (blood 
donations and turnout at referenda, measured as deviations from sample means). We find that both 
the direct and the overall effect are smaller in schools located in provinces with a higher social 
capital. These qualitative results remain when we add to the regressions the interactions with 
provincial unemployment and GDP per capita (also measured as deviations from sample means, see 
columns (3) and (5)), although the effect of social capital is smaller.  
Starting with Putnam’s seminal contribution, several studies have suggested that Southern Italy has a 
lower endowment of “bridging” social capital, the form of social capital supportive of a more 
cohesive society and higher civicness24, and is richer at the same time of “bonding” social capital, the 
type of social capital which reinforces family and clan ties in competition with the market and 
overall society and which is at the roots of the so called amoral familism (in the words of Banfield, 
1958)25. We interpret the higher level of cheating observed in Southern Italy as the outcome of lower 
marginal costs of cheating due to lower “bridging” social capital, and/or of higher marginal benefits 
due to higher “bonding” social capital.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Test-based accountability systems in education may be gamed by students, teachers and school 
administrators in order to obtain higher measured levels of performance. This paper shows that 
having an external examiner who monitors test procedures has negative effects on the measured 
performance of tested classes and schools.These results are based on a natural experiment designed 
by the Italian national test administrator (INVALSI) to monitor test procedures in a random sample 
of Italian primary school classes. We have used random assignment to treatment to estimate both 
the direct and indirect effects of external monitoring. The former is based on the comparison of 
monitored and un-monitored classes within the same school and the latter on the comparison of un-
monitored classes in schools with and without the external examiner.  
The overall effect (direct plus indirect) of external monitoring is statistically significant and sizeable: 
depending on the grade, the presence of an external examiner reduces the percentage of correct 
answers in the class by 5.5 to 8.5 percent with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. 
External monitoring spills over to un-monitored classes of the same school, but the size of this 
beneficial effect is rather small (about 20 percent of the overall effect).  
Using additional supporting evidence on the psychological conditions of students before and during 
the test and on the distribution of answers within classes, we have concluded that the better 
performance of classes without the external examiner is due to the manipulation of test outcomes by 
                                                        
24 Blood donations and referenda turnout measure bridging social capital. 
25 See Alesina and Ichino, 2009, for recent evidence. 
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teachers and/or students, and that the performance gap between monitored and un-monitored 
classes can be interpreted as a measure of the average intensity of cheating taking place in the latter.  
While the direct negative effect of external supervision on test performance is not surprising, the 
presence of a small but statistical significant indirect negative effect is less expected. We have argued 
that this effect can be explained either by (irrational) fear of supervision or by a model where 
rational teachers administering the tests dislike excessive dispersion of test results within the school.  
We believe that our results are useful for an economic assessment of external monitoring, which 
requires the evaluation of costs and benefits. To measure benefits, we need to ascertain whether 
external monitoring reduces cheating and by how much. Needless to say, using external examiners is 
not the only deterrence tool. Alternatives include re-shuffling the questions assigned to each 
students and computer – based tests. Reshuffling questions deters students from copying but does 
not strongly prevent cheating by teachers. Computer-based testing virtually eliminates cheating by 
teachers but it is quite costly, as it requires that each student is endowed with a computer. At the 
cost of 200 euro per workday, external examiners are rather cost-effective at reducing the 
manipulation of tests in a random sample of Italian schools. Yet, extending their use to the universe 
of tested schools seems complicated, not only because of the monetary costs involved but also 
because of the difficulty of finding enough qualified examiners.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Total and Sampled Number of Schools, Classes and Students. INVALSI SNV Test 2010 
 
Number of 
schools 
(total) 
Number of 
classes (total) 
Number 
of 
students 
(total) 
Number of 
sampled 
schools 
Number of 
sampled 
classes 
Number of 
sampled 
students 
Second 
Grade 7,700 30,175 555,347 1,385 2,000 39,299 
Fifth 
Grade 7,700 30,476 565,064 1,385 2,000 39,643 
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Table 2. Mean and Standard Deviation of Covariates - Math Tests - V Graders  
 
Panel A 
 Mean St Dev   Mean St Dev 
Gender    Mother occupation   
Missing (%) 0.01 0.10  Missing (%) 0.20 0.40 
Male (%) 0.50 0.50  Unemployed or retired (%) 0.35 0.48 
Place of birth    Employee (%) 0.31 0.46 
Missing (%) 0.04 0.20  Entrepreneur (%) 0.08 0.28 
Italy (%) 0.89 0.31  Middle manager (%) 0.06 0.23 
Citizenship    Father occupation   
Missing (%) 0.02 0.15  Missing (%) 0.22 0.41 
Italian (%) 0.89 0.32  Unemployed or retired (%) 0.04 0.19 
First generation foreigner (%) 0.05 0.22  Employee (%) 0.39 0.49 
Second generation foreigner (%) 0.04 0.20  Entrepreneur (%) 0.25 0.43 
Pre-primary school    Middle manager (%) 0.11 0.31 
Missing (%) 0.15 0.35  Mother education   
Yes (%) 0.83 0.37  Missing (%) 0.21 0.41 
Age    Primary (%) 0.39 0.49 
Missing (%) 0.01 0.10  Secondary (%) 0.29 0.45 
Older than regular (%) 0.03 0.16  Tertiary (%) 0.11 0.32 
Regular (%) 0.87 0.33  Father education   
Younger than regular (%) 0.09 0.29  Missing (%) 0.22 0.42 
Math grade in previous semester 
(range:1-10) 
   Primary (%) 0.43 0.49 
Missing (%) 0.07 0.26  Secondary (%) 0.25 0.43 
1-4 (%) 0.00 0.04  Tertiary (%) 0.10 0.30 
5 (%) 0.04 0.20  Mother nationality   
6-7 (%) 0.38 0.48  Missing (%) 0.09 0.28 
8-10 (%) 0.51 0.50  Italian (%) 0.80 0.40 
Italian grade in previous semester 
(range:1-10) 
   Father nationality   
Missing (%) 0.07 0.25  Missing(%) 0.09 0.29 
1-4 (%) 0.00 0.04  Italian (%) 0.82 0.39 
5 (%) 0.04 0.19  Private school 0.05 0.23 
6-7 (%) 0.41 0.49  Full time schedule class 0.23 0.42 
8-10 (%) 0.48 0.50  Number of students enrolled in 
class 
19.00 4.65 
Has own bedroom    Number of siblings   
Missing (%) 0.03 0.17  Missing (%) 0.02 0.15 
Yes (%) 0.55 0.50  0 (%) 0.15 0.36 
Has internet access    1 (%) 0.55 0.50 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  2 (%) 0.20 0.40 
Yes (%) 0.76 0.43  3 (%) 0.05 0.21 
Has an encyclopedia    4 or more (%) 0.03 0.17 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Lives with   
Missing (%) 0.71 0.46  Missing (%) 0.02 0.15 
Has own desk    Both parents (%) 0.86 0.35 
Missing (%) 0.02 0.15  One parent only (%) 0.06 0.24 
Yes (%) 0.85 0.36  Both parents alternatively(%) 0.05 0.22 
Has a PC    Others (%) 0.01 0.08 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Language spoken at home   
Yes (%) 0.75 0.43  Missing (%) 0.04 0.21 
Has a place for homework    Italian (%) 0.73 0.44 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Dialect (%) 0.15 0.36 
Yes (%) 0.84 0.37  Other (%) 0.07 0.25 
Number of books at home    Help with homework   
Missing (%) 0.04 0.20  Missing (%) 0.07 0.26 
0-10 (%) 0.12 0.33  No homework (%) 0.01 0.07 
11-25 (%) 0.25 0.43  No help needed (%) 0.20 0.40 
26-100 (%) 0.31 0.46  Parents (%) 0.45 0.50 
101-200 (%) 0.15 0.36  Siblings (%) 0.12 0.32 
>200 (%) 0.12 0.33  Private teacher (%) 0.03 0.17 
    Other (%) 0.04 0.20 
    No one (%) 0.09 0.28 
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Panel B (continued) 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
  Blood donations 2.81 2.17
Tenured teachers in the 
school (%) 
90.33 9.13 Average turnout at 
referenda (%) 
80.28 8.37
Class average ESCS index -0.045 0.51 Provincial unemployment
rate (2009) 
7.95 3.69
Class size 16.93 4.64 Provincial per capita GDP 
(2009) 
23.84 5.60
 
Panel C 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Math Test – V grade  Anxiety Questions   
Score 0.65 0.19 I was already anxious 
before starting the test 
0.61 0.49 
Within-class standard 
deviation 
0.14 0.04 I was so nervous I 
couldn’t find the answers 
0.19 0.39 
Within-class coefficient of 
variation 
0.23 0.09 While answering , I felt 
like I was doing badly 
0.50 0.50 
Within-class bottom quartile 0.55 0.14 While answering,
I was calm 
0.53 0.50 
Within-class median 0.65 0.13   
Within-class top quartile 0.75 0.12 Absences from test (%) 0.11 0.10 
Within-class Herfindal Index 0.53 0.15   
  Maths Test – II grade   
Ranking based on Math 
scores 
9.82 5.84
Score 
0.62 0.20 
  Italian Test – V grade   
Ranking based on Math 
grades given by teachers in the 
previous semester 
10.44 6.96 Score 0.70 0.18 
Italian Test – II grade   
Score 0.65 0.23 
 
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of the covariates included in the regressions (Panel A), the variables used in 
Section 7 (Panel B) and the dependent variables (Panel C). All numbers refer to the entire country. These statistics are based on 
individual, school and class level data. Except for the number of students enrolled in each class, the variables in Panel A have been 
categorized as dummy variables. Class size in Panel B refers to the number of students attending the test. Blood donations are the 
number of blood bags per 10,000 inhabitants in the province. Per capita GDP is measured in thousand euro. See the Appendix for 
further details.  
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Table 3 - Balancing Tests. First (between schools) and Second Stage (within schools) 
Randomization. - Math tests - V Graders. 
 
Panel A 
 Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
Private school (%) 0.003 . Mother occupation  
Full time schedule (%) 0.015 0.011 Missing (%) -0.014 -0.024***
Number of students enrolled in 
class 
0.079 0.425*** Unemployed or retired 
(%) 
0.008 0.012***
Gender  Employee (%) 0.003 0.004
Missing (%) 0.007*** 0.020*** Entrepreneur (%) 0.001 0.006**
Male (%) -0.005** -0.004 Middle manager (%) 0.003 0.002
Place of birth  Father occupation  
Missing (%) -0.014*** -0.027*** Missing (%) -0.014 -0.023***
Italy (%) 0.014*** 0.027*** Unemployed or retired 
(%) 
0.001 0.001
Citizenship  Employee (%) 0.002 0.016***
Missing (%) -0.008*** -0.013*** Entrepreneur (%) 0.009* 0.005
Italian (%) 0.008** 0.010*** Middle manager (%) 0.002 0.002
First generation foreigner (%) -0.001 0.000 Mother education  
Second generation foreigner 
(%) 
0.001 0.002 Missing (%) -0.017 -0.028***
Pre-primary school  Primary (%) 0.008 0.019***
Missing (%) -0.027*** -0.009* Secondary (%) 0.005 0.009**
Yes (%) 0.027*** 0.010* Tertiary (%) 0.004 0.000
Age  Father education  
Missing (%) 0.007*** 0.018*** Missing (%) -0.018* -0.025***
Older than regular (%) 0.000 0.000 Primary (%) 0.013* 0.016***
Regular (%) -0.008*** -0.014*** Secondary (%) 0.001 0.008**
Younger than regular (%) 0.002 -0.004** Tertiary (%) 0.003 0.001
Math grade in semester before 
the test 
 Mother nationality  
Missing (%) -0.021*** -0.009* Missing (%) -0.018*** -0.014***
1-4 (%) 0.000 0.000* Italian (%) 0.015*** 0.012**
5 (%) 0.001 0.000 Father nationality  
6-7 (%) 0.010** 0.008* Missing (%) -0.017*** -0.013***
8-10 (%) 0.011* 0.001 Italian (%) 0.015*** 0.009*
Italian grade in semester before
the test 
  
Missing (%) -0.021*** -0.008  
1-4 (%) 0.000 0.000  
5 (%) 0.000 0.001  
6-7 (%) 0.006 0.003  
8-10 (%) 0.014*** 0.004  
 
  
22 
 
Panel B (continued) 
 Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
Has own bedroom  Number of siblings   
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.009*** Missing (%) -0.007*** -0.009***
Yes (%) 0.000 0.004 0 (%) -0.001 0.000
Has internet access  1 (%) 0.005* 0.008**
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.008*** 2 (%) 0.001 0.000
Yes (%) 0.007** 0.008** 3 (%) 0.001 0.000
Has an encyclopedia  4 or more (%) 0.001 0.001
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.008*** Lives with   
Yes (%) 0.005 0.016*** Missing (%) -0.008*** -0.010***
Has own desk  Both parents (%) 0.008*** 0.007**
Missing (%) -0.005** -0.008*** One parent only (%) -0.001 0.000
Yes (%) 0.005* 0.009*** Both parents alternatively 
(%) 
0.000 0.002
Has a PC  Others (%) 0.000 0.000
Missing (%) -0.005** -0.008*** Language spoken at home   
Yes (%) 0.007** 0.011*** Missing (%) -0.008*** -0.009***
Has a place for homework  Italian (%) 0.004 0.007*
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.008*** Dialect (%) 0.003 0.001
Yes (%) 0.006** 0.008** Other (%) 0.001 0.001
Number of books at home  Help with homework   
Missing (%) -0.007*** -0.008*** Missing -0.008*** -0.006**
0-10 (%) 0.000 0.001 No homework (%) -0.001** -0.001***
11-25 (%) -0.004 -0.001 No help needed (%) -0.001 0.005
26-100 (%) 0.001 0.006* Parents (%) 0.006* 0.001
101-200 (%) 0.004** 0.003 Siblings (%) 0.003** -0.002
>200 (%) 0.006*** -0.001 Private teacher (%) 0.000 0.002
  Other (%) 0.002 -0.001
  No one (%) -0.001 0.002
Notes: the table shows the point estimates of the balancing tests between and within schools. We compute school or class averages of individual 
variables and test for balancing using regressions (1) and (2). Full time schedule refers to schools offering this option in the between schools analysis 
and to the schedule of the single class in the within school analysis. While variables in Panel A are available for students in both grades, variables in 
Panel B are only available for fifth grade students. Standard errors for the second stage are adjusted for clustering at the school level. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 
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Table 4. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.79*** -0.99*** -2.27*** -4.92*** 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.48) (0.50) 
Indirect Effect -0.81*** -0.70*** -0.73 -1.04* 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.45) (0.61) 
Overall Effect -3.59*** -1.69*** -2.99*** -5.96*** 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.54) (0.60) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.14 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: all regressions include the number of students enrolled in the class, regional dummies and regional dummies 
interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the school. Additional covariates are shown in 
Table 2 - panel A. Estimates are weighted by class size. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school level in 
parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. 
 
 
Table 5. The Effects of External Monitoring on Student Psychological Conditions. Math Tests – V 
Grade. Dependent variable: Percentage of Positive Answers in the Class. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
I was already 
anxious before 
starting the test 
I was so 
nervous I 
couldn’t find 
the answers 
While 
answering , I 
felt like I was 
doing badly 
While 
answering, 
I was calm 
 
          
Direct Effect 0.25 -0.92*** -0.08 0.64 
 (0.42) (0.29) (0.39) (0.39) 
Indirect Effect 0.25 0.01 0.36 -0.01 
 (0.31) (0.21) (0.28) (0.29) 
Overall Effect 0.50 -0.90*** 0.28 0.63* 
 (0.41) (0.28) (0.38) (0.38) 
     
Observations 27,141 27,142 27,141 27,140 
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.1 0.07 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 61.0 19.2 50.7 53.1 
Notes: see Table 4. In each column, the dependent variable is the percentage of students in the class who agreed with 
the sentence reported at the top of the column. Students with missing answers have been dropped from the estimation 
sample (about 2 percent of the total). The estimates refer to the entire country. 
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Table 6. The Effects of External Monitoring on the Standard Deviation, the Coefficient of Variation 
and the Quartiles of the Distribution of Correct Answers within the Class. Math tests – V Grade. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Bottom 
quartile 
Median Top quartile
            
Direct Effect 0.76*** 2.14*** -3.70*** -3.07*** -2.26*** 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.31) (0.29) (0.27) 
Indirect Effect 0.03 0.30 -0.55* -0.56* -0.61** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26) 
Overall Effect 0.79*** 2.44*** -4.26*** -3.63*** -2.88*** 
 (0.09) (0.22) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) 
      
Observations 27,325 27,325 27,325 27,325 27,325 
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.1 0.09 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Mean - Untreated Schools 14.1 22.8 55.6 65.6 75.2 
Notes: see Table 4. The estimates refer to the entire country. 
 
 
Table 7. The Effects of External Monitoring on the Heterogeneity of Answers in each Class. Math 
Tests – V Grade. Dependent Variable: Average Herfindhal Index in Each Class x 100. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect 3.93*** 1.24*** 2.63*** 7.32*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.60) (0.64) 
Indirect Effect 0.82** 0.64** 0.51 1.22* 
 (0.34) (0.31) (0.58) (0.73) 
Overall Effect 4.75*** 1.88*** 3.14*** 8.54*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.62) (0.719) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.2 0.17 0.13 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 52.8 57.3 55.7 46.9 
Notes: see Table 4. 
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Table 8. Heterogeneous Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent 
variable: Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Interacted 
with Class Size
Interacted 
with % 
Tenured 
Teachers 
Interacted 
with ESCS 
        
Direct Effect -3.41*** -1.34*** -2.65*** 
 (0.41) (0.29) (0.33) 
Interacted Direct Effect 0.98* -2.98*** -0.15 
 (0.53) (0.50) (0.54) 
Indirect Effect -0.94*** -0.66** -0.67** 
 (0.36) (0.29) (0.31) 
Interacted Indirect Effect 0.22 -0.19 -0.30 
 (0.41) (0.54) (0.44) 
Overall Effect -4.35*** -2.00*** -3.32*** 
 (0.43) (0.33) (0.36) 
Interacted Overall Effect 1.20** -3.17*** -0.45 
 (0.51) (0.57) (0.51) 
    
Observations 27,325 26,313 27,323 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes 
    
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 64.9 65.1 
Notes: Interacted effects refer to the interactions between direct, indirect and overall effects and the variable listed at the top of each 
column. The interacting variable enters also as an independent covariate in the regression. Class size and the percentage of tenured 
teachers in the school are coded as dummy variables taking value one and zero when above and below the median. ESCS is coded as a 
dummy taking value one when below median and zero when above. The proportion of tenured teachers is not available for private 
schools (729 classes), for the public schools located in the Province of Trento (263 classes) and for five Sicilian public schools who 
did not transmit the information (20 classes). Average ESCS is not available for 2 classes. All regressions include the number of 
students enrolled in the class, regional dummies and regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade 
classes in the school. Estimates are weighted by class size. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school level in parentheses. 
One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. 
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Table 9. Interacting External Monitoring with Measures of Social Capital. Math Tests – V Grade. 
Dependent variable: Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline  
Interacted 
with Blood 
Donations 
Interacted with 
Blood Donations 
and Macro 
Variables 
Interacted 
with Turnover 
at Referenda  
Interacted with 
Turnover at 
Referenda and 
Macro Variables 
            
Direct Effect -2.78*** -2.48*** -2.64*** -2.63*** -2.69*** 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) 
Interacted Direct Effect  0.81*** 0.41*** 0.25*** 0.14** 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) 
Indirect Effect -0.82*** -0.85*** -0.93*** -0.80*** -0.88*** 
 (0.28) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.20) 
Interacted Indirect Effect  -0.06 -0.13 0.01 -0.02 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.04) (0.07) 
Overall Effect -3.60*** -3.33*** -3.57*** -3.43*** -3.57** 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.31) (0.28) (0.30) 
Interacted Overall Effect  0.75*** 0.28** 0.26*** 0.12* 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07) 
      
Observations 27,178 27,178 27,178 27,178 27,178 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 
Notes: Interacted effects are the interactions between direct, indirect and overall effects and the variables listed at the top of each 
column. These variables enter as deviations from their sample means both in the interaction term and as an independent covariates in 
the regression. Social capital measures are not available for the provinces of Belluno and Isernia (147 classes). Macro variables: Per 
capita GDP and the unemployment rate in the province. All regressions include the number of students enrolled in the class, regional 
dummies and regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the school. Additional 
covariates are shown in Table 2 – panel A. Estimates are weighted by class size. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school 
level in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. 
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Figure 1. Geographical Distribution of Blood Donations, Average Turnout at Referenda, the 
Unemployment Rate and GDP per capita in the Italian Provinces. 
 
 
 
a. b.  
 
 
c. d.  
 
Notes: Panel a): number of blood donations per 10,000 inhabitants in 1995. Panel b): average turnover at the referenda 
that took place between 1946 and 1989. Panel c): unemployment rate in 2009. Panel d) GDP per capita in 2009. The 
data are ordered by quintiles, with darker colours referring to the top quintile of the distribution. 
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Appendix  
 
1) Tables 
 
Table A.1. The Effects of External Monitoring. Italian Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect  -2.61*** -1.03*** -2.17*** -4.39*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.42) (0.39) 
Indirect Effect -0.67*** -0.38* -0.81** -0.99** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.35) (0.46) 
Overall Effect -3.28*** -1.41*** -2.98*** -5.37*** 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.45) (0.45) 
     
Observations 27,369 11,557 4,894 10,918 
R-squared 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.17 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 70.0 70.2 70.1 69.7 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table A.2. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – II Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -4.20*** -1.57*** -3.09*** -7.50*** 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.54) (0.58) 
Indirect Effect -1.22*** -0.91*** -1.37** -1.53** 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.60) (0.74) 
Overall Effect -5.42*** -2.48*** -4.47*** -9.03*** 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.58) (0.69) 
     
Observations 27,012 11,724 4,905 10,383 
R-squared 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 62.9 59.9 61.8 66.7 
Notes: see Table 4. 
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Table A.3. The Effects of External Monitoring. Italian Tests – II Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect x 100 -3.40*** -1.36*** -2.17*** -6.21*** 
 (0.28) (0.34) (0.51) (0.54) 
Indirect Effect x 100 -1.04*** -0.71** -1.25** -1.33** 
 (0.28) (0.31) (0.53) (0.62) 
Overall Effect x 100 -4.44*** -2.07*** -3.42 -7.54*** 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.56) (0.58) 
     
Observations 27,025 11,721 4,911 10,393 
R-squared 0.13 0.2 0.16 0.11 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.9 65.0 66.2 66.7 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table A.4. GLM estimates of the Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. 
Dependent variable: Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.74*** -0.97*** -2.25*** -4.73*** 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.47) (0.48) 
Indirect Effect -0.80*** -0.70*** -0.72 -1.04* 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.45) (0.60) 
Overall Effect -3.54*** -1.67*** -2.97*** -5.77*** 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.53) (0.57) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: see Table 4.  
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Table A.5. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class. Finite Population Correction. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.89*** -1.08*** -2.35*** -5.05*** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.23) (0.24) 
Indirect Effect -0.83*** -0.71*** -0.70*** -1.06*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.27) 
Overall Effect -3.72*** -1.79*** -3.05*** -6.11*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.28) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table A.6. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class. Without Covariates. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.82*** -0.85*** -2.04*** -5.29*** 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.49) (0.52) 
Indirect Effect -0.70** -0.82*** -0.46 -0.70 
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.51) (0.65) 
Overall Effect -3.52*** -1.68*** -2.50*** -5.99*** 
 (0.31) (0.34) (0.58) (0.64) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Additional covariates  No No No No 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: see Table 4. Each regression includes the number of students enrolled in the class, regional dummies and regional 
dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the school. 
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Table A.7. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage Absent from the Test 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -0.53** -0.50 -0.47 -0.55 
 (0.24) (0.40) (0.47) (0.40) 
Indirect Effect -0.10 0.44 -0.44 -0.51 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.42) (0.44) 
Overall Effect -0.63** -0.06 -0.91** -1.06** 
 (0.25) (0.40) (0.46) (0.42) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Additional covariates  No No No No 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 11.0 10.4 11.7 11.4 
Notes: see Table 4. The only covariates still included in the models are the number of students enrolled in the class, 
regional dummies and regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the 
school. 
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2) External examiners. 
 
External examiners are selected by the regional education offices using criteria defined at the 
national level, from a pool of potential candidates composed by teachers and school principals, most 
of them retired. Eligible candidates must have personal characteristics that facilitate a fair 
collaboration with the school principal and the teachers involved in the test, should have a good 
knowledge of the evaluation procedure and should be familiar with the software and the procedure 
to transmit data to INVALSI.  
Eligibility requires that examiners did not work during the two years before the test in the same 
municipality or in the same school they are going to supervise. If they are still active as teachers, they 
must be employed in a non-primary school. INVALSI conducted some investigation about possible 
cases of collusion between external examiners and school principals or teachers and did not find 
evidence of misconduct. Once appointed, external examiners need to coordinate with the school 
principal to prepare for the test. External examiners generally worked for two days and earned 200 
euro per working day. 
 
3) Sampling procedure. 
 
The sampling procedure is a two-stage design and was taken from the IEA TIMMS survey, which 
INVALSI manages for Italy. Sampling takes place separately in each region. In the first stage, a pre-
specified number of schools was randomly drawn from the population of schools located in the 
region. Schools with less than 10 students were excluded from the population and the rest were 
listed in a spreadsheet with the corresponding number of enrolled students in the second and fifth 
grades, which is the relevant measure of school size. The sampling method adopted is a PPS – 
probability proportional to size: the probability that each school is randomly sampled is proportional 
to school size. Practically, a software randomly samples schools from the sampling frame.26 Only 5 
schools have been replaced from the original sample. This low replacement rate is due to the fact 
that participation and compliance with INVALSI procedures are compulsory because of the law. 
The second stage of the sampling procedure is a simple random sampling of classes within the 
sampled schools. One or two classes per grade, depending uniquely on school size, were randomly 
selected from each sampled school. No negotiation between school principals and INVALSI 
occurred to determine the selected classes. 
The PPS technique implies that larger schools have a higher probability of being sampled than 
smaller schools. However, this difference in the selection probabilities is largely offset at the second 
                                                        
26 Additional details on the sampling of schools can be found at the IEA TIMSS and PIRLS 2011 webpage 
http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/methods/pdf/TP_Sampling_Design.pdf 
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stage of sampling by selecting a fixed number of classes with equal probability from the sampled 
school. Classes in large schools with many classes in the target grade have a lower probability of 
selection than classes in smaller schools that have just one or two classes.  
 
4) From the initial dataset to the final sample  
 
Our data are drawn from the 2010 wave of the INVALSI SNV survey of educational achievements 
in Italian primary schools. These data are freely available from INVALSI. In this section of the 
Appendix we briefly describe our handling of the data.  
1) We exclude Valle d’Aosta and the Province of Bolzano, because all classes in these areas 
were assigned to external monitoring.  
2) We drop schools where there is a different number of second and fifth grade classes 
assigned to monitoring, because this outcome is inconsistent with the sampling scheme.  
3) We drop classes with less than five students and schools with a single class per grade or 
with two classes if both were assigned to monitoring.  
To illustrate the effects of these actions, we consider the Math test for fifth graders. For this group, 
the population consists of 7,700 schools, 30,476 classes and 565,064 students. Our initial dataset 
includes 7,541 schools, 29,811 classes and 491,421 non-disabled students in schools with more than 
ten students (smaller schools are excluded from testing) who were present during the testing day. 
Dropping data for the provinces of Aosta and Bolzano reduces the total number of schools to 
7,502, with 29,647 classes and 489,396 students. Elimination of treated schools where there is a 
different number of second and fifth grade classes leaves us with 489,126 students allocated in 
29,629 classes of 7,498 schools. Purging out classes with less than 5 students leaves us with 28,677 
classes in 7,452 schools and a total of 486,531 students. After dropping schools with a single class in 
the grade or with two classes if both are treated we obtain our estimation sample, which consists of 
6,108 schools, 27,325 classes and 462,570 students.  
 
5)Other data 
 
Unemployment and per capita GDP data refer to year 2009 and are drawn from EUROSTAT 
regional statistics database. Data on blood donations and the average turnout at referenda are from 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004). The original data have been re-classified to match INVALSI 
classification, which includes 103 provinces  
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Abstract 
We use data on professional chess tournaments to study how endogenous selection affects the 
relationship between age and mental productivity in a brain-intensive profession. We show that less 
talented players are more likely to drop out, and that the age-productivity gradient is heterogeneous 
by ability, making fixed effects estimators inconsistent. We correct for selection using an imputation 
procedure that repopulates the sample by applying to older cohorts the self-selection patterns 
observed in younger cohorts. We estimate the age-productivity profile on the repopulated sample 
using median regressions, and find that median productivity increases by close to 5 percent from 
initial age (15) to peak age (21), and declines substantially after the peak. At age 50, it is about 10 
percent lower than at age 15. We compare profiles in the unadjusted and in the repopulated sample 
and show that failure to adequately address endogenous selection in the former leads to substantially 
over-estimating productivity at any age relative to initial age.  
 
Keywords: aging, productivity, mental ability. 
JEL codes: D83, J14, J24. 
  
                                                        
*The authors are grateful to an Editor, three anonymous referees, Guy Michaels, Mario Padula, RoopeUusitalo, Jan Van 
Ours and to the audiences at seminars in London (LSE), Padova, Turin (EALE) and Venice for comments and 
suggestions. We also thank Michele Bertoni for technical help with data collection. Financial support from the 
University of Padova (Grant CPDA093857 – PercorsiLavorativi e InvecchiamentoAttivo) is gratefully acknowledged. All 
errors are our own. 
36 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a broad perception that mental ability declines with age, and not just for humans.1 Unless 
experience, knowledge, motivation and effort can fully compensate the decline in ability, 
productivity is also bound to decline. In many developed countries, population is ageing. If 
individual productivity declines with age, overall productivity will also decline, with important 
macroeconomic implications.  
In spite of the important implications for modern economies, surprisingly little is known about the 
relationship between age and productivity, and the little we know is not pointing unambiguously in 
the same direction. Skirbekk, 2003, reviews the empirical literature and concludes that productivity 
follows an inverted U-shaped profile, with significant decreases taking place from around age 50.2 
Van Ours, 2009, on the other hand, finds that while physical productivity does decline after age 40, 
mental productivity – measured by publishing in economics journals – does not decline even after 
age 50. Finally, Borsch-Supan and Weiss, 2007, use data on production workers of a large German 
car manufacturer and conclude that productivity does not decline at least up to age 60.3 
Measuring the effects of age on productivity is difficult. First, it is hard to find reliable measures of 
individual productivity. Second, in many jobs individual productivity should include also the effects 
on the productivity of others, either because of knowledge spill-overs or because some jobs involve 
a relevant team component. Third, the relationship between age and productivity in observed 
samples is often affected by endogenous selection. If more productive workers are more likely to 
stay in their jobs, for instance because they retire later (see Myck, 2010), selection may induce a 
spurious positive correlation between age and productivity.  
In this paper, we investigate the effects of endogenous selection on the age-productivity profile by 
using data on professional chess players. Focusing on chess players has important advantages. First, 
we can compute a quality - adjusted measure of individual productivity by looking at wins and draws 
in professional tournaments, weighting each result with the measured strength of the opponent. 
Second, chess is a purely individual activity, differently from most professional activities where team 
work and spill-overs among agents influence individual output. Because of this, our measure of 
productivity is accurate. 
Using longitudinal data on professional chess players with a rating provided by FIDE, the 
international chess federation, and on all the official FIDE tournaments played worldwide between 
2008 and 2011, we show that participation to these tournaments is characterized by substantial 
attrition, and that the relationship between age and productivity is heterogeneous by ability. When 
                                                        
1See The Economist, 2004 and Bloom and Sousa-Poza, 2013. 
2Recent contributions in this area that use individual productivity data include Weinberg and Galenson, 2005, and 
Castellucci, Padula and Pica, 2010. 
3Pekkarinen and Uusitalo, 2012, look at the population of Finnish blue-collar employees and use piece-rate wages as 
proxies for output.Their findings confirm that labour productivity stays roughly constant after age 40.  
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productivity is not separable in terms of age and ability, and there is selective attrition, commonly 
used fixed effects methods fail to deliver consistent estimates of the age-productivity 
profile.4Following Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008, we address the problems associated to endogenous 
attrition with imputation, and reconstruct the population of chess players by applying to older 
cohorts the self-selection patterns observed in younger cohorts. Conditional on an assumption of 
stationarity in the selection process across cohorts, we obtain that median productivity by age in the 
repopulated data is equal to productivity in the absence of endogenous attrition. 
We compare median age-productivity profiles in the unadjusted and in the repopulated sample, after 
netting out country and cohort effects, and find that the differences are stark. In the former case, 
productivity peaks at age 24 and declines almost monotonously thereinafter. At peak age, it is 
18percent higher than at baseline age (15). At age 50, it is about at the same level as the baseline. In 
the latter case, the peak occurs earlier, at age 21, and the increase from the baseline to the peak is 
much smaller (about 5 percent) than in the unadjusted sample. Furthermore, median productivity at 
age 50 is only about 90 percent of baseline productivity. These results point out that failure to 
account for endogenous selection and for the fact that less talented players tend to leave the game 
can lead both to substantially over-estimating productivity at all ages relative to baseline age and to 
obtain distorted estimates of the age-productivity profile.  
Several studies (see Skirbekk, 2003) have shown that the decline of mental abilities from early 
adulthood is a universal phenomenon. Unless the acquisition of skills and experience on the job 
outweighs this decline, productivity in cognitive tasks is also likely to fall with age. In this study, we 
find that the median productivity of professional chess players is significantly lower at age 40 than at 
age 20. This evidence from professional chess, a brain-intensive activity, suggests that better skills 
and longer experience cannot offset the decline in numerical and reasoning abilities. 
We are aware that chess is a rather special cognitive profession and that results cannot be easily 
generalized to economically more important tasks. We believe, however, that the contribution of our 
paper is partly methodological and goes beyond the specific environment characterizing professional 
chess: we show that productivity at any age is substantially over-estimated and that the estimates of 
age-productivity profiles are distorted when endogenous selection and heterogeneity by ability are 
not properly addressed. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we introduce our measure of productivity for chess 
players. Section 2 presents the data. The estimation strategy and the imputation method are 
discussed in Sections3 and 4. Results are in Section 5. Conclusions follow.  
 
 
                                                        
4SeeGobel and Zwick, 2011, for a discussion of estimation methods in this area of research. 
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1. Measures of Ability and Productivity for Professional Chess Players 
 
Ranking players has been a critical issue in chess until the 1960s, when the ELO rating system was 
introduced by FIDE, the International Chess Federation. This system was developed by the 
Hungarian mathematician Arpad Elo and is based on a Thurstonian model for paired comparisons 
(see Thurstone, 1927). In this section, we argue that ELO is not a measure of individual productivity 
but rather an indicator of individual (relative) ability in the game of chess.  
In the ELO system, the latent ability of player i, µi,is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
 and standard deviation arbitrarily set at 200.5 Let the outcome of a match between players i and j 
be the random variable zij=µi-µj. Player i wins if . With independent abilities, the probability 
of winning is , where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
random variable and σ=200√2.6 
The expected ability  of player i is estimated using the outcomes of the games she plays. Players 
are initially classified as unrated.7 Starting from their first official ELO score, , the score after 
game g is given by , where  is equal to 1if player i wins, to 0.5 if she draws 
and to 0if she loses the match,  is the expected winning probability of player i against player j, and 
K is a scale factor which weights the importance of a single game with respect to her entire previous 
career. This weight declines with the number of games played and with the ELO score.8 
The updating rule adjusts the ELO score when actual performance in the game differs from 
expected performance. When the current ELO perfectly predicts average actual performance, no 
further update occurs. Since only unexpected wins and losses matter in the updating mechanism, 
ELO cannot be considered a measure of productivity at chess, which depends on realized rather 
than unexpected wins and draws. To illustrate, a player can be very productive in terms of having a 
high winning rate and yet experience no change in ELO if these wins are expected.9To us, rather 
                                                        
5The normality assumption is based on observational data collected by Arpad Elo on the distribution of individual chess 
performance (see Gransmark and Gërdes, 2010).  
6 For example, consider two players with si-sj=200. In this case, the likelihoods that players i and j win are equal to 
Ф(200/200√2)=0.76 and 0.24 respectively. 
7 The results of their first games and the ELO score of their opponents determine a provisional rating. The following 
conditions are required to obtain a rating (see FIDE, 2012): 1) having played in at least one official FIDE tournament; 2) 
having completed a minimum of nine games against rated players and having scored at least one point against them (i.e., 
having won a match or having drawn two);3) the initial score ought to be above a minimum rating floor, equivalent to 
1400 ELO points for players in our sample, who obtained their first rating before 2009. 
8In practice, K = 30 for a player who has completed less than 30 games, K = 15 for players with a score lower than 2400 
and K = 10 once the rating reaches 2400 and she has completed at least 30 games (see Glickman, 1995, for details). 
Using the example in footnote 2, if player i wins, her ELO score increases by 0.24*K, while if she loses her ELO 
decreases by -0.76*K.  
9Furthermore, two players with the same initial ELO but different K factors (i.e. different experience) have different 
ELO adjustments even if their game results are the same, making the use of ELO as a measure of productivity even 
more problematic.  
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than a measure of productivity, ELO is a measure of relative ability at chess at a given point in time: 
it predicts ex-ante how likely a player is to win when he plays against another one, but it does not 
measure winning intensity.10 
We therefore distinguish between ELO and productivity, Y: in our view, the former is an estimate of 
relative ability, and the latter is measured as the weighted sum of wins and draws divided by the 
number of played games Git 
 
      [1] 
where i is for the player and t for the year, and  and  are dummies equal to 1 when 
either a win or a draw occur. Each win has weight equal to 1, each draw is weighted 0.5 and each 
loss has zero weight. This measure of productivity is quality adjusted because each win or draw is 
weighted with the relative quality of the opponent, measured by the ELO score. Since the weighted 
sum of wins and losses is divided by the number of games played, Yit is the productivity per match.11 
Productivity as defined in (1) is used in our baseline regressions. We also experiment, however, with 
two alternative definitions. In the former, we replace the ELO score of the opponent in the 
tournament with the average ELO score of all opponents met during the year. In the latter, we add 
up wins and draws without using weights.  
 
2. The Data 
 
Our data consist of a main and an auxiliary sample. The main sample has information on all official 
FIDE tournaments played worldwide between 2008 and 2011, that we have downloaded from the 
FIDE online archive.12Each tournament record reports the results of all the games played by each 
participant (wins, losses or draws), and his ELO score before and after the tournament.  
Our initial sample consists of male players with a FIDE rating, for whom we know the ELO score 
and the national federation, who were born between 1948 and 1993, were listed in FIDE by 2008 
and have played in at least one FIDE tournament between 2008 and 2011.From this sample, we 
drop “casual” players, who obtained an official rating for the first time in 2008 and have played only 
                                                        
10 ELO changes faster at younger ages, because the updating mechanism generates larger variations when the initial ELO 
is lower and because younger players try to fill their ability gap with more experienced players by learning, training and 
accumulating experience in tournaments. Hence, it is an informative but imperfect measure of innate talent at chess. 
11Our weighting system implies that playing two games against players of a given strength and winning both is equivalent 
to playing two games against opponents twice as strong and winning only one game. It also implies that winning one 
game against a player with ELO score x yields more in terms of productivity than drawing one game against a player 
with ELO equal to 2*(x-). 
12 As of December 2012, the web address of this archive is http://ratings.fide.com. 
Yit 
[I(winij ) * ELO j  12 I(drawij ) * ELO j ]j1
Git
Git
I(winij ) I(drawij )
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in 2008. For the remaining players, we only consider the outcomes of games played against rated 
players, both because we do not have a measure of ability for unrated opponents and because games 
against these opponents do not count for rating.13 We also drop players belonging to national 
federations with less than 30 affiliates. Our final sample consists of 40,545 players aged between 15 
and 60, who were listed in 2008 and remained in the FIDE list from a minimum of 1 to a maximum 
of 4 years.14Since our panel is not balanced, we end up with 140,074 observations.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on age, the number of games played and productivity. Average 
age is 38.09,the annual average number of games played by active players is 17.45 (range from 1 to 
289), and average productivity is equal 972.39, with a range between 0 and 2551.15Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of annual productivity, which exhibits a peak at zero (3.6% of observations), due to 
players who have never won or drawn a game in a single year, and an upper tail with few players 
having very high productivity. Table 1 also includes the means of several variables at the federation-
by-year level, that will be discussed in Section3: the number of tournaments organized in the year, 
the GDP per capita in real PPP 2005 (thousand) dollars, the number of internet users per 100 
inhabitants, the rate of growth of GDP per capita when individuals are aged 15 to 25, and the 
average number of internet users per 100 inhabitants for the same age interval.16Except for the 
number of tournaments, which are derived from our data, the other variables are drawn from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators, the Maddison Project Database and the Statistics of 
the International Telecommunication Union.  
We plot the empirical relationship between age and median productivity in Figure 2 (the continuous 
line), after netting out country fixed effects and country-specific cohort and period effects.17We find 
that median productivity increases by 18 percent, from 925.3 at age 15 to 1092.0 at age 24, and then 
declines almost linearly until 869.2 at age 60, when it is 6 percent below the level at age 15. In the 
figure, we also plot median productivity for the two sub-groups of players with an ELO score in 
2006 above and below 2000 (dashed lines)18. We notice two things. First, the two dashed lines are 
not parallel, as productivity declines more steeply amongst the less talented (bottom line). This 
                                                        
13 In the few cases where annual productivity is missing in either 2009 or 2010 but not in 2008 and 2011, we estimate 
missing values by interpolation.  
14The number of players enrolled in the lists in 2008 is 40,545. Of these, 37,396 are still present in 2009, 33,475 in 2010 
and 28,658 in 2011. 
15The relatively large value of average productivity is justified by our weighting wins and draws with the ELO of the 
opponent. In our sample, average ELO is 2073.7. 
16In practice, we match to each individual the average rate of GDP growth and the average number of internet users in 
the period when he is (was) 15 to 25.  
17 For the sake of comparability with the rest of the paper, Figure 2 is obtained by grouping players’ age across three 
adjacent years, starting from age 15. Thus players aged between 15 and 17 are assigned aged 15, players aged between 
age 18 and 20 are assigned age 18 and so on. A Figure based on ungrouped age is available upon the authors, but results 
are qualitatively the same. 
18According to the US Chess Federation, a score equal to 2000 separates experts from “regular” chess players.We 
consider ELO in 2006, rather than at the beginning of our short panel starting in 2008, to have a predetermined measure 
of ability, not affected by the performance of players between 2008 and 2011. The data are from the FIDE lists. For 
young players aged 15 or 16 in 2008 we use the first available ELO score. 
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implies that the relationship between age and productivity is heterogeneous by ability. Second, 
median productivity in the full sample raises sharply in the early stages, partly because less talented 
players, who are also less productive, are more likely to leave the sample as time goes by, thus 
altering the composition of the pool of players by ability at different ages. 
The auxiliary sample is a longitudinal dataset that tracks until 2011 all rated players that were 
included in the FIDE lists in 2001, and for each player has information on the federation, the year of 
birth, gender and the ELO score. Productivity, however, is missing. We use this dataset to better 
document the endogenous selection of professional players, who enter and exit the FIDE lists every 
year. We define as “stayers” the rated players still active between 2009 and 2011, and as “dropouts” 
those not active between 2009 and 2011. Setting at 100 the number of players listed in 2001, we find 
that dropouts at the end of the window of observation were25.78, about a quarter of the entire pool. 
We define the dummy DR (dropout) as equal to one if the player is a dropout and to zero otherwise, 
and regress this dummy on country effects, age and the ELO score in 2001, using a Probit model. 
We find that the probability of dropping out declines with age and is higher among the players with 
a lower initial ELO score. In particular, we estimate that adding 100 points to the ELO score is 
associated to a 6.8 percentage points reduction in the dropout rate, a substantial effect.19 
 
3. The Empirical Strategy 
 
Age can affect productivity by influencing mental ability, skill accumulation and experience, learning, 
motivation and effort. Outside options available to chess players may also change with age and 
affect the decision to stay on as a professional player or to drop out of FIDE lists.20Because of all 
these reasons, productivity Y is a function of age A and mental ability μ. As documented in the 
previous section and tested at the end of this section, this function is not separable in terms of age 
and ability. Therefore, we write 
 
       [2] 
 
where is positive if individuals with higher ability are better capable of accumulating skills as they 
age. 
Mental ability consists of time invariant innate talent α and a component that declines with age 
 
                                                        
19 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
20 As remarked by a chess-expert referee, aging in chess is not one process, but many processes, some of which run in 
opposite directions. This is the case of evaluation and calculation. Calculation in chess is the I-do-this-then-he-does-that-
then-I-do-this part, which is very strenuous. Evaluation is the ability to judge who is favoured in a certain position. This 
is done partly by analogy with known positions, and more experienced players have a larger mental "database" of 
positions to draw from. 
Yit Y (Ait ,it )   0 1Ait  2it  3Aitit
3
it
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           [3] 
 
Using [3] into [2], we can express productivity as a function of age, innate talent, and the interaction 
of talent with age. We describe the empirical relationship between productivity, age, talent and other 
covariates as follows 
   
    [4] 
 
where is a polynomial of order d in age, ε is a random error, innate talent α has 
unconditional zero mean and is orthogonal to age in the population, and Xit is a vector of country – 
specific period and cohort effects. 
Since age, period and cohort are linearly dependent and cannot be simultaneously controlled for 
non-parametrically, we choose to capture period and cohort effects with period-by-country and 
cohort-by-country variables. The former include the real GDP per capita, the share of internet users 
per 100 inhabitants and the number of tournaments organized in the year by each federation. GDP 
per capita is expected to capture access to resources and to affect the outside option of chess 
players; the share of internet connections captures access to the internet and to the training 
opportunities offered by the web; finally, the number of tournaments organized by the each 
federation is a measure of the supply of opportunities to play. The latter include the average rate of 
growth of GDP and of internet usage when each player was aged between 15 to 25. 
The orthogonality of talent and age implies that the conditional mean of [4] in the population is 
given by  
     [5] 
 
If we had population data, we could estimate the relationship between age and mean productivity by 
ordinary least squares, and the interaction between age and ability could safely be omitted. The 
conditional mean talent in the population and in the observed sample do not coincide, however, 
when individual players select in and out of the sample in a non-random way and returns are 
heterogeneous by ability. In the case of professional chess players, the decision to stay or leave the 
FIDE lists depends both on individual talent and on age, as discussed in Section 2. 
Therefore, in the unadjusted sample the conditional mean is different from zero and 
we have that 
it   i  Ait
Yit  0  d Aitd
d 0
D x Xit   i  iAit  it


D
d
d
itd A
1

E Yit | Ait , Xit  0  d Aitd
d 0
D x Xit
E  i | Ait,Xit 
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   [6] 
 
The conditional expectation of productivity depends both on the (nonzero) conditional mean of 
innate talent and on the interaction of this mean with age. When , productivity returns to age 
are heterogeneous by talent. In this case, applying a fixed effects estimator to the raw data – as done 
by Castellucci, Padula and Pica, 2010 – does not eliminate the bias due to selection because the 
within-transformation only removes the linear component of talent. To fully remove the selection 
bias, one needs to apply the within-player transformation to first-differenced data, as done for 
instance by Pischke, 2001, in his paper on the returns to training in Germany. This transformation, 
however, has the drawback that the linear term of the age polynomial in [4] cannot be identified 
when  is different from zero. We therefore turn to a method based on imputation, 
which allows us to reconstruct the population of chess players that would have been observed in the 
absence of self-selection. 
Before considering this method, however, we conclude this section by introducing a Hausman test 
of the hypothesis that the age-productivity gradient in our data is not heterogeneous by ability. If 
this is the case, in equation [4] (the null hypothesis). Under the null, first differences of [4] yield
, which can be consistently estimated on first-differenced data by 
ordinary least squares or by fixed effects models, with the former being more efficient than the 
latter. When the null does not hold, first differences of [4] yield 
, which can only be consistently estimated by fixed effects. 
We follow Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007, and perform the Hausman test in a setup where standard 
errors are clustered with respect to the individual, by augmenting the set of regressors in 
 with the deviations of each explanatory variable from its 
individual mean. We then test whether these additional regressors are jointly significant. Since we 
find that the p-value of the joint F test is equal to 0.0002,we reject the null hypothesis ( ) and 
conclude that returns are heterogeneous by talent.  
 
4. Imputation 
 
Our imputation method assumes that the self-selection process affecting the relationship between 
age and productivity depends on age and ability, but not on the cohort of birth. By virtue of this 
E Yit | Ait , Xit  0  d Aitd
d 0
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assumption, we are able to reconstruct the original population of older cohorts by using the patterns 
of self-selection observed in younger cohorts. After completing imputation, we estimate the 
relationship between age and productivity on the repopulated sample using median regressions. As 
remarked by Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008, the attractive feature of median regressions for 
imputation methods is that estimates only depend on the position of individuals with respect to the 
median observation, and not on the specific imputed value of the outcome variable. Thus, as long as 
observations with missing productivity are correctly imputed to the side of the median where they 
belong, median regressions retrieve the true parameters of interest.21 
Since the size of our sample in the main dataset is relatively small when we consider age-by-period 
cells, we pool individuals born in three contiguous years of birth into a single cohort. Therefore, 
using 2008 as our reference, our youngest cohort - - is aged 15 to 17 and our oldest cohort - - 
is aged 60 to 62. As each cohort consists of three contiguous years of birth, we only retain the initial 
and final year in our sample (2008 and 2011), that we denote t=0 and t=3 respectively, to avoid 
overlaps between cohorts. 
Our imputation strategy requires the following three assumptions: 
 
Assumption A0 (normality). For each cohort, the distribution of innate talent in the population is 
normal and has zero mean. 
Assumption A1 (anchoring). Cohort  at time t=0 is not self-selected. 
Therefore,ܧሾߙ௜|ܿଵହ, ݐ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ܯ݁݀ሺߙ௜|ܿଵହ, ݐ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 0.22 
Assumption A2 (stationarity).Median productivity at a given age is invariant across cohorts. Let 
productivity net of the effect of the exogenous controls included in vector Xit be , where c is the 
cohort. Then for all values of k. 
 
Assumption A0 guarantees that the conditional median of [4] yields [5]. Assumption A1 posits that 
attrition out of FIDE lists occurs only after age 15, and implies that our sample of young players 
aged 15 is representative of the population of potential professional chess players at the time of 
entry in the profession. Assumption A2 requires that, conditional on age, median ability does not 
vary across cohorts. We provide evidence in support of this crucial assumption by looking at ELO 
scores as proxies of individual ability. Using our auxiliary dataset, we organize individuals in seven 5-
yearsage groups, starting from age 25 to 29 and ending with 55 to 59, and consider three points in 
                                                        
21For the same reason, median regression is also robust to the presence of a mass of observations with zero productivity 
documented in Figure 1. 
22We use E for the mean operator and Med for the median. 
15c 60c
15c
y ict
Med(y itc | c  k, t  3)  Med(y itc | c  k  3, t  0)
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time: 2001 (the reference point), 2006, and 2011.23 For each age group, we compute median ELO 
scores in 2006 and 2011, and their percentage changes with respect to 2001.Results reported in 
Figure 3 suggest that these changes have been quite small for each age group, and always below 3 
percent. We conclude from this that cohort and time effects are negligible in our data for each 
selected age group. 
The imputation procedure consists of the following six steps: 
1) median regressions of productivity on country dummies and the country – specific time 
and cohort effects Xit, to filter out the effects of Xit and obtain ;  
2) the identification of players belonging to the first cohort  at time t=0,who have dropped 
out from the sample any time between t=0 and t=3; 
3) the imputation to each identified dropout player of a productivity value at time t=3arbitrarily 
larger (smaller) than median productivity at time t=3 if  ( );24 
4) the computation of median productivity at the end of the observation period (t=3) – or 
 - on the repopulated sample; 
5) the computation of . If , we add to cohort as many players 
(bots) with an arbitrary low productivity as required to re-establish , which must hold 
under assumption A2. We add bots with arbitrarily high productivity if instead . By so 
doing, we repopulate cohort at time t=0 and correct for the self-selection affecting this cohort 
prior to t=0. The repopulated cohort is then used as the basis for the next iteration, involving cohort 
. 
6) steps 2-5 are repeated for each cohort until the last, .Once the sample has been 
repopulated, equation [4] can be estimated using median regressions. 
We show in the Appendix the results of a Monte Carlo experiment designed to evaluate how our 
imputation performs in a controlled setting. Results indicate that the procedure is capable of 
reproducing the medians of the original population rather well. In our method, the assumed lack of 
                                                        
23We start from the age group 25-29 because for earlier age groups we only have either one or two observations over 
time.  
24We allocate dropouts with productivity close to the median at time t=0either above or below the median at time t=3 as 
follows. First, we compute the distribution of  for all the players with  and the 
distribution of  for the players with . Next, we define as close to the median the 
dropouts with D or D’ smaller than the 10th percentile of the relevant distribution. For these players, we impute an 
arbitrarily large value of productivity with probability P (resp. 1-P’) and an arbitrarily low value of productivity with 
probability 1-P (resp. P’) if  (resp. ),where is the 10th percentile of the 
distribution and  and . To all remaining dropouts we impute an arbitrarily large (small) 
productivity if  ( ). 
itcy
y itc
15c
y i0c15  Med(y i0c15 ) y i0c15  Med(y i0c15 )
m3,15  Med(y i3c15 )
m0,18  Med(y i0c18 ) m0,18 m3,15 18c
15,318,0 mm 
15,318,0 mm 
18c
21c
60c
D  y i0c15  Med(y i0c15 ) D  0
D'  Med(y i0c15 )  y i0c15 D  0
D  pct10(D) D' pct10(D') pct10(.)
P  D
max(D)
P ' D'
max(D')
D  pct10(D) D' pct10(D')
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selection for the youngest cohort – our Assumption A1 – trickles down to the older cohorts because 
of Assumption A2.To illustrate the logic of our imputation strategy, consider the youngest cohort. 
Under the anchoring assumption, A1, at the end of step 3 the cohort at time t=3 is not self-
selected, and median productivity in this re-populated cohort is the counterfactual median that 
would have been observed had cohort  not suffered attrition between time t=0 and t=3. Under 
stationarity (Assumption A2), this median is also the counterfactual median productivity for cohort 
 at time t=0.Cohort  at time t=0 is re-populated with bots until its median productivity meets 
the counterfactual (step 5). These bots are considered as dropouts between t=0 and t=3 and treated 
accordingly. Finally, all dropouts (actual dropouts and bots) of cohort  are used to compute the 
median productivity that cohort  would have displayed at time t=3 had no attrition occurred. 
 
5. Results 
 
We estimate equation [4] on the repopulated sample, using a third order polynomial in age.25We 
report our estimates in the first column of Table 2and plot the associated age-productivity profile in 
Figure 4. The right panel of the figure reports median productivity by age in the repopulated sample 
(the dots), after normalizing the median value of productivity at age 15to 1. The left panel of the 
figure reports instead the normalized age-productivity profile in the unadjusted sample. We estimate 
that in the repopulated sample median productivity rises from age 15 to peak age 2126 by slightly 
more than 5 percent and then declines almost monotonously. Productivity is equal to its initial value 
at age 15 just after age 30, to 95 percent of the initial value at age 40, and to less than 90 percent of 
the initial value at age 50.  
The comparison with the left panel of the figure points out several important differences: first, 
relative productivity is always lower in the repopulated sample; second, productivity from baseline to 
peak age increases much more in the unadjusted than in the repopulated sample (18 percent), 
suggesting that the increase in the former case is mainly due to the endogenous attrition of less 
talented players; third, peak age in the repopulated sample occurs earlier than in the unadjusted 
sample; finally, productivity from peak age declines rather smoothly and at a similar pace in both 
samples, indicating that the effect of endogenous selection is less important at later ages, in line with 
our finding that dropout rates decline with age.  
As a result of these differences, while in the unadjusted sample productivity at age 50 is about as 
high as at the baseline age and it is only about 5 percent below by age 60, in the repopulated sample 
                                                        
25Adding additional powers to the polynomial does not alter the goodness of fit. Notice also that the variables in the X 
vector are filtered out in the first step of the imputation process.  
26According to the polynomial estimated in Table 2, peak age is 21.51. 
15c
15c
18c 18c
18c
18c
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productivity at age 50 is already about 10 percent lower than at the baseline (15 percent by age 60). 
We conclude that failure to properly address endogenous selection leads to over-estimating 
productivity at all ages relative to baseline age, and to distorted estimates of the age-productivity 
profile, that inflate productivity increases until peak age and, to a much lesser extent, productivity 
declines after the peak.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 report our results when we change the definition of productivity27. 
In column (2) we weight wins and draws with the average ELO score of the opponents met in a 
given year rather than in each game. In column (3) we consider the raw winning rate, defined as the 
number of wins plus the number of draws weighted by 0.5 over the total number of games played in 
a given year. Results turn out to be remarkably similar to our baseline specification in column (1), 
with marginal changes in the estimated peak age. 
 
Conclusions  
We have used data on professional chess tournaments to study the relationship between age and 
mental productivity in a brain-intensive profession. Using chess has the advantage that individual 
productivity can be measured with accuracy. We have shown that selective attrition is an important 
phenomenon, and that the age-productivity profile is heterogeneous with respect to ability. When 
productivity is not separable in terms of ability and age, the fixed effects estimator produces 
consistent estimates of the age-productivity profile only when applied to first-differenced data. In 
this case, however, the linear term of the age polynomial cannot be identified.  
We have therefore turned to imputation to repopulate our sample, and to median regressions, using 
the property that estimates are affected by the position of productivity observations with respect to 
the median but not by the specific values of imputed productivity. We have compared the estimated 
age – productivity profiles in the unadjusted and in the repopulated sample, and found that 
accounting for endogenous selection dramatically reduces productivity at all age, relative to baseline 
age, and alters significantly the shape of the age-productivity profile. While in the unadjusted sample 
median productivity at age 50 is about as high as at age 15,in the repopulated sample it is about 10 
percent lower. We have argued that productivity is higher in the unadjusted sample because weaker 
players are more likely to dropout from chess as they age. The effect of selection is particularly 
pronounced at earlier ages, and generates a steep increase in productivity until peak age. Because of 
this large increase, productivity at later ages remains above baseline productivity, in spite of an 
almost linear decline after the peak. 
Our results highlight the importance of accounting for endogenous selection, and do not confirm 
the recent results by Van Ours, 2009,suggesting that for economists, another brain-intensive 
                                                        
27The size of the repopulated sample changes across columns in the table because the number of bots required to 
perform the imputation varies with the measure of productivity being used.  
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profession, mental productivity does not decline with age. We find that chess professionals aged 40 
are about 5 percent less productive than young players aged 15.  
This paper is not alone in emphasizing that productivity is not separable in terms of age and ability. 
In the Mincerian tradition, it has been customary to assume that earnings (and productivity) are 
separable in age (experience) and education (ability), mainly because of lack of data on lifetime 
earnings. Recent work by Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2008, however, has shown that this 
assumption is convenient but not supported by the empirical evidence. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max
Age 38.09 12.31 15 60
Games 17.45 19.20 1 289
Productivity 972.39 396.66 0 2551
GDP per capita (in thousand $ at constant 
prices) 
22.06 12.01 2.64 53.48
Internet users (per 100 inhabitants) 57.19 23.05 4.38 96.62
Number of tournaments 139.8 156.97 4 674
GDP per capita growth at age 15-25 2.15 2.29 7.15 21.97
Average number of internet users at age 15-
25 
(per 100 inhabitants) 
14.09 23.11 0 92.60
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Table 2 – Estimates of Eq. [4]using median regressions on the repopulated sample. Dependent 
variable: alternative measures of productivity 
 
 
Baseline With average 
ELO of 
opponents as 
weight 
Un-weighted 
winning rate 
Age 38.98*** 
(7.01) 
37.21**
(6.88) 
0.02*** 
(0.002) 
Age2/100 -
126.00***  
(20.35) 
-121.70***
(19.98) 
-0.06*** 
(0.008) 
Age3/1000 10.97*** 
(1.85) 
10.74***
(1.82) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Peak age 21.51 21.28 22.27
    
Number of players in the 
unadjusted sample 
40,545 40,545 40,545
Number of players in the 
repopulated sample 
52,385 52,226 50,041
 
Note: country dummies, real GDP per capita, the number of tournaments, the percentage of internet users per 100 
inhabitants, real GDP growth and growth of access to internet when individuals were aged between 15 and 25 have been 
filtered from the data in the first step of the imputation process. Three, two and one star for statistically significant 
coefficients at the 1, 5 and 10% level of confidence.  
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Figure 1. The distribution of productivity in the sample 
 
Source: main dataset 
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Figure 2. Median productivity by age, full sample and by initial ELO score. 
 
Source: main dataset 
 
 
Figure 3. Changes in median ability by age group 
 
Source: auxiliary dataset 
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Figure 4. Median age-productivity profiles in the unadjusted and in the repopulated sample. 
 
 
Source: main dataset 
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Appendix 
 
We perform a Monte Carlo experiment to evaluate how well our imputation strategy reproduces the 
initial population starting from a selected sample. Suppose that the data generating process is given 
by 
 ݕ௜௧௖ ൌ  5 ൅  40ܣ௜௧௖ െ 120 ஺೔೟೎
మ
ଵ଴మ ൅ 10
஺೔೟೎య
ଵ଴య ൅ 20 ߙ௜ ൅ ߙ௜ܣ௜௧௖ ൅ 
 ൅10 ܥܥ ௜ܱ௖ ൅ 2 ܥ ௖ܲ௧ ൅ 10  ଶܲ െ 50  ହܲ ൅ 60  ଵܲ଴ ൅ ߝ௜௧௖   [A1] 
where individual talent is ߙ௜~ܰሺ0,1ሻand the noise term  is distributed as N(0,10). The country-
specific cohort and period effects are CCO and CP respectively, while P are country dummies. 
There are 16 cohorts, {15,18,21,...,60}, each composed of 3,000 individuals observed at time t=0 
and at time t=3, and 10 countries. Players are ranked on the basis of their name and systematically 
allocated to countries (the first player is allocated to the first country, the second player to the 
second country, the eleventh player to the first country again and so on). We assume that that 
country fixed effects are all zero except for countries 2, 5 and 10. 
The initial sample is composed of 96,000 players. Given the features of the data generating process, 
ability is orthogonal to age in the population. Players self-select into chess on a year-by-year basis 
according to a selection rule that depends on age, ability, and an individual-by-time specific random 
shock vit, that follows a N(0,0.1) distribution. The selection rule is defined as follows: 
ܼ௜௧௖ ൌ 1   ifܣ௜௧௖ ൌ 15 
ܼ௜௧௖ ൌ 1   if ߙ௜ ൅ ߭௜௧௖ ൐  0.035ܣ௜௧௖ െ 2.5 and ܣ௜௧௖ ൐ 15   [A2] 
ܼ௜௧௖ ൌ 0   otherwise  
where Z is an indicator that takes value 1 when player i keeps playing and 0 when he drops out. 
After selection, the correlation between age and talent is assumed to be equal to 0.187, and average 
ability increases with age. The main feature of this selection process is that less talented players drop 
out as they get older, coherently with our estimates. 
The simulation operates as follows: after randomly drawing the initial population, we apply our 
selection rule to generate attrition and obtain a selected sample. We then apply to this sample the 
imputation procedure described in the text. Next, we estimate the following model on the 
repopulated sample 
 ܯ݁݀ሺݕത௜௧௖|ܣ௜௧௖ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ௜௧௖ ൅ ߚଶܣ௜௧௖ଶ ൅ ߚଷܣ௜௧௖ଷ ൅ ߦ௜௧௖    [A3] 
where, as in the main text, ݕത௜௧௖represents productivity net of country specific cohort and period 
effects. We repeat this procedure 500 times. The estimates obtained from (A3) are shown in Figure 
A1, where we plot the age-productivity profile obtained from our Monte Carlo simulation, its 95% 
itc
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confidence interval, and the profile from the data generating process. The two overlap almost 
perfectly and the confidence interval is remarkably narrow. 
 
Figure A1. True and Simulated Age-Productivity Profiles – Monte Carlo Analysis 
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Chapter 3 
 
Laterborns Don’t Give Up. 
The Effects of Birth Order on Earnings in Europe* 
 
by 
 
Marco Bertoni 
(University of Padova and CEP, LSE) 
 
Giorgio Brunello 
(University of Padova, IZA and CEsifo) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
While it is well known that birth order affects educational attainment, less is known about its effects 
on earnings. Using data from eleven European countries for males born between 1935 and 1956, we 
show that firstborns enjoy on average a 13.7 percent premium over laterborns in their wage at 
labour market entry. However, this advantage is short lived, and disappears by age 30, between 10 
and 15 years after labour market entry. While firstborns start with a better match, partly because of 
their higher education, laterborns quickly catch up by switching earlier and more frequently to better 
paying jobs. We argue that a key factor driving our findings is that laterborns are more likely to 
engage in risky behaviours. 
 
Key words: birth order, earnings, risk aversion, Europe 
JEL Code: D13, J12, J24 
                                                        
*  We thank Hessel Oosterbeek, Erik Plug, Olmo Silva, Guglielmo Weber, Christoph Weiss and the audience at 
workshops in Reus, Padova and Rome (Brucchi Luchino) for comments and suggestions. This paper uses data from 
SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th 2010 and SHARE release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011. The SHARE data 
collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th frame work programme (project 
QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th framework programme (projects 
SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006 062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and 
through the 7th frame work programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822). 
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Introduction 
Does birth order affect wages? According to Ruth Mantell of the Wall Street Journal, 2011, the 
answer is clearly positive. She reports that firstborn kids are “...the most likely to earn six figures and 
hold up a top executive position among workers with siblings...”. She also quotes economist Sandra 
Black as saying that “... birth order affects educational attainment, which then affects earnings […]. 
Laterborns earn less than firstborns, and a substantial part of this difference is due to the fact that 
laterborns get fewer years of education.” 
While there is substantial empirical research investigating the effects of birth order on educational 
attainment, less has been done to explore the effects on earnings. One reason could be the scarcity 
of datasets containing information both on earnings and on birth order. Another reason, we suspect, 
is that the research question is viewed as not particularly interesting. If one believes, as many 
economists do, that earnings are a function of human capital, evidence that firstborns have better 
education implies that they also have higher earnings.  
Yet – with a single important exception1 - the few studies that have addressed this issue have found 
that the effects of birth order on earnings are rather negligible, in spite of the significant effects on 
educational attainment. For example, in their study of Swedish data, Björklund and Jäntti, 2012, find 
that firstborns attain on average 0.2 more years of education than laterborns, but only a 0.25% 
premium on earnings between ages 31-40. Given that returns to education in Sweden range between 
3.5 and 5.5 percent (see Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker, 2003), the estimated premium is much 
lower than the expected 0.7-1.1 percent. These studies also focus on earnings at a given point in a 
working lifetime, typically before age forty, or on average earnings over a short period of the 
working life cycle, and are therefore silent on whether birth order has a temporary or a permanent 
impact on individual earnings.  
In this paper, we contribute to this small literature by studying the effects of birth order on earnings 
over the life cycle in a sample of 4,280 males born between 1935 and 1956 and residing in eleven 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). We consider several measures of real annual earnings: 
the entry wage - defined as the initial wage in the first job - wages at age 30, 40 and 50, and the 
current or last wage, defined either as the wage in the job currently held if still active at age 50 plus 
or as the wage in the last job before retiring. We also add a measure of lifetime earnings, or the 
discounted value of the stream of earnings from age ten to retirement. By looking at earnings at 
different points in the life cycle, and at lifetime earnings, we can tell whether the estimated birth 
order effects on earnings are temporary or permanent.  
                                                        
1 Kantarevic and Mechoulan, 2005, find that order of birth has a significant effect on hourly earnings in a relatively small 
sample of US workers. 
59 
 
We show that the advantage enjoyed by firstborns over laterborns is short lived: they earn on 
average a 13.7% premium in their entry wage, but this advantage is completely gone by age 30. We 
also find that being a firstborn has no statistically significant effect on earnings at age 50 and on the 
current wage. Since the initial wage gains are quickly lost, and laterborns start working earlier than 
firstborns, it is not surprising that being a firstborn has no statistically significant effect on lifetime 
earnings.  
The temporary advantage enjoyed by firstborns implies that birth order has a positive effect on 
earnings growth, measured as wages at age t minus the entry wage. Importantly, we find that this 
effect remains even after controlling for educational attainment. This suggests that differences in 
education between firstborns and laterborns are not sufficient to explain the observed differences in 
wages over the lifecycle. We also find that education negatively affects earnings growth, a result 
consistent both with the learning model by Altonji and Pierret, 2001, and with the human capital 
model, provided that education and experience are substitutes in the production of skills.  
Temporary birth order effects are closely associated to differences in job-to-job mobility after labour 
market entry. On the one hand, firstborns find better initial matches – not only they earn more, but 
they are also more likely than laterborns to be in white collar and in public sector jobs - and stay on 
their initial jobs longer. On the other hand, laterborns start with poorer matches but change jobs 
swiftly, and by virtue of job mobility quickly catch up with firstborns. To illustrate the effects of 
mobility, we compare expected log wages at age 30 for firstborns and laterborns and find that they 
are quite similar (a 0.7% advantage for laterborns). These wages can be expressed as the weighted 
average of log wages for those still in the first job at age 30 and log wages for those in other jobs, 
using as weights the probability of being in the first job at age 30. While firstborns who are still in 
their first job at age 30 retain a 5% advantage on earnings over laterborns in their first job at 30, this 
advantage is more than compensated by the fact that, at that age, laterborns have a higher 
probability of being already in their second or third job, that pay higher earnings than the first job. A 
similar pattern holds at age 40 as well. 
Drawing on a vast literature in psychology (see for instance Sulloway, 2007) and using our own 
evidence in support, we argue that firstborns differ from laterborns both because they have higher 
education and because they are less likely to engage in risky behaviours (see Wang et al., 2009). On 
the one hand, better education explains why firstborns start with a better match. On the other hand, 
the higher propensity to take risks explains why laterborns incur in higher turnover (see Allen et al, 
2005) and enjoy higher wage growth than firstborns (see Shaw, 1996).  
The paper is organized as follows: we briefly review the relevant literature in Section 1, introduce the 
data in Section 2 and discuss the empirical methodology in Section 3. Our results are reported in 
Section 4. We discuss our findings in Section 5 and present a few extensions in Section 6. 
Conclusions follow. 
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1. Review of the Literature 
The effects of birth order on educational attainment have been widely studied. In a recent influential 
contribution, Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2005, (BDS from now on) use Norwegian registry data 
and find that birth order has a significant and large negative effect on children’s education, even 
after controlling for family size. In particular, they estimate that being a second child reduces 
educational attainment with respect to being a firstborn by close to 0.3 years of schooling. Negative 
effects have been found also in recent research by Bagger et al., 2013, for Denmark, Björklund and 
Jantti, 2012, for Sweden, and De Haan, 2010, and Kantarevic and Mechoulan, 2005, for the US.  
Less has been done to investigate the effects of birth order on earnings. Most of the existing studies 
are based on US data and consider earnings relatively early in an individual’s career (before age 40). 
While results are sensitive to the inclusion of covariates, the broad assessment is that the estimated 
effects tend to be small or negligible. Behrman and Taubman, 1986, use US data for young adults 
and show that, after adjusting for age or work experience, there are differences by birth order in 
both schooling and log earnings. The effects on earnings, however, become statistically insignificant 
when they include controls for observed childhood family background characteristics.  
Olneck and Bills, 1979, examine the effect of birth order and family size on childhood test scores 
and adult levels of education, occupation, and wages, finding a negligible influence of birth order on 
all measures of achievement. Kessler, 1991, uses data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth to examine the effect of birth order and family size on individual behaviour over the course 
of teenage and early adult lives. He finds that neither birth order nor childhood family size 
significantly influences the level or growth rate of wages for individuals aged 14-22, 18-26 and 22-30.  
Björklund and Jäntti, 2012, use Swedish registry data and report that the firstborn child attains 0.2 
years of additional education and earns around 0.25% higher long-run earnings (earnings are 
measured at ages 31-40) than other siblings. After examining other outcomes, they conclude that 
birth order is not a major source of the family impact on economic outcomes and thus not a major 
source of inequality of opportunity.2  
To our knowledge, the work by Kantarevic and Mechoulan, 2005, stands out as the only paper to 
date that finds significant effects of birth order on (hourly) earnings. The authors use data from the 
Childbirth and Adoption History File (CAHF), a special supplemental file of the US PSID (Panel 
Study on Income Dynamics)3 and find that, when the age of the mother at birth is omitted from the 
vector of covariates, birth order has no statistically significant effect on earnings. When age is 
                                                        
2 Yet, in a recent contribution, De Haan, Plug and Romero, 2012, find that birth order affects early outcomes in 
Ecuador. 
3 Their sample is rather small (3000 observations) and pools together males and females. 
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included, they report that the hourly earnings of firstborns are 6.3% higher than those of 
laterborns.4 
 
2. The Data  
In this paper, we use the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a 
multidisciplinary and cross-national European data set containing current and retrospective 
information on labour market activity, retirement, health and socioeconomic status of more than 
25,000 individuals aged 50 or older. We draw our data from the first three waves of the survey, and 
in particular the third wave, SHARELIFE, which contains detailed retrospective data on life and 
labour market histories. We focus on males because of the problems associated with female labour 
force participation and exclude the self-employed and people aged 50+ who have worked less than 5 
years.5 In SHARELIFE, survey participants are asked to report the amount they were paid monthly 
after taxes each time they started an employment spell. They are also asked the monthly net wage in 
their current job (if they are still working) and the monthly net wage at the end of the main job in 
their career (if they have already retired). For wages and other benefits to be comparable across time 
and country, we follow Brunello, Weber and Weiss, 2012, and transform them into 2006 Euro using 
PPP exchange rates and CPI indices.  
We use these rich data to construct for each individual several measures of real annual earnings, that 
span his working life from the first to the current or last job. We start with the entry wage , 
defined as the initial wage in the first job. Since information on this wage is missing for about 25 
percent of the individuals in our final sample, we use predictive mean matching to impute missing 
data and obtain .6 We also compute the initial wage in the second and third job, the current or 
last wage, the wages at age 30, 40 and 50 and lifetime earnings.  
We define lifetime earnings (or permanent income) as the income flowing from the asset value of 
working at age ten. The construction of this variable and of wages at different ages is described in 
detail both in Appendix A of Brunello, Weber and Weiss, 2012, and in Weiss, 2012. In short, for 
those who have had only one job in their working life (more than 20 percent of the sample), we 
interpolate between the first wage and the last (or current) wage. For those who have had more than 
one job, we observe the first wage in each job as well as the current or last wage. For this second 
group, we regress current wages on labour market experience, a rich set of controls, which include 
                                                        
4 The statistical significance of this effect falls from 5 to 10% when father’s education and the age of the father at 
childbirth are added to the covariates. 
5 Murphy and Welch, 1990, also exclude the self-employed in their analysis of age-earnings profiles.  
6 As shown in Section 4, our results do not depend on imputation. Predictive mean matching replaces a missing value 
with the observed value for which the predicted value is the closest to that of the missing value. See Weiss, 2012, for 
details. The percentage of missing values is very similar among firstborns (23.2%) and laterborns (24.3%).  
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education, occupation, sector of activity, cohort and country effects and economic conditions at age 
ten, and the interactions of these controls with experience. We then use the estimated coefficients 
and the first wage in each job to generate both the final wage in the job and within-job earnings 
growth.7 With this information in hand, we compute annual wages at age 30, 40 and 50 and the 
discounted value of earnings at age ten, using a 2 percent discount rate. 8  
Our dataset has the advantage that it covers eleven European countries, and the potential drawback 
that it uses long recall data. These data are subject to measurement error, possibly not of the classical 
type. However, as discussed in Brunello, Weber and Weiss, 2012, validation studies have found that 
recall bias is not severe in SHARELIFE data, arguably because of the state-of-the-art elicitation 
methods used: respondents are helped to locate events along the time line, starting from domains 
that are more easily remembered, and then asked progressively more details about them.9  
Our final sample consists of 4,280 males born between 1935 and 1956 and residing in Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland.10 While waves 1 and 2 of the survey have information on order of birth (“Were you 
the oldest child, the youngest child, or somewhere in-between?”), wave 3 has data on individual and 
household conditions at age ten. We rely on answers to the question “Including yourself, how many 
people lived in your household at this accommodation when you were ten?” to measure gross family 
size, which includes both siblings and other members.11 We also use the answers to the question 
“Who lived in the household when ten” to estimate net family size, or the number of siblings, by 
subtracting other members (parents, grandparents and other relatives) from gross family size. In our 
data, the average household size at age ten is 5.44 members, and the average number of siblings is 
3.34.12 As shown in Table 1, the distribution of siblings varies with whether the interviewed 
individual is the oldest child or not, mainly because 24 percent of oldest children are only children. 
Compared with the distribution of siblings in the Norwegian sample used by BDS, our sample 
comprises households with a higher number of siblings, which reflects both the different sample 
period – the individuals are born between 1935 and 1956 in our sample and between 1912 and 1984 
in BDS’s sample - and the fact that our sample includes also Southern European countries, where 
                                                        
7  Brunello, Weber and Weiss, 2012, show that estimates are broadly unaffected when they replace labour market 
experience with age and exclude education in the wage regressions used to generate both the end wage in each job and 
within-job earnings growth for individuals who have had more than one job.  
8 We are very grateful to Christoph Weiss for providing the codes required to compute earnings profiles and lifetime 
earnings from the third wave of the survey SHARE. 
9 Brunello, Weber and Weiss, 2012, validate this procedure by comparing predicted and actual wages in the German 
GSOEP and find that predictions based on the methodology suggested in the text are accurate. 
10 By selecting only individuals born from 1935 onwards, we reduce the role of survivorship bias (see Modin, 2002) and 
recall bias for older workers, the weight of imputation, and also make sure that no individual in our sample entered the 
labour market before the second World War. 
11 Needless to say, household size at age ten is less correlated with order of birth than household size at birth. For the 
small minority of individuals for which this information was not available – around 2 percent of our sample – we 
reconstruct sibship size using information on the number of siblings alive at the time of the first SHARE interview. 
12 We recode the number of siblings so that the top category is 10 or more.  
63 
 
the number of siblings is typically higher (2.90 in Sweden and 3.88 in Spain).  
The third wave of SHARE also contains a wealth of data on household and individual conditions at 
age ten. We define the vector X as comprising the following covariates: whether the household was 
located in a rural area or a village, dummies for the profession of the main breadwinner, a dummy 
for the presence of hunger episodes before age 15, a dummy indicating whether parents smoked, 
drank heavily o had mental health problems during childhood, a dummy if one parent died before 
age 35, and dummies for the presence of parents, grandparents or foster parents in the household.13 
 Unfortunately, our information on the age of the parent at birth is available only for those parents 
who were still alive at the time of the interview. We check whether omitting this critical piece of 
information significantly affects our estimates by running our regressions with and without the age 
of the mother at birth in the sub-sample where this measure is available. As reported below, our 
evidence suggests that omitting maternal age at birth does not affect our estimates in a qualitative 
way.  
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the main variables used in this study, separately by order of 
birth (firstborns and laterborns). The statistics for the full sample are reported in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. These tables suggest that firstborns are on average better educated than laterborns (12.59 
versus 11.49 years of schooling), start working later (at age 19.6 versus 18.6) and have a substantially 
higher entry wage (11,786 real euro versus 10,577, a 11.4% premium). This “premium” declines with 
the second and third job and with age and is close to 3.3% in the current or last wage (23,546 versus 
22,787). Firstborns have fewer siblings (1.51 versus 2.91) than laterborns. Furthermore, the 
households where firstborns lived at age ten were more likely to be located in urban areas and to 
have a white collar breadwinner, indicating that household wealth was also higher. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology  
We estimate the following linear regression model:  
 
       (1) 
 
where the subscripts i, j and t are for individuals, households and time, w is annual real earnings, O is 
a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is firstborn and to 0 otherwise14, F is the number of siblings in 
the household when the individual was ten, the vector X is described in the previous section, c and 
s are cohort and country fixed effects and  is an error term, which can be decomposed as 
                                                        
13 We exclude information such as the number of books in the household and housing facilities at age ten because they 
could be affected by birth order, as suggested by De Haan, Plug and Romero, 2012. 
14 As in BDS, we treat children without siblings as firstborns. As discussed later in the paper, sensitivity analysis which 
excludes firstborns yields very similar results. 
itcsijiit XFOw  ln
it
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, where  and  are family and individual fixed effects and v is random noise. 
Since we are interested in the effects of being firstborn on earnings at different points of the life 
cycle, we use as dependent variable (in logs): the entry wage, the initial wage in the second and third 
job, the wage at ages 30, 40 and 50, the current or last wage and lifetime earnings.  
As discussed by Bagger et al, 2013, family size can be viewed as the outcome of inter-temporal utility 
maximization by altruistic parents, and the family fixed effect  as a function of parental spending 
and preferences, partly unobserved by the analyst. Parental choice implies that family size is a 
function of . Since parents typically choose size and individual investment in human capital, 
which affects earnings, the family fixed effect influences individual outcomes directly. Birth order, 
on the other hand, depends directly on family size and only indirectly on the family fixed effect. 
The identification of birth order effects in Eq. (1) is complicated by the fact that, while the order of 
birth may well be considered as good as randomly assigned within a given family, the question is less 
clear-cut when variation between families is also used, as we do. As shown in Table 2, firstborn 
individuals belong more frequently to smaller families, and smaller families are not only typically 
better off, but may also devote more time and economic resources to each child (the quality-quantity 
trade-off discussed by Becker and Lewis, 1973). Since family size depends both on observable and 
on unobservable parental traits that may also be related to earnings capacity, the omission of some 
of these traits in Eq.(1) biases the estimated coefficient of family size, and contaminates the 
estimates of birth order effects.  
BDS address this problem by using two approaches: the first approach relies on selection on 
observables and consists of including a rich set of covariates describing economic and social 
conditions of families, in the hope that this set mops up the family fixed effect. In the second 
approach, they use family fixed effects, thereby focusing on within-family variation in educational 
outcomes. We capture some household traits by conditioning our estimates on the covariates 
included in vector X. When these effects are netted out and we estimate (1) by ordinary least 
squares, the bias in the estimated coefficient of birth order is  
 
    (2) 
 
Since birth order depends on  only indirectly, 0),( jiOCov  . Furthermore, 0),( iiOCov   if 
there are no genes for being firstborn.15 Therefore, the bias in (2) is driven by the negative 
                                                        
15 BDS, 2005, argue that “…in general, there are no genes for being a firstborn or a laterborn so it is unlikely that the 
birth order effects we find have genetic or biological causes...”, p.20. De Haan, Plug and Rosero, 2012, have recently 
questioned this assumption on the ground that that laterborns may face higher prenatal environmental risks because of 
increased levels of maternal antibody, that may attack the development of the brain in utero.  
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correlation between order of birth and family size ),( ji FOCov  and by the OLS bias in estimated 
family size effects ( ) OLS . By removing this bias, family fixed effects guarantee that the estimate 
of birth order effects is consistent. Alternatively, one can set to zero the covariance between order 
of birth and family size by estimating separate regressions by family size, as done for instance by 
BDS. 
Since in our data we do not observe multiple members within the same original family, we cannot 
estimate (1) using family fixed effects. We therefore estimate Eq. (1) by family size and show that 
the qualitative results based on these estimates are broadly unaffected when we pool different family 
sizes. This suggests that the bias induced by pooling has relatively small effects on the coefficient of 
interest, which measures the effects of birth order on labour market outcomes. Reassuringly for our 
estimation strategy, BDS find that birth order effects on educational attainment are rather 
homogeneous across families of different size, and that their estimates do not vary much when 
family fixed effects are added to tease out unobservable family characteristics.  
Notice that empirical strategies that rely on family fixed effects are not entirely free of problems. To 
see why, consider that within a given family firstborn and laterborn children usually belong to 
different birth cohorts, and therefore tend to face different macroeconomic and labour market 
conditions at several key moments of their lives.16 This may confound the effect of birth order on 
earnings.  
Since we have measures of real annual earnings at different points of an individual working life as 
well as a measure of lifetime earnings, we can study how the effects of birth order on earnings vary 
over the life cycle. To illustrate, suppose that firstborns have a higher initial wage in their first job 
than laterborns, and assume that we can observe the wage of both groups at age 50. We can then 
estimate  
 
 ݈݊ ௜ܹହ଴ െ ݈݊ ௜ܹி ൌ ሺߙହ଴ െ ߙிሻ ൅ ሺߚହ଴ െ ߚிሻ ௜ܱ ൅ ሺߛହ଴ െ ߛிሻܨ௝ ൅ ሺߜହ଴ െ ߜிሻ ௜ܺ ൅ ߶௦ ൅ ߶௖ ൅ ሺݒ௜ହ଴ െ ݒ௜ிሻ     (3) 
 
where the subscripts 50 and F are for the late and the entry wage, and the parameters  are country 
and cohort effects. This approach has the advantage that it differences out both family and 
individual fixed effects. Assuming that , by estimating (3) we can evaluate whether the 
positive effect of birth order on earnings persists ( ), increases ( ) or declines 
( ) over time.  
                                                        
16 For instance, Angelini and Mierau, 2012, find negative effects of bad macroeconomic conditions at birth on childhood 
health. Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009, estimate negative effects of recessions during early adulthood on self-
confidence, locus of control and other beliefs. Lindeboom et al., 2006, find negative mortality effects of a recession at 
birth. Most relevant for our purposes, Oreopoulos et al., 2010, find negative effects of graduating during a recession on 
employment and earnings – especially in the short run. 
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4. Main Results 
We introduce the presentation of our estimates by showing in Table 3 the estimated effect of the 
dummy “oldest child” on educational attainment, both by family size (two, three and four siblings) 
and by pooling all sizes. We find a positive and statistically significant effect, that ranges between 
0.645 and 0.749 years of education, similar to the average effect estimated by BDS for Norway 
(0.656)17 but much higher than the effect estimated by Björklund and Jäntti for Sweden (0.248).  
Our key results are presented in Table 4, where we show estimated birth order effects both on the 
entry and on the current or last wage, separately by number of siblings18 (2, 3 or 4 siblings) and by 
pooling together all different family sizes, after controlling for sibship size. The table is organized in 
eight columns, four for each definition of earnings. We find that the dummy “oldest child” has a 
positive, sizeable and statistically significant effect on the entry wage. Depending on the number of 
siblings, our estimates suggest that firstborns earn at labour market entry approximately 13.5 to 
18.6% more than laterborns, a substantial amount. Yet, this gain is gone by age 50 or later.  
The table also shows that our qualitative results are not affected if we pool families with different 
number of siblings. For instance, we estimate that firstborns enjoy a 13.7% premium with respect to 
laterborns in their entry wage and no premium at all in their current wage. Because of this, we will 
focus the presentation of our results in the rest of this section on the sample that pools all family 
sizes.19 In Table 5, we look at earnings measured at different points of the lifecycle (age 30, 40 and 
50), as well as at lifetime earnings, and confirm that order of birth matters only at labour market 
entry.  
Since some of the data have been imputed, one may worry that our findings are driven by 
imputation. Table 6 compares estimated birth order effects on entry and current earnings in the 
samples with and without imputation, and shows that these effects are quite similar. Without 
imputed data, the marginal effect on the entry wage is slightly smaller than with imputation (12.9% 
vs. 13.7%). However, the two estimates are not statistically different.  
An additional source of concern is that the estimates in Table 4 do not control for the age of the 
mother at birth. This can affect our estimates, as parents of firstborns are likely to be younger than 
parents of laterborns. Unfortunately, our data include information on the age of parents at birth only 
for the interviewed individuals whose parents were still alive at the time of the survey. Given that 
the survey focuses on individuals aged 50+, this is only a minority of the original sample. 
Nonetheless, for this smaller sample we can compare estimates with and without controlling for the 
                                                        
17 This effect is computed as the arithmetic mean of the effect of being the second to the tenth child. See Table 8, 
column 1 of BDS. 
18  Similarly to Price, 2008, we stop at 4 siblings because sample size would fall drastically if we were to consider 
households with a higher number of siblings. 
19 Detailed results by family size are available from the authors upon request. 
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age of the mother at birth. As reported in Table 7, including the age of the mother at birth as 
additional covariate in the regressions has virtually no effect on our estimates.  
Our results suggest that the effect of being firstborn on earnings is temporary and dies out as 
individuals increase their experience in the labour market. To confirm this, Table 8 presents the 
estimated effects of birth order on earnings growth over the life cycle, measured alternatively as the 
difference between earnings at 30, 40, 50 or current earnings and the entry wage. By differencing 
individual wages over the life cycle, we are able to purge our estimates from fixed family and 
individual effects. In all cases, the estimated coefficient associated to being firstborn is negative, 
statistically significant and between -13.5 and -16.2%, confirming that firstborns may have an early 
advantage, but that laterborns quickly catch up.  
We investigate whether the birth order effect disappears when we control for differences in 
educational attainment by adding years of schooling as an additional covariate in the earnings growth 
regressions, where the fixed individual and family effects which correlate with education have been 
removed. Table 9 shows that education attracts a negative and statistically significant coefficient, and 
that the effect of birth order remains even after conditioning on education, although with a lower 
absolute value. This finding suggests that education is not the only “mediator” of the effects of birth 
order on earnings.  
Finally, we consider the effects of birth order on the probability of being without a job at different 
ages, starting with age 20. We estimate linear probability models and report in Table A2 that 
firstborns have a higher probability of being without a job early on in their career (at age 20 and 25) 
and are as likely as laterborns to be employed at later ages. Clearly, this effect reflects the fact that 
firstborns are more likely to stay in school longer.  
 
5. Discussion 
Our key findings can be summarized as follows: a) birth order effects on earnings are temporary and 
decline with labour market experience; b) the effects of birth order on earnings cannot be fully 
explained by the higher educational attainment of firstborns; c) higher education and earnings 
growth are negatively correlated. The last result is consistent both with the learning model of Altonji 
and Pierret, 2001, and with the human capital model if early and later learning episodes are 
substitutes rather than complements.20 These models, however, need to be adequately adapted to 
encompass also findings a) and b).  
                                                        
20 In their classical paper on employer learning and wage dynamics, Altonji and Pierret, 2001, have shown that, when 
employers observe schooling but have only repeated noisy observations on cognitive skills, which affect productivity and 
are positively correlated with schooling, the effect of education on earnings declines with labour market experience, in 
line with our results. The human capital model is also consistent with our results if the earnings capacity invested in 
human capital during work declines with education. Mincer reports that returns to education decline with experience 
(see Willis, 1986, Table 10.5). Heckman et al, 2006, use US Census data and show that log earnings – experience profiles 
are parallel across schooling levels from 1940 to 1970 and converging from 1980 to 1990.  
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For this purpose, it is useful to briefly describe the labour market careers of firstborns and 
laterborns and to highlight the importance of labour mobility in the process of catching up of the 
latter with the former. Table 10 shows that firstborns are less mobile: they are 4.1 percentage points 
less likely than laterborns to have more than a single job in their careers, and more likely to be 
employed in their first job as white collar workers or as public sector employees.21 These jobs are 
typically more stable than private sector jobs (see Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009), and in some 
countries they are also associated to milder age earnings profiles.22 
Define those who were still in their first job by age 30 as stayers and those who have moved to new 
jobs by that age as movers. Table 11 shows that firstborns at age 30 or 40 are more likely to be 
stayers.23 For both firstborns and laterborns, the average log wage at age 30 can be written as 
݈݋݃ ଷܹ଴ ൌ ݌ଷ଴݈݋݃ ଷܹ଴ௌ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ݈݋݃ ଷܹ଴ெ, where the superscripts S and M are for stayers and movers, 
and p is the probability of being in the first job at age 30. In the case of firstborns, the log wage turns 
out to be equal to 9.506=0.421*9.300+0.579*9.656. In the case of laterborns, it is equal to 
9.513=0.356*9.250+0.644*9.659. We notice that the average wage for laterborns at age 30 is only 
about 0.7% higher than the wage for firstborns (9.513 versus 9.506), in spite of the fact that 
firstborn stayers earn on average 5% more than laterborn stayers (9.3 versus 9.250). Since the 
average wage of movers is very similar across birth orders (9.656 versus 9.659), laterborns did catch 
up by age 30 because they were more likely to have moved by that age into better paid jobs: their 
probability of having done so was 0.644 rather than 0.579 for firstborns. Similar results hold for 
wages at age 40.24 We conclude that firstborns start with a good match - sometimes a white collar or 
a public job - and stay in this match for a relatively long period. Laterborns instead struggle from 
initial low wages to higher wages by hopping quickly to new jobs.  
Why do we observe these differences in labour market turnover? An important reason is education: 
since firstborns are better educated, they are more likely to locate a good initial match. An additional 
candidate factor, we believe, is that laterborns are more willing than firstborns to engage in risky 
behaviour and change employer more frequently. Allen et al, 2005, have shown that the relationship 
between turnover intentions and turnover is stronger for those lower in risk aversion. In support of 
                                                        
21  Since 10.2 and 8.7 percent of laterborns are white collars and in the public sector respectively, the estimated 
percentage difference is equivalent to a 25.5 and a 35 percent gap. Our results are qualitatively unaltered when we add 
education as an additional control. 
22 Cappellari, 2002, for Italy and Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993, for the Netherlands show that age earnings profiles are 
steeper in the private sector. Conversely, Dustmann and van Soest, 1998, show that profiles are steeper in the German 
public sector, and Disney et al., 2009 present mixed evidence for the UK. Following Zajonc, 1976, we speculate that 
firstborns may have had to share with parents the responsibility of growing younger siblings. This could have induced 
them to invest effort and parental networks to locate a good and stable first job and to keep it for a longer period of 
time. In support of this view, Table A3 in the Appendix shows that the probability that a firstborn lands a white collar or 
a public sector job as his first job increases with the number of siblings. 
23 Table A4 in the Appendix compares stayers and movers at age 30 and 40 and show that stayers – who are more likely 
to be firstborns – start on average their second job – if ever - at age 39, more than 17 years later than movers.. 
24 We have also examined whether being firstborn has had any effect on experiencing unemployment but find no 
evidence that this is the case. 
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this view, the psychological literature has pointed out that laterborns tend to be more rebel and 
reckless with respect to firstborns,25 who instead have a tendency to be more conscientious and self-
disciplined (see Sulloway, 2007). Psychologists explain these differences by referring to the fact that 
while firstborns are endowed with higher parental resources,26 laterborns are put under greater 
pressure to obtain the same returns from more limited resources and thus need to play riskier moves 
(see Wang et al, 2009).  
To verify whether laterborns are less risk averse than firstborns, we use principal component 
analysis to extract the latent variable ρ from the vector Г, which includes five indicators of risk 
attitudes available in our data: whether the individual has ever bought private retirement accounts 
and life insurance packages, the body mass index and smoking and drinking habits.27 Since this 
variable increases with risky health behaviours and decreases with the willingness to buy insurance 
and retirement accounts, we interpret it as a measure of risk taking. We regress ρ on birth order and 
the other covariates and report our estimates in Table 12. We find that the effect of being firstborn 
on the willingness to take risks is negative and statistically significant, independently of whether we 
control or not for the mediating role of education. 
We use these results to augment the human capital model so that it can account for findings a) and 
b). 28 The augmented Mincerian equation is given by  
 
itijiitiiitiitiit fXxRdRdxSbxcSbaw   21211ln     (4) 
 
 
where S, R and x are respectively years of schooling, risk taking attitudes and labour market 
experience. Dohmen et al, 2007, and Hartog et al, 2003, have shown that wages are increasing in risk 
taking attitudes ( )01 d . We have shown that firstborns are more risk averse than laterborns, 
implying that if iO  is a dummy for being firstborn and 01 r , then 
 
iii zOrrR  10           (5) 
                                                        
25 In his extensive monograph “Born to rebel”, Sullloway, 1996, shows descriptive evidence that firstborns have always 
been more prone to support the status quo, and that laterborns have been more willing to challenge it. Nisbett, 1968, 
and Sulloway and Zweigenhaft, 2010, respectively show that laterborns are more likely to play risky sports than 
firstborns, and when playing the same sport they are more likely to carry out riskier moves. Zweigenhaft and von 
Ammon, 2000, show that being a laterborn positively affects the number of times a college student was arrested. Herrera 
et al., 2003, show how these findings mirror general beliefs about personality traits of first and laterborns. 
26 See also Lehmann et al., 2012, for evidence on differences in prenatal investments across first and laterborns. 
27 Smoking habits are captured by a dummy indicating whether the individual has ever smoked, and drinking habits by a 
dummy indicating whether the individual drinks alcohol on a daily basis. 
28 The learning model could also be augmented by positing that birth order captures other individual attitudes and non-
cognitive skills accumulated before schooling (see Cunha and Heckman, 2007, and Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006). 
This extension would require, however, that employers can observe birth order. This seems unlikely in the presence of 
rules prohibiting discrimination.  
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Placing (5) into (4) yields 
 
itijiitiiitiitiit fXxOrdOrdxSbxdrcSbdraw   12112201110 )()(ln  
 
and by taking first differences we obtain 
 
itiiit OrdSbdrcw  122201 )(ln        (6) 
 
Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Shaw, 1996, finds that wage growth is positively 
correlated with preferences for risk taking. In our setup, this implies that 02 d , and that firstborns 
have lower earnings growth, in line with finding b). To explain finding a), notice that the entry wage 
is the wage at zero labour market experience (t=0), so that  
 
0111100 )(ln iijiiii fXOrdSbdraw         (7) 
Furthermore, education is higher among firstborns, so the positive effect of being firstborn on the 
early wage requires that the positive effect of having higher education more than compensates the 
negative effect of being less willing to take risks.29 The temporary nature of the advantage of being 
firstborn then follows from finding b).  
 
6. Extensions and Robustness Checks 
In this section, we provide a few extensions and sensitivities to the baseline results discussed in the 
previous section. First, we report in Table A5 the estimates of birth order effects when single 
children are excluded from the sample, and show that our results are hardly affected. Second, we 
investigate sources of heterogeneity in birth order effects by splitting the sample according to 
whether individuals lived in urban or rural areas at age ten, parental occupation at age ten was in 
blue or white collar jobs and finally between countries where the prevalent religion is protestant or 
catholic.  
In rural areas, parental preferences for oldest children may have been stronger than in urban areas, 
with implications for labour market success. The estimates reported in Table A6 show that 
firstborns who were living in a rural area at age ten earn a higher premium in their first job with 
respect to laterborns than firstborns who lived in urban area. Yet, since the difference between the 
                                                        
29 To see this, define iii OS   10 and substitute this in Eq.(7). We obtain that the marginal effect of being 
firstborn on earnings is 1111 rdb  . 
 
71 
 
estimated coefficients – reported in columns (1) and (2) of the table – is not statistically significant, 
we consider this evidence as suggestive at best.30  
Next, we estimate our regressions separately for individuals who had parents in a blue collar or in a 
white collar job during childhood. We find that firstborns with a blue collar father earn a slightly 
higher premium over laterborns than firstborns with a white collar father. However, as in the 
previous case, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients do not vary by parental 
group (Table A7). Finally, we report in Table A8 our estimates when the sample is separated in two 
groups of countries, depending on the prevailing religion in each country. Since protestants see 
success at work as a manifestation of the benevolence of God, we expect protestant parents to be 
less likely to favour first or later born children. Therefore, the wage premium in the initial job should 
be smaller in protestant than in catholic countries. Excluding Germany and Switzerland from the 
sample, because these two countries are not obviously protestant or catholic, we identify as 
protestant countries Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands and as catholic countries the rest 
(Austria, Italy, Czechia, France and Spain). Our results do not confirm our priors, as we find that the 
effect of order of birth on wages does not significantly differ across groups of countries.  
 
Conclusions  
While there is substantial empirical research investigating the effects of birth order on educational 
attainment, little has been done to explore the effects on earnings. Some of the relatively few studies 
that have addressed this issue have found that the effects of birth order on earnings are rather 
negligible, in spite of the significant effects on educational attainment. This is puzzling if one 
believes that the key reason why birth order matters for wages is because it affects education.  
We have used a sample of 4,280 European males born between 1935 and 1956 to study the effects 
of birth order on earnings over the life cycle. We have found that firstborns earn on average a 13.7% 
premium in their entry wage. This advantage, however, is completely gone by age 30. We have also 
found that being a firstborn has no statistically significant effect on earnings at age 50 or on current 
earnings, which are typically at a later age. We have estimated the effects of order of birth and 
education on earnings growth, measured at different points of the working life cycle, and found that 
both attract a negative and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that education is not the 
only “mediator” of birth order effects on earnings.  
We have interpreted these results by combining two facts: firstborns have both higher education and 
higher risk aversion than laterborns. Using these facts, for which we find support both in this paper 
and in the economic and psychological literature, we have argued that the observed patterns of 
earnings can be explained by differences in labour turnover. On the one hand, better education is a 
                                                        
30 We test differences between coefficients by using the suest command in Stata 12.  
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key reason why firstborns start with a better match. On the other hand, the higher propensity to 
take risks explains why laterborns change jobs more frequently and enjoy higher wage growth than 
firstborns.  
Our paper emphasizes the importance of using a life cycle approach in the study of the effects of 
birth order on earnings. This approach allows us to distinguish between temporary and permanent 
effects, unlike cross – sectional approaches that use a single observation of earnings for each 
individual. Since we have shown that the effect of birth order varies along the life cycle, choosing a 
single point in this cycle is likely to yield a misleading view of the relationship between birth order 
and earnings.  
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Tables  
Table 1. Distribution of the number of brothers and sisters in the household at age ten 
Number of siblings at age ten Oldest child Intermediate or 
youngest child 
1 24.09 0 
2 36.64 26.50 
3 20.26 26.33 
4 10.50 18.35 
5 4.28 10.72 
6 2.00 6.69 
7 1.14 4.71 
8 0.57 3.09 
9 0.06 1.15 
10+ 0.46 2.45 
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Table 2. Summary statistics, by birth order 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number 
of obs. 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
obs. 
    
  Oldest 
sibling 
Other 
sibling 
 
  
First wage 11,786.46 11,931.81 1,752 10,577.37 13,055.06 2,528
Second wage 18,145.44 17,149.13 1,276 16,343.13 15,476.64 1,981
Third wage 22,307.85 19,460.54 849 20,541.04 16,688.16 1,364
Wage at 30 18,281.29 15,213.39 1,718 18,641.52 15,837.45 2,473
Wage at 40 22,162.24 17,644.81 1,741 21,586.36 16,490.78 2,503
Wage at 50 23,723.05 17,132.32 1,703 22,625.79 15,799.70 2,437
Current or last wage 23,546.84 15,161.50 1,752 22,787.13 15,169.60 2,528
Lifetime earnings net of pensions 8,844.11 5,580.00 1,752 8,676.27 5,486.53 2,528
  
Not employed at age 30 0.019 0.138 1,752 0.022 0.146 2,528
Not employed at age 40 0.006 0.079 1,752 0.010 0.099 2,528
Not employed at age 50 0.028 0.165 1,752 0.036 0.186 2,528
Age when first job started 19.602 4.165 1,752 18.587 4.060 2,528
Age when last job ended 58.163 4.429 1,752 57.786 4.404 2,528
Oldest child 1 - 1,752 0 - 2,528
Only child 0.241 0.428 1,752 0 - 2,528
Number of siblings (including the 
interviewed person) 2.512 1.456 1,752 3.917 1.944 2,528 
  
Mother in the house at ten 0.965 0.183 1,752 0.972 0.165 2,528
Father in the house at ten 0.913 0.282 1,752 0.930 0.255 2,528
Foster mother in the house at ten 0.021 0.142 1,752 0.011 0.105 2,528
Foster father in the house at ten 0.032 0.176 1,752 0.017 0.128 2,528
Grandparents in the house at ten 0.147 0.354 1,752 0.106 0.308 2,528
Other relatives in the house at ten 0.059 0.236 1,752 0.049 0.215 2,528
Other non-relatives in the house at ten 0.016 0.125 1,752 0.022 0.146 2,528
Hunger episodes before age 15 0.031 0.174 1,752 0.042 0.200 2,528
Parents smoke, drank or had mental 
problems 0.691 0.462 1,752 0.700 0.458 2,528 
At least one parent died before turning 
35 0.038 0.192 1,752 0.017 0.129 2,528 
Breadwinner at ten is blue collar 0.661 0.474 1,752 0.722 0.448 2,528
Lived in rural area 0.378 0.485 1,752 0.439 0.496 2,528
Years of education 12.593 4.091 1,752 11.487 4.250 2,528
Age of mother at birth 23.876 3.960 764 27.671 4.707 692
Source. SHARE survey waves 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
  
78 
 
Table 3. Birth order effects on education, by number of siblings. Dependent variable: number of years of schooling 
   
 Two siblings Three siblings Four siblings All siblings 
          
Oldest child 0.749*** 0.676*** 0.706** 0.645*** 
 (0.205) (0.248) (0.336) (0.123) 
     
Number of siblings - - - -0.123*** 
 
 
  (0.032) 
Observations 1,312 1,021 648 4,280 
R-squared 0.243 0.253 0.320 0.254 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence.  
 
 
Table 4. Birth order effects on real earnings. By family size and pooling sizes. Dependent variable: log real wage 
 Entry 
wage 
2 siblings 
Entry 
wage 
3 siblings 
Entry 
wage 
4 siblings 
Entry wage 
all siblings 
Wage in 
current or 
last job 
2 siblings 
Wage in 
current or 
last job 
3 siblings 
Wage in 
current or 
last job 
4 siblings 
Wage in 
current or 
last job all 
siblings 
         
Oldest child 0.135** 0.145** 0.186* 0.137*** 0.004 -0.023 0.030 -0.011 
 (0.056) (0.064) (0.098) (0.033) (0.031) (0.039) (0.057) (0.020) 
         
Number of 
siblings 
- - - -0.032*** 
(0.009) 
- - - -0.021*** 
(0.005) 
         
Observations 1,312 1,021 648 4,280 1,312 1,021 648 4,280 
R Squared 0.236 0.255 0.250 0.233 0.244 0.264 0.227 0.210 
         
Notes. All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence.  
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Table 5. Birth order effects on earnings – by pooling family sizes 
    
 Entry wage  Wage at 
30 
Wage at 
40 
Wage at 
50 
Wage in 
current or 
last job 
Lifetime 
earnings 
        
Oldest child 0.137*** -0.024 -0.002 0.007 -0.011 0.000 
 (0.033) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) 
Number of siblings -0.032*** -0.011 -0.015** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.015*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
       
Observations 4,280 4,191 4,244 4,140 4,280 4,280 
R-squared 0.233 0.221 0.208 0.205 0.210 0.266 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence.  
 
Table 6. Birth order effects on earnings – with and without imputation 
      
 Entry wage 
no 
imputation 
Entry wage 
with 
imputation 
Wage in current 
or last job no 
imputation 
Wage in current or 
last job with 
imputation 
        
Oldest child 0.129*** 0.137*** -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.020) (0.020) 
Number of siblings -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Observations 3,262 4,280 4,278 4,280 
R-squared 0.247 0.233 0.211 0.210 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence.  
 
 
80 
 
Table 7. Birth order effects on earnings – with and without controls for age of mother at birth 
 Entry wage  Entry wage  Wage in current 
or last job 
Wage in current or 
last job 
     
Oldest child 0.187*** 0.175*** 0.005 -0.015 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.035) (0.033) 
Number of siblings -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.022** -0.022** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age of mother at birth 0.003 - 0.005 - 
 (0.007)  (0.004)  
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456 
R-squared 0.262 0.261 0.204 0.202 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence.  
 
 
Table 8. Birth order effects on wage growth over the life cycle 
 Wage at 30 –  
Entry wage 
Wage at 40 –
Entry wage 
Wage at 50 –
Entry wage 
Wage in current 
or last job 
- first wage 
    
Oldest child -0.162*** -0.135*** -0.142*** -0.148*** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Number of 
siblings 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
     
Observations 4,191 4,244 4,140 4,280 
R-squared 0.082 0.096 0.106 0.137 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence.  
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Table 9. Birth order and education effects on wage growth over the life cycle 
 Wage at 30 –  
Entry wage 
Wage at 40 –
Entry wage 
Wage at 50 –
Entry wage 
Wage in current 
or last job 
- first wage 
    
Oldest child -0.131*** -0.103*** -0.110*** -0.119*** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Years of 
schooling 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
-0.050*** 
(0.004) 
-0.048*** 
(0.004) 
-0.045*** 
(0.005) 
     
Number of 
siblings 
0.016* 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
     
Observations 4,191 4,244 4,140 4,280 
R-squared 0.110 0.123 0.132 0.156 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence.  
 
Table 10. Birth order, number of jobs held and type of first job 
Had more than 
one job 
First job was full 
time 
First job was 
white collar 
First job was in 
public sector 
          
Oldest child -0.041*** -0.004 0.029*** 0.036*** 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Number of siblings 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Observations 4,280 4,280 4,275 4,280 
R-squared 0.0654 0.030 0.118 0.062 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence. 
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Table 11. Birth order effects on the probability of being still in the first job at selected ages 
Still in first job at 30 Still in first job at 40
Oldest child 0.058*** 0. 051***
 (0.016) (0.015)
Number of siblings -0.004 -0.003
 (0.004) (0.004)
 
Observations 4,191 4,244
R-squared 0.084 0.083
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence. 
 
 
 
Table 12. Birth order, education and the propensity to take risks 
    
Oldest child -0.071** -0.058** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
Years of schooling - -0.021*** 
  (0.003) 
Number of siblings 0.006 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
   
Observations 3,929 3,929 
R-squared 0.189 0.197 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, 
grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Summary statistics  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
observations 
 
First wage  11,072.31 12,619.95 4,280
Second wage 17,049.22 16,173.88 3,257
Third wage 21,218.86 17,819.29 2,213
Wage at 30 18,493.85 15,583.83 4,191
Wage at 40 21,822.60 16,974.00 4,244
Wage at 50 23,077.15 16,367.90 4,140
Current or last wage 23,098.11 15,169.12 4,280
Lifetime earnings net of pensions 8,744.98 5,524.95 4,280
Not employed at age 30 0.021 0.143 4,280
Not employed at age 40 0.008 0.091 4,280
Not employed at age 50 0.033 0.178 4,280
Age when first job started 19.002 4.133 4,280
Age when last job ended 57.940 4.418 4,280
Oldest child 0.409 0.492 4,280
Only child 0.099 0.298 4,280
Number of siblings (including the interviewed person) 3.342 1.891 4,280
Mother in the house at ten 0.969 0.173 4,280
Father in the house at ten 0.923 0.266 4,280
Foster mother in the house at ten 0.015 0.121 4,280
Foster father in the house at ten 0.023 0.150 4,280
Grandparents in the house at ten 0.123 0.328 4,280
Other relatives in the house at ten 0.053 0.224 4,280
Other non-relatives in the house at ten 0.019 0.138 4,280
Hunger episodes before age 15 0.037 0.190 4,280
Parents smoke, drank or had mental problems 0.696 0.460 4,280
At least one parent died before turning 35 0.026 0.158 4,280
Breadwinner at ten is blue collar 0.697 0.460 4,280
Lived in rural area 0.414 0.493 4,280
Years of education 11.940 4.220 4,280
Age of mother at birth 25.679 4.727 1,456
Source: SHARE survey waves 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
Table A2. Birth order effects on the probability of not being employed at different ages 
 Not 
employed at 
20 
Not 
employed 
at 25 
Not 
employed at 
30 
Not 
employed 
at 35 
Not 
employed at 
40 
Not 
employed at 
50 
      
Oldest Child 0.072*** 0.029*** -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Number of Siblings -0.008* -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
Observations 4,280 4,280 4,280 4,280 4,280 4,280 
R-squared 0.119 0.069 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.023 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster 
mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house 
at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence.  
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Table A3. Birth order, number of jobs held and type of first job. By number of siblings 
  
 First job 
white 
collar, at 
most 3 
siblings 
First job was full 
time, 4 siblings or 
more 
First job was 
in public 
sector, at most 
3 siblings 
First job was 
in public 
sector, 4 
siblings or 
more 
  
Oldest child 0.019 0.040** 0.031** 0.049** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.021) 
Number of siblings -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
     
Observations 2,755 1,520 2,755 1,525 
R-squared 0.147 0.159 0.076 0.083 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster 
mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house 
at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence.  
 
 
 
Table A4. Labour turnover and earnings growth 
 
Age 30      Age 40     
 Mean Mean
 
Still in first job  
  
Still in first job  
Log wage at 30 9.273 Log wage at 40 9.395
Log first wage 9.058 Log first wage 9.000
Log second job 9.857 Log second wage 9.776
Log third job 9.944 Log third wage 9.850
Age started first job 20.589 Age started first job 20.462
Age ended first job 51.214 Age ended first job 56.130
Age started second job 39.225 Age started second job 47.666
Age started third job 43.883 Age started third job 50.975
   
Not in first job anymore  Not in first job anymore
Log wage at 30 9.658 Log wage at 35 9.869
Log first wage 8.604 Log first wage 8.698
Log second job 9.232 Log second wage 9.319
Log third job 9.622 Log third wage 9.655
Age started first job 17.865 Age started first job 18.421
Age ended first job 21.471 Age ended first job 23.545
Age started second job 21.977 Age started second job 22.842
Age started third job 27.784 Age started third job 29.023
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Table A5. Birth order effects, excluding single children 
  Entry wage Wage in 
current or 
last job 
Wage in 
current or 
last job – 
entry wage 
        
Oldest Child 0.140*** -0.015 -0.155*** 
 (0.035) (0.021) (0.038) 
Number of Siblings -0.034*** -0.021*** 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) 
    
Observations 3,858 3,858 3,858 
R-squared 0.225 0.205 0.135 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster 
mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house 
at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6. Birth order effects on earnings, by rural and urban areas 
 Entry wage. 
Rural 
Entry 
wage. 
Urban 
Wage in 
current or 
last job. 
Rural 
Wage in 
current or 
last job. 
Urban 
Wage in 
current or last 
job – entry 
wage. Rural 
Current or last 
wage - first 
wage. Urban 
              
Oldest child 0.168*** 0.121*** -0.021 -0.010 -0.189*** -0.130*** 
 (0.051) (0.044) (0.029) (0.027) (0.056) (0.048) 
Number 
siblings 
-0.015 -
0.048*** 
-0.011 -0.031*** 0.004 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) 
       
Observations 1,772 2,508 1,772 2,508 1,772 2,508 
R-squared 0.212 0.264 0.271 0.182 0.130 0.161 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster 
mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house 
at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence.  
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Table A7. Birth order effects on earnings, by parental occupation 
        
 Entry 
wage. 
White 
collar 
breadwinn
er 
Entry 
wage. 
Blue collar 
breadwinn
er 
Wage in 
current or last 
job. White 
collar 
breadwinner 
Wage in 
current or last 
job. Blue collar 
breadwinner 
Wage in 
current or last 
job – entry 
wage. White 
collar 
breadwinner 
Current or last 
wage - first 
wage. Blue 
collar 
breadwinner 
              
Oldest child 0.121** 0.144*** -0.038 0.004 -0.159** -0.140*** 
 (0.058) (0.041) (0.035) (0.024) (0.063) (0.044) 
Number 
siblings 
-0.028 -
0.034*** 
-0.030*** -0.018** -0.002 0.016 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.021) (0.012) 
       
Observations 1,297 2,983 1,297 2,983 1,297 2,983 
R-squared 0.224 0.212 0.190 0.201 0.137 0.139 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster 
mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house 
at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence.  
 
 
Table A8. Birth order effects on earnings, by prevailing religion in the country 
 Entry wage. 
Catholic 
Entry 
wage. 
Protestant 
Wage in 
current or 
last job. 
Catholic 
Wage in 
current or 
last job. 
Protestant 
Wage in 
current or last 
job – entry 
wage. 
Catholic 
Current or last 
wage - first wage. 
Protestant 
              
Oldest child 0.139** 0.134** -0.044 0.014 -0.183*** -0.120* 
 (0.047) (0.060) (0.030) (0.030) (0.052) (0.062) 
Number 
siblings 
-0.020 -
0.050*** 
-0.019*** -0.013 0.001 0.037** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) 
       
Observations 2,320 1,318 2,320 1,318 2,320 1,318 
R-squared 0.215 0.212 0.153 0.085 0.14 0.152 
Notes: All regressions include dummies for: cohort, country, mother in the house at 10, father in the house at 10, foster 
mother in the house at 10, foster father in the house at 10, grandparents in the house at 10, other relatives in the house 
at 10, hunger episodes by age 15, parents smoked, drank or had mental problems, at least one parent died by age 35, 
breadwinner occupation at age 10, lived in rural area at age 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Hungry Today, Happy Tomorrow? 
Childhood Conditions and Self-Reported Wellbeing Later in Life1* 
 
by 
Marco Bertoni 
(University of Padova and CEP, LSE) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We use anchoring vignettes to show that, on data for eleven European countries, exposure to 
episodes of hunger in childhood leads people to adopt lower subjective reference points to evaluate 
satisfaction with life in adulthood. This is consistent with the satisfaction treadmill theory of hedonic 
adaptation, and highlights that failure to consider reporting heterogeneity will result in downward-
biased estimates of the negative effects of starvation in childhood on the levels of wellbeing later in 
life. These findings underline the importance of considering issues of interpersonal comparability 
when studying the determinants of subjective wellbeing. 
 
 
Keywords: subjective wellbeing, childhood conditions, anchoring vignettes. 
JEL Codes: C42, I31, J13. 
                                                        
* 1 I am extremely grateful for supervision from Giorgio Brunello, for advice from Danilo Cavapozzi, and for 
suggestions from Viola Angelini, Luca Corazzini, Marta de Philippis, Andrea Moro, Omar Paccagnella, Enrico Rettore, 
Elisabetta Trevisan and Guglielmo Weber, and participants at seminars in Padua and Venice. All errors are my own. 
This paper uses data from SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th 2010 and SHARE release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 
2011. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th framework 
programme (project QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th framework 
programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006 062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-
CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822). 
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Introduction 
This paper studies the effects of childhood conditions on self-reported wellbeing later in life. There 
is wide evidence in economics showing that events taking place early in life affect personality traits, 
education, late-life health, socio-economic conditions and wellbeing2. Understanding the long reach 
of events happening in critical periods of human development (Cuhna and Heckman, 2007) is thus 
of uttermost importance to identify proximate causes of successful lives (Layard et al., 2013). Our 
study is focused in particular on the experience of hunger episodes in childhood, as a case of 
extreme deprivation, and our outcome of interest is subjective wellbeing. Policy makers and 
economists are devoting an increasing amount of effort to the analysis of self-reported happiness 
and to subjective indicators of life satisfaction, with the aim of considering a definition of welfare 
that goes beyond strictly economic measures3. Yet, as underlined by Clark et al., 2005, the first 
question to be asked when studying what makes a happy person concerns the meaning of “being 
happy”: a crucial issue of interpersonal comparability limits in fact the use of subjective measures to 
inform policy decisions. In psychometrics, this problem is known as differential item functioning 
(Holland and Wainer, 1993), and refers to the fact that people interpret and use the same reporting 
scale differently. 
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we want to assess the effect of early-life starvation on the 
reference points used by individuals to rate life satisfaction. As highlighted by Deaton, 2008, 
evaluation of subjective wellbeing is a relative one. People compare their situation with a subjective 
benchmark, a “shifting standard” that depends on comparison with peers and with one’s past 
experiences. According to the satisfaction treadmill theory of hedonic adaptation (Kahneman, 1999, 
and Frederick, 2007), the experience of extreme deprivation may lead people to develop lower 
aspirations regarding the level of life achievements to consider as satisfying. As a consequence, when 
asked to evaluate a given situation on a discrete and bounded rating scale (e.g. a scale going from 1 
to 5), individuals exposed to hunger episodes will assign it a better judgement than people not 
exposed to hunger, even if that situation represents the same level of happiness for both groups. To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence documenting whether there is an effect of 
childhood condition on individual reporting scales, and this paper contributes to fill this gap.  
                                                        
2 For instance, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004, Akbulut-Yuksel, 2009, and Kesternich et al., 2012, find negative effects 
of exposure to WWII on education, health and labour market outcomes. Meng and Qian, 2009, Lindeboom et al., 2010, 
Havari and Peracchi, 2011, Neelsen and Stratmann, 2011, Pinger et al., 2011, and Kesternich et al., 2013, study the 
effects of exposure to childhood hunger on several outcomes later in life, including longevity, education, health and the 
share of budget devoted to food purchases, while Lindeboom et al., 2006, van den Berg et al., 2010, and Angelini and 
Mierau, 2013, relate exposure to negative macroeconomic conditions at birth to longevity, health and reaction to adverse 
shocks later in life. Finally, both Frijters et al., 2011, and Layard et al., 2013, analyse life-cycle models of subjective 
wellbeing, that link childhood conditions to happiness later in life.  
3 See Layard, 2005, 2006 and 2013, for thorough discussions. The United Nation’s World Happiness Report series, and 
the newly realized OECD Better Life Index are just some policy efforts in this sense.  
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On top of the importance of this question to qualify how hedonic adaptation to negative life events 
works, modelling individual-specific response scales allows us to evaluate the effects of hunger 
episodes on wellbeing levels without worrying about interpersonal comparability of self-reported 
happiness evaluations: if people exposed to hunger adopt lower reference points, estimates that do 
not take reporting style differences into consideration will be biased towards finding positive effects. 
Commonly used methods to deal with scale bias when longitudinal data are available include the use 
of individual fixed effects models, that help dealing with time-invariant reporting heterogeneity. Still, 
results from Angelini et al., 2011, highlight that the scale people use to rate their conditions is a 
time-varying one, and these techniques are not of much help to deal with cross-sectional data. We 
instead rely on a vignettes approach. In an anchoring vignettes questionnaire, respondents first 
evaluate their own situation in a given domain, then they rate a series of descriptions of situations of 
hypothetical persons, the vignettes, using the same rating scale applied for the self-assessment. We 
can use answers to vignette questions as an anchor to properly model individual reporting scales 
and, in turn, to filter subjective evaluations from reporting heterogeneity4. 
We use data on eleven European countries from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe, SHARE, a longitudinal and multidisciplinary survey of the European population aged 50+. 
There are two main advantages of using SHARE for this analysis: the second wave of the survey 
contains a vignette questionnaire on life satisfaction, that can be used to model reporting 
heterogeneity, while the third wave collects retrospective information on people’s life histories, 
including data on specific periods of hunger5 and other childhood experiences, and on family 
background. 
Our main empirical result is that experience of hunger in childhood leads people to shift their 
subjective reference points downwards, i.e., to give a higher rating to the same latent level of 
wellbeing. We also find a long run scarring effect of starvation in childhood on the level of 
happiness later in life, but contrarily to the extant literature we are the first to derive our results from 
a model that takes differences in reporting styles into account. Comparing our estimates with the 
ones from a model that does not allow for individual-specific evaluation scales, we conclude that 
failure to properly treat reporting heterogeneity leads to underestimate the effects of negative 
childhood conditions on late-life wellbeing. 
                                                        
4 This approach was introduced in social sciences by King et al., 2004, in the context of political efficacy. Kapteyn et al., 
2007, and Angelini et al., 2011, are illustrative examples concerning disability conditions, while Bago d’Uva, 2008, Kok et 
al., 2012, and Peracchi and Rossetti, 2012, study self-reported health and depression. In the context of life satisfaction, 
Angelini et al., 2012 and 2013, look at satisfaction with life in general, and Bonsang and Van Soest, 2012a and 2012b, 
look at satisfaction with social contacts, job and income. 
5 These measures have been validated against potential issues of recall bias (see Garrouste and Paccagnella, 2011, and 
Havari and Mazzonna, 2011). However, given the self-reported nature of this information, if more pessimistic people 
report suffering of hunger more easily then the effects of hunger on reporting scales that we are estimating are lower 
bounds to the true ones. 
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Beyond contributing to the economic and psychological literature on hedonic adaptation, showing 
an example of satisfaction treadmill, our findings are also relevant for the economic literature that 
wants to model the determinants of life satisfaction over the life cycle, as we highlight the need to 
consider the effects of childhood conditions on individual-specific reporting scales to draw 
meaningful conclusions on what predict a satisfactory life using subjective data. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 1 presents the data we use and some descriptive statistics. Our 
econometric model is described in Section 2, and Section 3 illustrates our main empirical results. We 
discuss the validity of the vignettes approach for our analysis in Section 4, while Section 5 presents 
some sensitivities and extensions to our main results. Conclusions follow thereafter.  
 
1. The Data 
This paper exploits the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, SHARE, that collects 
detailed longitudinal information on household composition, socio-economic status, health and 
wellbeing of the population aged 50+ of several European countries.  
On the one hand, we draw information on adulthood conditions, on self-reported wellbeing and on 
anchoring vignettes from the COMPARE subsample of the second wave of SHARE, that was 
collected between 2006 and 2007. On the other hand, we rely on the information on childhood 
environment contained in SHARELIFE, the third wave of the survey, that was carried out between 
2008 and 2009. Our final sample is composed of 4,950 individuals who took part in both the 
COMPARE and the SHARELIFE surveys, were born between 1920 and 1956 and were residing in 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain and Sweden at the time of the wave 2 interview6. Unfortunately, about 30% of the initial 
COMPARE sample is lost in SHARELIFE because of panel attrition. To test for endogenous 
attrition7, in Table A1 in the Appendix we compare for each country the mean values of several 
variables8 from wave 2 computed in the full sample and in the selected sample that we consider. The 
mean values of most variables look very similar across the two samples, and we cannot detect any 
selection pattern that is common for all countries. We conclude that endogenous attrition is not an 
issue for the data at hand.  
Data on life satisfaction and anchoring vignettes were collected in SHARE within the COMPARE 
project. After completion of the main interview, in eleven countries a representative subset of 
                                                        
6 We also drop a small minority of individuals with missing values on any of the variables included in our analysis. 
Information on life satisfaction, anchoring vignettes, and hunger episodes is missing for less than 1% of the sample. 
7 Bonsang and Van Soest, 2012a, show that the COMPARE sample is comparable to the full SHARE sample of wave 2.  
8 These include gender, age, log annual household income, being affected by one or more of a list of limitations in the 
Activities of Daily Living (ADL), having an ISCED 4 or higher educational qualification, being in a couple, being 
employed, being retired, the self-assessment and anchoring vignettes evaluation of satisfaction with life. 
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respondents were asked to complete on their own a paper-and-pencil questionnaire containing self-
assessment questions on satisfaction with life and on several other health and disability domains. For 
each domain, brief descriptions of the conditions of hypothetical persons were also included 
(anchoring vignettes), and individuals were asked to rate these as well. Beyond the self-assessment 
question, two vignette questions on life satisfaction were also present (see Angelini et al. 2012 and 
2013), and all life satisfaction ratings had to be provided on the same five-points ordinal scale. The 
exact wording of the three questions is reported in Figure 1, together with the reporting scale that 
respondents were asked to use, while Figure 2 presents the distribution of answer to self-assessment 
and vignette questions on life satisfaction in our sample. There is substantial variation in vignette 
evaluations across individuals in our sample, suggesting that reporting heterogeneity cannot be easily 
ignored, and the global ordering of vignette evaluations suggests that Carrie’s conditions are 
generally evaluated as describing a higher level of life satisfaction than John's. 
Other adulthood variables we consider include demographic information, educational levels 
(primary, secondary or post-secondary qualifications), dummy variables for being in a couple, for 
suffering of one or more of a list of limitations in Activities of Daily Living (ADL) or in 
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL), for being employed and for retirement. We also use 
information on annual household income and on household net wealth9. Descriptive statistics for 
these variables are shown in Table 1. 
We derive information on childhood from the third wave of SHARE, SHARELIFE, that collects 
retrospective data on the entire lives of respondents, including early life conditions and family, 
employment, housing, and health histories. SHARELIFE has the advantage of providing data on life 
histories that are comparable across several European countries, but there is also a potential threat 
of recall bias, that is common in retrospective studies (see Smith, 2009). Nonetheless, validation 
studies carried out by Garrouste and Paccagnella, 2011, and Havari and Mazzonna, 2011, show that 
the state-of-the-art elicitation methods used in SHARELIFE, based on life history calendars, greatly 
reduced the incidence of recall bias. Amongst early life conditions, our main interest lies in the 
experience of hunger episodes in childhood, i.e. from birth until age 15. The SHARLIFE 
questionnaire explicitly asks each individual to recall whether she experienced “a period when you 
suffered from hunger”, and if so to indicate the exact years when the hunger episode started and 
stopped. In previous studies, Havari and Peracchi, 2011, Pinger et al., 2011, Kesternich et al., 2012, 
Halmdienst and Winter-Ebmer, 2013, and Attanasio et al., 2014, validated the reliability of this self-
reported measure against historical events. Figure 3 shows the distribution of people in a hunger 
                                                        
9 Financial variables are measured in PPP terms at German prices of 2006, and divided by household size. As in Angelini 
et al., 2013, we transform financial variables using the arcsinh(.) function, allowing for zeroes and for negative values 
that show up for wealth. 
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episode that started in childhood in our sample, by country and year10. Hunger episodes are most 
commonly reported during World War II years, from 1939 until 1945, but further patterns related to 
historical events can be traced out in the data. For instance, we see that among Spanish people 
hunger episodes start to be reported already from the mid-1930s, in coincidence with the Spanish 
Civil War. We also observe peaks in hunger that correspond to the Greek famine of 1941-1942, the 
Dutch famine of 1944 and the German famine of 1945-1948 (see Pinger et al., 2011, for further 
details)11.  
We also exploit SHARELIFE to derive information on other conditions experienced by 
respondents in their childhood. First, following Mazzonna, 2011, we use principal component 
analysis to extract a single indicator of childhood socio-economic status from a vector of commonly 
used proxies (see Brunello, Weber and Weiss, 2012) that comprises the following variables: the 
number of books at home at age 10, occupation of the main breadwinner in the household at age 
10, the number of rooms per person and the presence of an inside toilet and of running water in the 
accommodation where the individual was living at age 10. Besides hunger episodes, like Bohacek 
and Myck, 2010, and Halmdienst and Winter-Ebmer, 2013, we consider a set of other relevant 
childhood events that might be related to starvation and to wellbeing later in life. These include 
having lived in an orphanage or with foster parents, being relocated during childhood because of 
war, being dispossessed of the family’s house, land, business or of other properties during 
childhood12. Like Kesternich et al., 2012, we also consider an indicator for exposure to war events in 
childhood, that varies by cohort and country13, but we are not able to distinguish between broad 
exposure to war and living in specific combat areas, as they instead do. Finally, we develop 
indicators for living in a rural area at age 1014, for whether the father or the mother were absent 
from the household at age 10, for having “troubled” parents, that smoked, drank or had mental 
health problems, and for having any siblings while in childhood. Descriptive statistics for these 
variables are also reported in Table 1, while Table 2 shows marginal effects of a Probit model that 
                                                        
10 This figure differs quantitatively from the ones reported in other studies mentioned above, as we consider only hunger 
episodes that started before age 15, but the qualitative picture is very similar. 
11 Kesternich et al., 2013, further validate this self-reported measure by looking at post-WWII Germany and showing 
that the regional and temporal variation in self-reported hunger episodes closely mirrors differences in centralised food 
supply rations between German regions during that period of time.  
12 Unlike Bohacek and Myck, 2010, we cannot consider also whether the individual was a victim of prosecution, as in the 
SHARELIFE questionnaire there is no indication on the timing of prosecution and we would not be able to distinguish 
between instances of prosecutions that happened in childhood and later on. 
13 Like Kesternich et al., 2012, we consider as exposed to war in childhood all individuals born until 1945 in all non-
neutral countries (neutral countries were Sweden and Denmark) except for Germany, where war ended in 1948, and 
who were younger than 15 when the war started, i.e. in 1939 in all countries except for Spain, where we the civil war 
started in 1936.  
14 Neelsen and Stratmann, 2011, examine the Greek famine of 1941-42, and show that hunger incidence was more 
severe in urban than rural areas. 
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relates this set of childhood conditions to the occurrence of hunger15. Results from this descriptive 
analysis confirm that most of the childhood conditions considered are significantly linked to 
starvation in infancy, and that hunger is also, but not only, the result of poverty. We are going to 
include these variables as controls in all further analysis. 
 
2. Empirical Methods 
The aim of our empirical analysis is to exploit the availability of anchoring vignette questions to 
estimate the effect of childhood hunger on the subjective scales individuals use to report wellbeing. 
This will allow us to filter subjective evaluations from differential item functioning, and to evaluate 
the effects of hunger on the levels of adulthood wellbeing without issues of reporting heterogeneity. 
To this end, we use the Heterogeneous Thresholds (or Hierarchical) Ordered Probit model, Hopit, 
introduced by King et al., 2004. We first describe the econometric model, then we discuss the 
conditions under which our findings can be given a causal interpretation.  
The vignettes approach to identification in presence of reporting heterogeneity relies on two 
assumptions. The first one, response consistency, posits that individuals use the same response scale 
to evaluate their own condition and the ones described in vignette questions. The second 
assumption, vignette equivalence, states that there are no differences across respondents in the 
perception of the level of life satisfaction described by each vignette (Bago d’Uva et al., 2011), so 
that differences in vignette evaluations only reflect differences in reporting styles. 
As highlighted by Peracchi and Rossetti, 2013, differential item functioning “is essentially a problem 
of identification in ordered response models, where the observed responses are derived from latent 
continuous random variables, discretized through a set of heterogeneous cut-off points”. Under 
vignette equivalence, variation in responses to anchoring questions allows identification of 
individual-specific cut-off points used to report wellbeing on a discrete scale. In turn, response 
consistency allows to use this set of individual-specific thresholds to model the self-assessments free 
from issues of interpersonal comparability. The validity of the two assumptions has been widely 
debated in the literature, with mixed findings. We will come back to this point while discussing our 
empirical findings. 
We model the latent level of life satisfaction assessed by individual i, , as follows:  
      (1) 
                                                        
15 Controls for cohort and country of birth are included as well, and their effects mirror the evidence presented in Figure 
2. 
Yi
*
Yi
*  Xi  i
 i  N(0,1)
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In (1), Xi is a vector of individual observable variables that includes exposure to hunger and the 
other childhood covariates described in the previous section, while i is an error term that is 
independent of Xi and follows a standard normal distribution16. In the data we do not observe , as 
individuals are asked to report their life satisfaction on a five points ordinal scale. The following rule 
is assumed to relate the observed life satisfaction level Yi to : 
  ௜ܻ ൌ ݆ ݂݅ ߦ௜௝ିଵ ൏ ௜ܻכ ൑ ߦ௜௝, ݆ ൌ 1,… ,5  (2) 
To model subjective response scales, the Hopit model allows thresholds ξi to depend on the same 
set of individual covariates included in (2), according to the following specification: 
    (3) 
In (3), the exponential specification is only needed to grant monotonicity of the individual-specific 
thresholds, while as in Kapteyn et al., 2007, we extend the basic Hopit model to allow for an 
individual-specific random effect in the threshold equations, i, that allows for unobserved 
correlation between the evaluations of the three life satisfaction assessments. 
The parameters in  and  1 would not be identified using self-assessments questions alone, while the 
parameters in  j, j = 2, 3, 4 would be identified only via the exponential functional form restriction.  
In the Hopit model identification exploits the fact that each individual is also asked to rate two 
vignette questions on the same measurement scale used for the self-assessment. Under vignette 
equivalence, the latent evaluation of the k-th vignette, , does not systematically vary over 
individuals i, so that 
  
Zki
*  k  ki,
 ki  N 0,2      (5) 
Vignettes are evaluated on the same five points ordinal scale used for self assessment, and the 
observed rating of vignette k, , is linked to  as follows: 
  (6) 
                                                        
16 Location and scale normalization are achieved by setting the constant term to 0 and the variance of the error term i 
to 1. 
Yi
*
Yi
*
i0  ; i5  ;
i1  1Xi i;
ij  ij1  exp  j Xi  ,  j=2, 3, 4
i  N 0,2 
Zki
*
Zki Zki
*
Zki  j  if  ij1  Zki*  ij, j =  1, ... , 5
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Under response consistency, the same thresholds apply to both self-assessment and vignette 
questions. This assumption allows to link the two components of the model: vignette evaluations are 
used to identify the parameters in  and , that fully describe the set of discretizing cut-offs i. Given 
i , the vector  is identified through the self-reports. The full model is estimated via maximum 
likelihood.  
Causal interpretation of the effects of childhood hunger on the levels and on the scale used to report 
life satisfaction in adulthood deserves further discussion, beyond the validity of vignette equivalence 
and response consistency. While episodes of starvation in childhood temporally pre-date wellbeing 
evaluation later in life, so that no issue of reverse causation arises, causal interpretation of our 
findings might be jeopardized by the presence of other confounding factors. As discussed in Section 
1, experience of childhood hunger is at least partly supply-driven, as it is associated to the exogenous 
occurrence of famines and central rationing of food supply. On the other hand, as shown in Table 2, 
hunger is also driven by exposure to World War II and to other childhood events, and the incidence 
of starvation is higher among individuals coming from a low socio-economic background. As a 
consequence, any unconditional relation between hunger and self-reported wellbeing can hardly be 
interpreted as causal. The strategy we exploit to deal with endogeneity is simple selection-on-
observables17: we assume that conditioning on the wealth of childhood covariates described in 
Section 1 mops up the remaining unwanted correlation between any other observable and 
unobservable determinant of both late-life wellbeing and childhood hunger that is not included in 
the model, so that the remaining correlation between hunger and self-reported wellbeing can be 
interpreted in a causal sense. Of course, unless this untestable assumption holds our findings can 
only be interpreted in a descriptive sense, as conditional correlations. 
 
3. Main Empirical Results 
The empirical results described in this section are based on the random effects Hopit model 
presented in Section 2. We also compare these findings with a baseline model that does not allow 
for interpersonal variation in reporting scales, akin to an Ordered Probit model, to assess the 
relevance of reporting heterogeneity. Table 3 shows selected estimation results for exposure to 
hunger, while full outcomes are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. In both tables, results for 
the baseline model are shown in column 1, while column 2 reports parameter estimates for the self-
assessment equation in the Hopit model, and columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 report estimates for the 
                                                        
17 Other papers have exploited the sources of exogenous variation described in Section 1, famines and wars, as 
instruments for childhood hunger (e.g. see Havari and Peracchi, 2011, and Pinger et al., 2011). However, no IV-Hopit 
model - allowing instrumental identification of the effect of hunger on both the levels and the scale used to report 
subjective wellbeing - is available so far. We leave the development of such models for further research, and choose to 
make do with selection-on-observables for this paper.  
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parameters in the equation for threshold 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. A formal likelihood ratio test 
strongly rejects the baseline model vis-à-vis the heterogeneous threshold one (p-value = 0.000), 
implying that the presence of heterogeneity in reporting styles is statistically relevant. 
Our key finding is that exposure to hunger significantly affects the scale used to report life 
satisfaction18. Looking column 6 in Table 3, we see that there is a negative shift in the upper 
discretizing threshold for people who suffered of starvation early in life, i.e., they use the highest 
point on the ordinal scale to rate the same level of satisfaction with life that would receive a lower 
evaluation from people not exposed to hunger19. We interpret this result in the light of the 
satisfaction treadmill theory of hedonic adaptation (see Kahneman, 1999, and Frederick, 2007). This 
theory posits that, since no absolute scale to evaluate wellbeing exists, people carry out subjective 
evaluations with respect to individual-specific reference points, that are assumed to depend on the 
conditions of close peers and on one's past experiences. Therefore, individuals who experienced 
extreme deprivation in childhood may evaluate the same life achievements more positively, as they 
could have developed lower aspirations for what having a satisfactory life means. 
This positive rescaling effect does not mean that people experiencing hunger are more satisfied with 
their lives. Indeed, we find that the opposite is true: childhood hunger is negatively linked to 
happiness levels later in life, and the relation is strongly significant. We estimate a long-run negative 
scarring effect of childhood hunger on satisfaction with life in adulthood, that is consistent with 
other studies on negative childhood conditions and late-life wellbeing (e.g. see Havari and Peracchi, 
2011, and Kesternich et al., 2012, both using data from SHARELIFE), but is derived in a more 
general framework that takes reporting heterogeneity into account. Comparing results from the 
baseline and the Hopit models, we see that failure to consider reporting heterogeneity will result in 
downward biased estimates of the effect of childhood hunger on the levels of life satisfaction, 
highlighting that subjective measures of wellbeing may only partially reflect the effects of life events 
on satisfaction with life in presence of rescaling effects. 
To quantitatively assess the relevance of these rescaling effects, we turn to a counterfactual 
simulation. Results are shown in Figure 4. The upper graph plots the distribution of life satisfaction 
that is predicted by our model. We derive this figure by first computing for each respondent the 
predicted values of latent life satisfaction, , and of her specific cut-off points, , given her 
individual characteristics, and then by plotting the resulting distribution of life satisfaction measured 
on the five points ordinal scale. The middle and lower graphs, instead, show the counterfactual 
                                                        
18 The p-value of a test for joint significance of hunger exposure in the four threshold equations is reported at the 
bottom of Table 4: the null hypothesis is strongly rejected in the data.  
19 Since the hunger indicator we are using is self-reported, this effect is a lower bounds to the true effect on reporting 
scales if more pessimistic people are more prone to report hunger. As a consequence, even our corrections for reporting 
heterogeneity on the levels of subjective wellbeing are lower bounds to the true ones. 
ˆ Y i
* ˆ i
 97
distributions of life satisfaction that we would observe if we assigned to each individual the cut-off 
points she would have used had she, or had she not, experienced childhood hunger, respectively, 
while leaving all her other baseline characteristics and her self-assessment equation unaltered. 
According to our estimates, the share of the sample reporting to be “very satisfied” with life 
increases by a non-negligible 12% using the reporting scales that would hold under exposure to 
hunger with respect to the complementary case, while the exact same share of people would report 
to be “neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied”20. 
Looking at the full set of estimated parameters, reported in Table A2 in the Appendix, it is 
reassuring to see that the same patterns described for hunger hold for socio-economic status in 
childhood as well: kids that start from a disadvantaged background are less satisfied with life later 
on, but tend to rate the same situations more positively. In our view, this finding strengthens our 
interpretation in terms of a satisfaction treadmill21. Furthermore, significant differences on wellbeing 
levels and on reporting styles are found across people from different countries, and the overall 
patterns are comparable to the ones described by Angelini et al., 2013. Finally, the parameter 
associated with John’s vignette is more negative than the one associated with Carrie’s, consistently 
with the global ordering of the two vignettes, while the standard deviation of the individual random 
effects is statistically significant, bringing support to the extended Hopit model vis-à-vis its simple 
formulation22. 
 
4. Discussing the Identifying Assumptions 
Before showing some sensitivities and extensions to our main results, it is worth discussing the 
crucial issue of validity of response consistency and vignette equivalence. Response consistency 
states that individuals adopt the same subjective scale to evaluate satisfaction with their own life and 
the situations described in each vignette. Several tests for this assumption were proposed in the 
literature. Kapteyn et al., 2011, test this hypothesis by conducting a survey experiment that relies on 
longitudinal data on health conditions and self-reported health status. They construct individual-
specific vignettes illustrating the past situation of each respondent, deriving the relevant information 
from her answers to questions posed in previous waves of the panel, and ask her to rate the vignette. 
Comparing current vignette evaluations with past self-assessments, they find mixed support for 
response consistency, depending on the domain of interest. A growing number of studies suggests 
                                                        
20 On the other hand, it is not surprising to see that the top and bottom graph are very similar, as only a small fraction of 
the sample was exposed to childhood hunger. 
21 Other childhood conditions have limited impact on both reporting scales and life satisfaction, once socio-economic 
status and hunger episodes are taken into account. 
22 This finding is also confirmed by a formal likelihood ratio test, that rejects the baseline Hopit model in favour of the 
extended one (p-value = 0.000). 
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instead to validate response consistency using objective measures of the concept of interest. For 
instance, Van Soest et al., 2011, consider self-perceived drinking problems, and show that people’s 
evaluation of their own drinking problems and of vignettes describing a drinking level equal to their 
own one are strongly aligned, supporting response consistency23. Angelini et al., 2013, however, 
highlight that such tests can hardly be implemented when it comes to evaluating satisfaction with life 
in general, as this is a multidimensional concept that cannot be unquestionably measured using a 
single objective indicator. They instead show that, in the SHARE data, people whose situation in 
each of the domains described in a vignette is analogous to the situation depicted in the vignette give 
equal evaluations of satisfaction with their own life and of that of the person described in the 
vignette, bringing strong support to response consistency for the case of satisfaction with life. 
Even when response consistency holds, the validity of the vignettes approach requires a further 
assumption, vignette equivalence. To test vignette equivalence one needs to show that the level of 
life satisfaction of the person described in a vignette is perceived equally by each respondent, 
irrespectively of his or her personal characteristics. Murray et al., 2003, highlight that a minimal 
requirement for vignette equivalence to hold is that individuals systematically order the vignettes in 
the same way24. Kristensen and Johansson, 2008, further suggest that, in a cross-country study, 
vignette equivalence is unlikely to hold if we find that results from models estimated pooling all 
countries and separating groups of countries that share different sets of values and social norms are 
very different from one another25. Instead, finding similar results should be supportive of vignette 
equivalence. When more than one vignette is available, Bago d’Uva et al., 2011, propose to use one 
vignette to anchor the assessment of the other ones, and to test whether personal characteristics 
used to model the thresholds enter significantly in the evaluation of the other available vignettes. 
Under the hypothesis of response consistency, evidence in this sense would suggest violations of 
vignette equivalence. Using data on mobility limitations and cognitive functions, they do not find 
strong support for vignette equivalence. Peracchi and Rossetti, 2013, propose a statistical test for the 
joint validity of the two assumptions that exploits the fact that the Hopit model is over-identified if 
both response consistency and vignette equivalence hold. Using data on several health domains, they 
find mixed support for the validity of the two assumptions, depending on the domain and sample 
considered. Still, both tests are based on the further assumptions of correct model specification and 
no omitted variables, i.e., they may reject the null hypothesis for reasons that differ from failure of 
                                                        
23 A similar test was proposed by Datta Gupta et al., 2010, and Bago d’Uva et al., 2011, studying health, cognitive 
functions and mobility limitations. However, their results do not unambiguously point in favour of response 
consistency. 
24 Still, Bago d’Uva et al., 2011, highlight that interpersonal differences in the levels of vignette evaluations are not 
inconsistent with equal ranking of the vignettes. 
25 While this is especially true for the estimated vignette levels (θ1 and θ2) and for the coefficients associated with the 
country dummies, this conclusion is less likely to hold for the effects of other individual-level covariates, as different 
effects across the split samples may just reflect heterogeneous effects by country. 
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the two identifying conditions. Thus, as no formal test of vignette equivalence is available yet, as in 
Angelini et al., 2013, we produce informal evidence on the validity of vignette equivalence in our 
data. 
Following the ordering test proposed by Murray et al., 2003, in our data we see that only 8% of 
respondents rate vignettes inconsistently with the global ordering26, which is reassuring. This finding 
holds also across groups of countries that share similar values, as identified by the Inglehart-Wezel 
values map (see Kristensen and Johansson, 2008). As in Angelini et al., 2013, we consider three 
groups of countries: ex-communist countries (Czech Republic and Poland), catholic countries 
(Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) and protestant countries (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden)27. We replicate our estimation outcomes dropping individuals who rate vignettes 
inconsistently with the global ordering, and results (not shown) are fully comparable with the 
baseline, suggesting that our findings are not driven by violations of vignette equivalence that would 
result in inconsistent vignette ordering. We also re-estimate our model separately for the three 
groups of countries identified according to the Inglehart-Wezel values map and described above, 
leaving Germany as the baseline country in every group. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that 
estimated vignette levels and country dummies from the pooled and split samples are in line with 
each other in terms of both ordering and magnitude, confirming findings by Angelini et al., 2013, 
and bringing support to vignette equivalence. 
 
5. Sensitivities and Extensions 
This section proposes some sensitivity checks and some extensions to our main empirical results. 
First, it is interesting to understand whether our results on the effects of hunger on self-reported 
wellbeing are mediated by adulthood conditions that depend on hunger episodes and are commonly 
known to determine satisfaction with life. Evidence from SHARE presented by Havari and 
Peracchi, 2011, and Pinger et al., 2011, shows that childhood hunger is related to lower educational 
achievement and worse health and labour market outcomes in adulthood. In turn, using the SHARE 
data Angelini at al., 2013, show that these characteristics are linked with both the levels and the scale 
used to report life satisfaction. We thus introduce a set of adulthood outcomes as mediating 
variables in our model28, and evaluate by how much the effects of childhood hunger change with 
                                                        
26 That is, they rate Carrie’s vignette as representing a lower satisfaction level than John’s (see Figure 2). 
27 Since it is an orthodox country, we drop Greece for this analysis.  
28 The variables we consider are taken from the second wave of SHARE and were described in Section 1. Although 
Angrist and Pischke, 2008, refer to mediators as “bad controls”, a similar strategy is exploited, for instance, by Giuliano 
and Spilimbergo, 2013, to assess the effects of growing up in a recession on beliefs in adulthood, by Frjiters et al., 2011, 
and Layard et al., 2013, in the context of modelling life-cycle dynamics of subjective wellbeing, and by Halmdienst and 
Winter-Ebmer, 2013, to seek for mediators of the effects of early-life shocks on health later in life, using SHARELIFE 
data.  
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respect to our baseline. Results for hunger are reported in Table 4, while complete estimation 
outcomes are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. We see that the effects of hunger on reporting 
scales and wellbeing levels survive even when we include the mediating variables29, suggesting that 
their role is not a central one. 
Next, we consider potential issues of dynamic selection. Looking at the Dutch potato famine of 
1846-1847, Lindeboom et al., 2010, show that nutritional conditions in infancy negatively affect 
mortality age. If more optimistic people survive longer after an episode of hardship, or if survivors 
have characteristics that make them more prone to report life satisfaction using more positive scales, 
sample selection may bias our results towards finding positive reporting effects. To understand 
whether survival is linked to reporting styles and life satisfaction levels, we estimate a Probit 
regression of the probability of deceasing between SHARE wave 2, conducted in 2006, and the 
successive wave, conducted in 2008, on vignette evaluation, self-reported satisfaction with life and a 
set of controls measured at baseline, in 200630. Results in Table 5 do not suggest that reporting styles 
and life satisfaction levels are correlated with death probabilities. Although these results are based on 
surviving in old age, and not on surviving to hunger episodes in childhood, they are still reassuring 
about concerns of dynamic selection on the basis of reporting styles and life satisfaction levels. 
Furthermore, in Table 6 we drop from our sample individuals born before 1930 or before 1935, 
amongst whom dynamic selection should be more serious31, and results are fully comparables with 
our baseline. 
We provide further sensitivities in Table A5 in the Appendix. Panel A excludes from our sample 
people who migrated from country of birth, a result that may be linked to the experience of hunger, 
and results are still in line with the ones presented in Table 3. Finally, in Panel B and Panel C we 
respectively drop people residing in neutral countries during World War II (i.e. Sweden and 
Denmark) and people born after 1949, as episodes of hunger were less common within these 
groups. Again, the patterns detected are comparable with our baseline.  
We next explore potential sources of heterogeneity in the effects of hunger on wellbeing, taking into 
account the effects of hunger on reporting scales32. 
                                                        
29 Reassuringly, the effects of the mediating variables are in line with results presented by Angelini et al., 2013. Results of 
counterfactual simulations from this model, available from the author, are also similar the ones presented in Figure 4. 
30 The sample considered excludes wave 2 respondent for whom no information is available at wave 3 because of unit 
non-response. We checked that unit non-response in wave 3 does not depend on life satisfaction and vignette evaluation 
in separate regressions (not shown). Similar results (not shown) are obtained when we consider survival until wave 4, 
conducted in 2011. In that case, however, we had to remove Greece, that did not take part in the fourth wave of the 
survey. 
31 If recall bias is also stronger for older individuals, results from the subsample of younger individuals should be less 
subject to this issue as well.  
32 Our results are mainly descriptive, and this evidence should be viewed as suggestive. 
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We first ask whether there are gender differences in the effects of childhood hunger on wellbeing. 
Evidence coming mainly from developing countries33 shows that the impacts of negative childhood 
shocks are larger for girls than for boys, and that this is partly explained by differential 
compensation mechanisms carried out by parents, who tend to favour survival of sons vs. 
daughters. Table 7 reports results when we split the sample by gender, and we see that scarring 
effects on wellbeing levels are larger for girls, and smaller and only marginally significant for boys.  
According to Graham and Oswald, 2010, the dynamics of adaptation to life events depend on 
hedonic capital, i.e., the stock of psychological resources available to an individual. In their 
theoretical model, hedonic capital depends on a collection of stock-like variables affecting individual 
wellbeing, like interpersonal relationships, psychological traits, and social status, that help to smooth 
wellbeing when a shock hits. In this context, the presence of siblings may contribute to the 
generation of hedonic capital: sharing the same negative experiences and encouraging each other, 
children with siblings should be able to cope with starvation better than single children. In turn, 
higher income may help to buffer the effect of hunger episodes. We test these two hypothesis by 
splitting the sample between single children and individuals with siblings, and between respondents 
with an index of socio-economic status below and above the median level in the sample. Results 
presented in Table 8 show that scarring effects on wellbeing levels are indeed stronger for only 
children. Finally, Table 9 confirms that people from higher socio-economic background suffer less 
from hunger episodes in childhood, consistently with the idea of a buffering effect of income. 
 
Conclusions 
Current attention in public policy and economics is devoted to developing a deeper understanding 
of the factors promoting happiness throughout life. Using data from eleven European countries, our 
paper looks at the effects of childhood hunger on self-reported wellbeing later in life. Using 
anchoring vignettes, we are able to disentangle the effects of early life starvation on the levels and on 
the subjective scale used to report wellbeing in adulthood.  
We contribute to the literature by showing that people exposed to hunger in childhood have lower 
subjective reference points against which they evaluate life satisfaction, as predicted by the 
satisfaction treadmill theory of hedonic adaptation. This is a new finding, that sheds light on the 
determinants of endogenous benchmarks used to evaluate subjective wellbeing, on which little is 
known so far. Consequently, using Hopit models we are able to provide the first evidence of 
negative long-run scarring effects of childhood hunger on the levels of wellbeing that is free from 
issues of interpersonal comparability, and we show that failure to consider reporting heterogeneity 
                                                        
33 For instance, see Maccini and Yang, 2009, for a review. 
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will result in estimates that are biased downwards. Hence, our results raise awareness on the 
importance of considering differences in reporting styles when studying the long reach of childhood 
conditions onto late-life wellbeing.  
We are aware that the validity of the conclusions from this paper strongly depends on the 
identifying assumptions behind the empirical analysis. Research that provides more robust evidence 
on the validity of the vignettes approach will help to validate our findings, as well as research 
developing methods to exploit instrumental variables techniques within the vignettes framework. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Self-assessment and anchoring vignette questions for life satisfaction. 
 
Notes: Monetary values were PPP-adjusted across countries. Source: SHARE wave 2 questionnaire. 
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Figure 2. Self-assessment and vignette evaluations for life satisfaction 
 
Source: SHARE. 
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Figure 3. Childhood hunger episodes, by country and year. 
 
Notes: only people in a hunger episode started before age 15 are considered. Source: SHARE 
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Figure 4. Model predictions and counterfactual simulations. 
 
Notes: the upper bar reports the distribution of life satisfaction predicted by the Hopit model. The middle (lower) bar 
reports the counterfactual distributions of life satisfaction that would hold if all respondents were given the reporting 
scale they would have experienced had they (had they not) been exposed to hunger episodes in childhood, leaving 
anything else unchanged. Source: SHARE 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Self-assessed life satisfaction 3.915 0.766 1 5
John's vignette 2.655 0.819 1 5
Carrie's vignette 3.500 0.846 1 5
     
Female 0.545 0.498 0 1
Born before 1930 0.099 0.299 0 1
Born 1930-1934 0.105 0.307 0 1
Born 1935-1939 0.141 0.348 0 1
Born 1940-1944 0.211 0.408 0 1
Born 1945-1949 0.182 0.386 0 1
Born after 1949 0.262 0.440 0 1
BE 0.123 0.329 0 1
CZ 0.109 0.312 0 1
DE 0.134 0.341 0 1
DK 0.135 0.342 0 1
ES 0.069 0.254 0 1
FR 0.050 0.218 0 1
GR 0.075 0.264 0 1
IT 0.103 0.305 0 1
NL 0.067 0.250 0 1
PL 0.081 0.272 0 1
SE 0.053 0.225 0 1
Hunger 0.057 0.231 0 1
Childhood SES 0.000 1.000 -2.022 5.889
Dispossession 0.027 0.163 0 1
Lived in orphanage 0.014 0.116 0 1
Lived with foster parents 0.011 0.104 0 1
Relocation for war 0.034 0.181 0 1
War exposure 0.452 0.498 0 1
Rural area 0.437 0.496 0 1
Troubled parents 0.666 0.472 0 1
Mother absent 0.033 0.178 0 1
Father absent 0.093 0.290 0 1
Siblings 0.831 0.375 0 1
     
In a couple 0.780 0.414 0 1
Primary education 0.269 0.443 0 1
Secondary education 0.490 0.500 0 1
Higher education 0.241 0.428 0 1
With ADL limitations 0.082 0.275 0 1
With IADL limitations 0.129 0.336 0 1
Retired 0.510 0.500 0 1
Employed 0.288 0.453 0 1
Wealth 6.335 3.153 -14.195 15.694
Income 5.616 2.345 0.775 13.273
Notes: the table reports descriptive statistics for outcome variables, childhood conditions and adulthood conditions in 
the upper, middle and lower panel, respectively. 
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Table 2. Childhood hunger and other childhood conditions. 
Female  -0.00253  Rural area -0.0146***
 (0.00301)   (0.00359) 
Childhood SES -0.00740***  Dispossession  0.115*** 
 (0.00211)   (0.0311) 
Troubled Parents  0.0112***  Lived in orphanage 0.0730** 
 (0.00314)   (0.0365) 
Mother Absent  -0.00357  Lived with foster parents -0.0109 
 (0.00706)   (0.00746) 
Father Absent  0.0396***  Relocation for war  0.0397** 
 (0.0118)   (0.0155) 
Siblings  0.000124  War exposure  0.0252*** 
 (0.00424)   (0.00908) 
  
 
  
Country Dummies Yes    
Cohort Dummies  Yes    
Observations 4,950      
Notes: the table reports marginal effects from a probit regression. Dependent variable: suffering of hunger in childhood. 
One, two and three stars for statistical significance of the underlying coefficient at ten, five and one percent levels of 
confidence. 
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Table 3. Hunger effects on self-reported wellbeing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit  Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4
       
Hunger -0.281*** -0.353*** 0.0545 0.0400 -0.0948 -0.195***
 (0.0781) (0.0929) (0.109) (0.0716) (0.0591) (0.0553)
       
Observations 4,950      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.001           
Notes: the table reports coefficients related with hunger from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Other 
childhood covariates included are described in Section 1. Full estimation outcomes are reported in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. The p-value reported in the bottom line refers to a test for joint significance of the hunger coefficients in the 
four cut-off equations. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent levels of 
confidence. 
 
Table 4. Hunger effects on self-reported wellbeing - with mediators. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit  Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4
       
Hunger -0.278*** -0.369*** 0.0347 0.0480 -0.0899 -0.206***
 (0.0795) (0.0960) (0.116) (0.0719) (0.0592) (0.0550)
       
Observations 4,950      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.000           
Notes: the table reports coefficients related with hunger from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Other 
childhood covariates included are described in Section 1. The model includes also the set of adulthood mediators 
described in Section 1. Full estimation outcomes are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. The p-value reported in the 
bottom line refers to a test for joint significance of the hunger coefficients in the four cut-off equations. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent levels of confidence. 
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Table 5. Dynamic selection across SHARE waves, vignette evaluation and life satisfaction 
  (1) (2) 
      
John's vignette 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Carrie's vignette -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Life satisfaction  0.001 
  (0.002) 
   
Wave 2 covariates Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 5,459 5,459 
Notes: the table reports marginal effects from Probit regressions. Dependent variable: deceased in SHARE wave 3. The 
regression controls for country and cohort fixed effects, gender, education, marital status, employment status, income, 
wealth and health, all measured at wave 2. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent 
levels of confidence.  
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Table 6. Hunger effects on self-reported wellbeing - excluding older cohorts. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit  Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4
       
1930-1956 cohorts       
Hunger -0.272*** -0.356*** 0.126 0.0180 -0.123* -0.194***
 (0.0851) (0.102) (0.118) (0.0773) (0.0654) (0.0594)
Observations 4,460      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.001      
       
1935-1956 cohorts       
Hunger -0.309*** -0.416*** 0.103 0.0307 -0.144* -0.188***
 -0.103 (0.123) (0.144) (0.0935) (0.0805) (0.0709)
Observations 3,939      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.015           
Notes: the table reports coefficients related with hunger from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Other 
childhood covariates included are described in Section 1. Full estimation outcomes are available from the author. The p-
value reported in the bottom line of each panel refers to a test for joint significance of the hunger coefficients in the four 
cut-off equations. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent levels of confidence. 
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Table 7. Heterogeneous hunger effects on self-reported wellbeing across genders.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit  Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4
       
Males       
Hunger -0.199* -0.228* 0.0954 0.0999 -0.102 -0.252***
 (0.112) (0.136) (0.152) (0.0957) (0.0854) (0.0818)
Observations 2,252      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.003      
       
Females       
Hunger -0.388*** -0.512*** 0.00362 -0.00933 -0.0841 -0.165**
 (0.110) (0.130) (0.164) (0.109) (0.0828) (0.0774)
Observations 2,698      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.092           
Notes: the table reports coefficients related with hunger from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Estimation 
is carried out separately for males and females. Other childhood covariates included are described in Section 1. Full 
estimation outcomes are available from the author. The p-value reported in the bottom line of each panel refers to a test 
for joint significance of the hunger coefficients in the four cut-off equations. One, two and three stars for statistical 
significance at ten, five and one percent levels of confidence. 
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Table 8. Heterogeneous hunger effects on self-reported wellbeing for individuals with siblings and 
single children.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit  Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4
       
With siblings       
Hunger -0.229*** -0.297*** 0.0830 0.0416 -0.0986 -0.223***
 (0.0864) (0.103) (0.117) (0.0766) (0.0655) (0.0617)
Observations 4,115      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.001      
       
No siblings       
Hunger -0.473** -0.573** 0.142 -0.126 -0.0513 -0.0209
 (0.187) (0.223) (0.271) (0.166) (0.137) (0.131)
Observations 835      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.876           
Notes: the table reports coefficients related with hunger from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Estimation 
is carried out separately for individuals with siblings and single children. Other childhood covariates included are 
described in Section 1. Full estimation outcomes are available from the author. The p-value reported in the bottom line 
of each panel refers to a test for joint significance of the hunger coefficients in the four cut-off equations. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent levels of confidence. 
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Table 9. Heterogeneous hunger effects on self-reported wellbeing for individuals coming from high 
and low socio-economic status in childhood. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4
       
High SES       
Hunger -0.0684 -0.0315 0.0466 0.139 0.0399 -0.255**
 (0.144) (0.186) (0.202) (0.121) (0.104) (0.102)
Observations 2,473      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.013      
       
Low SES       
Hunger -0.346*** -0.454*** 0.126 -0.0574 -0.149** -0.138**
 (0.0939) (0.111) (0.131) (0.0858) (0.0721) (0.0678)
Observations 2,477      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.016      
Notes: the table reports coefficients related with hunger from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Estimation 
is carried out separately for individuals above and below the median level of socio-economic status. Other childhood 
covariates included are described in Section 1. Full estimation outcomes are available from the author. The p-value 
reported in the bottom line of each panel refers to a test for joint significance of the hunger coefficients in the four cut-
off equations. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent levels of confidence. 
 118
Appendix 
Table A1. Attrition between the full COMPARE sample (wave 2) and the subsample of survivors in 
SHARELIFE (wave 3). 
Country Sample N. obs 
Attrition 
rate (%) 
% 
female Age 
Log 
(income) 
% higher 
education
% with 
ADL 
limitation
% in a 
couple
% 
employed
% 
retired
Self-
assessed 
life satisf. 
John’s 
vignette 
Carrie’s 
vignette
Germany Wave2 1,103 38.1 52.7 64.86 10.07 29.9 6.6 80.3 27.3 54.0 3.9 2.9 3.4 
 Wave3 683  52.0 64.55 10.13 33.4 5.7 81.0 27.8 52.7 4.0 2.8 3.4 
Sweden Wave2 440 40.2 54.1 65.54 10.24 33.4 8.2 78.4 37.3 58.4 4.2 2.4 3.4 
 Wave3 263  52.5 65.13 10.31 33.5 6.1 79.1 38.8 57.4 4.3 2.3 3.4 
Netherlands Wave2 482 33.0 51.7 61.63 10.36 27.8 3.3 84.9 40.7 33.8 4.1 2.7 3.3 
 Wave3 323  52.3 62.22 10.34 28.2 2.8 83.6 36.2 36.8 4.1 2.7 3.3 
Spain Wave2 478 28.9 52.9 64.18 9.41 13.4 8.8 81.4 26.2 34.3 3.8 2.5 3.4 
 Wave3 340  55.3 64.35 9.35 12.4 8.2 80.9 25.3 33.2 3.8 2.4 3.5 
Italy Wave2 666 24.2 53.6 64.98 9.74 9.2 8.4 83.6 18.2 53.6 3.6 2.4 3.3 
 Wave3 505  53.3 64.84 9.70 8.3 8.9 85.7 17.6 56.4 3.6 2.4 3.3 
France Wave2 356 29.8 55.1 64.28 10.26 25.3 9.8 70.8 27.5 56.7 3.8 2.4 3.2 
 Wave3 250  54.8 64.04 10.34 26.8 8.4 69.2 30.8 56.8 3.8 2.4 3.2 
Denmark Wave2 926 27.5 54.3 64.35 10.20 39.5 5.9 81.9 43.2 47.8 4.3 3.0 3.8 
 Wave3 671  54.7 64.13 10.25 41.7 5.2 82.0 45.0 47.1 4.4 3.0 3.8 
Greece Wave2 498 25.3 52.2 64.63 9.51 21.1 5.8 71.3 33.3 39.8 3.6 2.7 3.3 
 Wave3 372  54.8 64.53 9.45 19.4 4.6 69.1 31.7 39.8 3.6 2.7 3.3 
Belgium Wave2 812 22.5 53.6 65.51 10.01 23.4 10.3 75.0 21.1 51.6 3.9 2.5 3.6 
 Wave3 629  54.1 65.87 10.03 22.4 11.3 75.2 19.7 52.3 4.0 2.5 3.7 
Czechia Wave2 850 37.4 58.5 64.31 9.48 11.2 7.5 70.1 27.2 67.3 3.7 2.8 3.7 
 Wave3 532  58.6 64.15 9.51 12.8 6.6 70.5 26.1 68.4 3.7 2.8 3.6 
Poland Wave2 527 27.5 56.4 62.93 9.06 17.6 26.2 75.9 18.8 55.4 3.7 2.6 3.5 
 Wave3 382  57.3 61.50 9.06 19.9 23.8 76.7 21.7 51.8 3.7 2.7 3.6 
               
Total Wave2 7,138 30.7 54.2 64.40 9.86 23.5 8.8 77.8 29.0 51.3 3.9 2.7 3.5 
 Wave3 4,950  54.5 64.25 9.87 24.1 8.2 78.0 28.8 51.0 3.9 2.7 3.5 
Notes: the table reports attrition rate and mean values of several variables measured at baseline (wave 2), for the full 
wave 2 COMPARE sample and for the selected wave 3 sample we consider in our analysis, for each country and for the 
pooled sample.  
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Table A2. Childhood conditions and self-reported wellbeing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 3 Cut 4 
Hunger -0.281*** -0.353*** 0.0545 0.0400 -0.0948 -0.195*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0929) (0.109) (0.0716) (0.0591) (0.0553) 
Childhood SES 0.104*** 0.163*** 0.0310 -0.00607 0.00787 0.0317** 
 (0.0201) (0.0253) (0.0334) (0.0212) (0.0153) (0.0129) 
Dispossession 0.0178 0.0368 -0.0917 -0.0296 0.0910 0.0810 
 (0.109) (0.135) (0.182) (0.118) (0.0767) (0.0698) 
Lived in orphanage 0.0606 -0.0527 -0.384 0.130 0.0749 -0.0720 
 (0.152) (0.189) (0.313) (0.168) (0.111) (0.0971) 
Lived with foster parents -0.0409 0.0397 0.104 0.0316 -0.131 0.0713 
 (0.174) (0.227) (0.296) (0.162) (0.142) (0.111) 
Relocation for war  0.000518 0.164 0.172 0.0730 -0.131* 0.101 
 (0.101) (0.132) (0.142) (0.0914) (0.0794) (0.0658) 
War exposure -0.0278 -0.0357 0.208* -0.112* -0.0191 -0.0164 
 (0.0636) (0.0789) (0.113) (0.0674) (0.0474) (0.0406) 
Rural  -0.0646* -0.0116 -0.0986* 0.117*** -0.0349 0.0143 
 (0.0367) (0.0453) (0.0599) (0.0371) (0.0274) (0.0236) 
Troubled parents -0.0569 -0.0995** -0.0479 0.00474 0.0181 -0.0352 
 (0.0378) (0.0469) (0.0589) (0.0372) (0.0282) (0.0249) 
Mother absent 0.0802 0.0865 -0.165 0.150 -0.0920 0.0109 
 (0.104) (0.127) (0.169) (0.0945) (0.0809) (0.0678) 
Father absent -0.0383 -0.0459 0.00322 -0.0462 0.111** -0.0678 
 (0.0649) (0.0799) (0.107) (0.0664) (0.0464) (0.0424) 
Siblings 0.150*** 0.149** -0.143* 0.0280 0.0489 0.0415 
 (0.0479) (0.0586) (0.0747) (0.0465) (0.0355) (0.0309) 
Female -0.0862** -0.147*** 0.0653 -0.0510 -0.0133 -0.0530** 
 (0.0343) (0.0426) (0.0547) (0.0340) (0.0256) (0.0221) 
Born before 1930 -0.206*** -0.104 0.207* -0.0701 0.0656 -0.0740 
 (0.0719) (0.0881) (0.122) (0.0747) (0.0531) (0.0479) 
Born 1930-1934 -0.0919 0.0961 0.206 -0.0747 0.0965* 0.0307 
 (0.0766) (0.0956) (0.130) (0.0790) (0.0570) (0.0497) 
Born 1935-1939 0.113 0.261*** 0.280** -0.112 0.0414 0.0138 
 (0.0720) (0.0911) (0.124) (0.0766) (0.0545) (0.0463) 
Born 1945-1949 0.0396 0.0955 -0.0840 0.0687 0.0246 0.00338 
 (0.0673) (0.0845) (0.123) (0.0720) (0.0514) (0.0425) 
Born after 1949 -0.172*** -0.205*** 0.0784 -0.0761 0.00965 -0.00847 
 (0.0519) (0.0636) (0.0892) (0.0541) (0.0388) (0.0323) 
SE 0.598*** 0.635*** 0.546*** 0.0243 -0.113 -0.311*** 
 (0.102) (0.135) (0.174) (0.0997) (0.0763) (0.0692) 
NL 0.291*** 0.555*** 0.652*** -0.312*** 0.0147 0.0413 
 (0.0838) (0.120) (0.140) (0.0940) (0.0604) (0.0536) 
ES -0.179** -0.213** 0.760*** -0.0893 -0.467*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0827) (0.103) (0.137) (0.0838) (0.0689) (0.0530) 
IT -0.479*** -0.321*** 0.886*** -0.221*** -0.200*** -0.0286 
 (0.0728) (0.0914) (0.125) (0.0771) (0.0543) (0.0496) 
FR -0.197** 0.151 0.639*** -0.0350 0.0101 -0.0745 
 (0.0898) (0.117) (0.148) (0.0882) (0.0637) (0.0644) 
DK 0.572*** 0.132 -0.324* 0.0188 -0.0893 -0.161*** 
 (0.0808) (0.103) (0.193) (0.108) (0.0609) (0.0490) 
GR -0.479*** -0.529*** 0.773*** -0.264*** -0.0104 -0.608*** 
 (0.0797) (0.0971) (0.137) (0.0879) (0.0558) (0.0603) 
BE 0.0536 -0.218** 0.442*** -0.0860 -0.284*** -0.286*** 
 (0.0689) (0.0870) (0.129) (0.0783) (0.0544) (0.0440) 
CZ -0.455*** -0.631*** 0.0269 -0.0796 0.0464 -0.131*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0894) (0.149) (0.0899) (0.0502) (0.0450) 
PL -0.366*** -0.487*** 0.614*** -0.229*** -0.204*** -0.167*** 
 (0.0787) (0.0964) (0.139) (0.0864) (0.0595) (0.0506) 
Constant   -4.184*** 0.587*** 0.212*** 0.786*** 
   (0.191) (0.0945) (0.0649) (0.0547) 
Baseline model - Cut-offs   -4.181*** 0.590*** 0.204*** 0.784*** 
   (0.189) (0.0934) (0.0642) (0.0542) 
θ1 -1.988*** -2.070***     
 (0.0897) (0.109)     
θ2 -0.793*** -0.884***     
 (0.0855) (0.106)     
σv 0.0194 0.013     
 (0.0195) (0.0198)     
ση 0.454*** 0.406***     
 (0.0183) (0.0182)     
Observations 4,950           
Notes: the table reports coefficients from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Childhood covariates included 
are described in Section 1. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent levels of 
confidence.
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Table A3. Estimated country dummies and vignette levels in the pooled sample and separating by 
group of countries identified in accordance with the Inglehart-Wezel values map. 
  (1) (4) (3) (2) 
  
Full sample 
 
Protestant 
countries 
Catholic
countries
Ex-communist
countries 
     
DK 0.101 0.170   
 (0.104) (0.129)   
NL 0.539*** 0.557***   
 (0.120) (0.125)   
SE 0.607*** 0.681***   
 (0.136) (0.156)   
BE -0.224***  -0.213**  
 (0.0866)  (0.0883)  
ES -0.211**  -0.193*  
 (0.102)  (0.105)  
FR 0.150  0.133  
 (0.117)  (0.117)  
IT -0.317***  -0.306***  
 (0.0910)  (0.0937)  
CZ -0.632***   -0.655*** 
 (0.0891)   (0.0945) 
PL -0.487***   -0.477*** 
 (0.0961)   (0.104) 
     
θ1 -2.078*** -1.758*** -1.966*** -1.909*** 
 (0.112) (0.179) (0.145) (0.169) 
θ2 -0.862*** -0.669*** -0.793*** -0.794*** 
 (0.109) (0.175) (0.141) (0.164) 
     
Observations 4,577 1,928 2,375 1,602 
Notes: the table reports the coefficient on country dummies and on the rating levels of each vignette question from an 
extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Estimation is carried out on the full set of countries and on three separate 
groups defined in accordance with the Inglehart-Wezel values map. Since it is an orthodox country, Greece is excluded 
from this analysis. Protestant countries are Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Catholic countries include 
Belgium, Italy, France and Spain. Czech Republic and Poland are included amongst ex-communist countries. All samples 
include Germany as baseline country. Full estimation outcomes are available from the author. Other childhood 
covariates included are described in Section 1. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one 
percent levels of confidence. 
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Table A4. Childhood conditions, adulthood mediators and self-reported wellbeing.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline Hopit Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4 
              
Hunger -0.278*** -0.369*** 0.0347 0.0480 -0.0899 -0.206*** 
 (0.0795) (0.0960) (0.116) (0.0719) (0.0592) (0.0550) 
Childhood SES 0.0694*** 0.118*** 0.0293 -0.0103 0.0123 0.0172 
 (0.0215) (0.0274) (0.0366) (0.0216) (0.0160) (0.0134) 
Dispossession 0.0211 0.0558 -0.0824 -0.0404 0.0942 0.0941 
 (0.110) (0.140) (0.194) (0.118) (0.0767) (0.0694) 
Lived in orphanage 0.0982 -0.0250 -0.476 0.160 0.0925 -0.0869 
 (0.155) (0.195) (0.342) (0.170) (0.110) (0.0961) 
Lived with foster parents -0.0478 0.0465 0.0954 0.0368 -0.130 0.0724 
 (0.177) (0.236) (0.315) (0.162) (0.143) (0.110) 
Relocation for war  -0.0562 0.0859 0.168 0.0800 -0.134* 0.0680 
 (0.103) (0.136) (0.151) (0.0910) (0.0792) (0.0654) 
War exposure -0.0477 -0.0610 0.213* -0.113* -0.0126 -0.0175 
 (0.0648) (0.0817) (0.117) (0.0661) (0.0472) (0.0403) 
Rural  -0.0579 0.00436 -0.0980 0.114*** -0.0322 0.0186 
 (0.0376) (0.0472) (0.0644) (0.0376) (0.0275) (0.0236) 
Troubled parents -0.0387 -0.0746 -0.0621 0.00799 0.0196 -0.0251 
 (0.0385) (0.0485) (0.0625) (0.0371) (0.0282) (0.0247) 
Mother absent 0.105 0.124 -0.169 0.155 -0.105 0.0336 
 (0.105) (0.132) (0.182) (0.0956) (0.0810) (0.0675) 
Father absent -0.0476 -0.0648 -0.00153 -0.0409 0.107** -0.0774* 
 (0.0661) (0.0824) (0.114) (0.0665) (0.0463) (0.0421) 
Siblings 0.150*** 0.144** -0.156** 0.0302 0.0473 0.0406 
 (0.0488) (0.0607) (0.0792) (0.0465) (0.0354) (0.0308) 
Female 0.0928** 0.0719 0.0437 -0.0360 -0.00580 -0.00411 
 (0.0372) (0.0469) (0.0630) (0.0368) (0.0273) (0.0232) 
In a couple 0.533*** 0.575*** 0.171 -0.0746 -0.0402 0.0808* 
 (0.0644) (0.0775) (0.108) (0.0630) (0.0451) (0.0423) 
Primary education -0.144** -0.251*** -0.0621 -0.0132 0.0370 -0.116*** 
 (0.0599) (0.0756) (0.0983) (0.0571) (0.0445) (0.0381) 
Secondary education -0.123*** -0.152** -0.0251 -0.0356 0.0638* -0.0152 
 (0.0463) (0.0606) (0.0813) (0.0468) (0.0348) (0.0284) 
With ADL limitations -0.584*** -0.462*** 0.228** -0.0625 -0.0352 0.0807 
 (0.0704) (0.0832) (0.107) (0.0671) (0.0509) (0.0505) 
With IADL limitations -0.443*** -0.480*** 0.0448 0.00315 -0.0461 -0.108*** 
 (0.0581) (0.0691) (0.0924) (0.0563) (0.0415) (0.0397) 
Retired 0.226*** 0.257*** 0.0183 -0.0109 0.00720 0.0589* 
 (0.0535) (0.0657) (0.0858) (0.0524) (0.0394) (0.0348) 
Employed 0.354*** 0.428*** -0.102 0.0743 0.0135 0.0662* 
 (0.0579) (0.0718) (0.105) (0.0619) (0.0428) (0.0366) 
Wealth 0.0192** 0.0237** 0.000842 -0.00265 0.00444 0.00893* 
 (0.00823) (0.00966) (0.0126) (0.00675) (0.00581) (0.00522) 
Income 0.0208 0.0186 0.0244 -0.00902 -0.0126 -0.000435 
 (0.0143) (0.0171) (0.0225) (0.0127) (0.0101) (0.00927) 
Constant   -3.668*** 0.765*** 0.285*** 0.641*** 
   (0.313) (0.155) (0.109) (0.0983) 
Baseline model - Cut-offs    -2.980*** -1.364*** -0.126 1.794*** 
   (0.160) (0.152) (0.150) (0.153) 
θ1 -1.226*** -1.214***     
 (0.152) (0.186)     
θ2 0.0427 0.0438     
 (0.151) (0.185)     
σv 0.0817*** 0.0460**     
 (0.0198) (0.0203)     
ση 0.475*** 0.422***     
 (0.0194) (0.0192)     
Observations 4,950 4,950         
Notes: the table reports coefficients from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Childhood covariates and 
adulthood mediators included are described in Section 1. Country and cohort effects are included as well. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at ten, five and one percent levels of confidence. 
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Table A5. Hunger effects on self-reported wellbeing - sensitivities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Baseline Hopit  Cut-off 1 Cut-off 2 Cut-off 3 Cut-off 4
A. Excluding migrants       
Hunger -0.312*** -0.394*** 0.0590 0.0279 -0.0892 -0.208***
 (0.0799) (0.0946) (0.111) (0.0736) (0.0604) (0.0568)
Observations 4,873      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.001      
       
B. War countries only       
Hunger -0.295*** -0.351*** 0.0403 0.0562 -0.0989* -0.181***
 (0.0787) (0.0944) (0.111) (0.0725) (0.0598) (0.0559)
Observations 4,017      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.003      
       
C. 1920-1949 cohorts       
Hunger -0.258*** -0.315*** 0.0452 0.0647 -0.105* -0.193***
 (0.0798) (0.0960) (0.113) (0.0736) (0.0606) (0.0570)
Observations 3,652      
Cut-offs (P-value) 0.001           
Notes: each panel reports coefficients related with hunger from an extended Hopit model for life satisfaction. Panel A 
excludes people who migrated from country of birth. Panel B excludes people from Sweden and Denmark. Panel C 
excludes individuals born after 1949. Other childhood covariates included are described in Section 1. Full estimation 
outcomes are available from the author. The p-value reported in the bottom line of each panel refers to a test for joint 
significance of the hunger coefficients in the four cut-off equations. One, two and three stars for statistical significance 
at ten, five and one percent levels of confidence. 
